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This study examines U.S. national identity in the first third of the twentieth 
century.  During this period, heated discussions ensued throughout the country regarding 
the extent to which the door of American society should be open to people of Mexican 
descent.  Several major events brought this issue to the foreground:  the proposed 
statehood of Arizona and New Mexico in the early twentieth century, the increase in 
Mexican immigration after World War I, and the repatriation of Mexican immigrants in 
the 1930s.  The “Swinging Door” explores the competing perspectives regarding the 
inclusion or exclusion of people of Mexican descent embedded within each of these 
disputes. 
This dissertation argues that four strategies evolved for dealing with newcomers 
of Mexican descent:  assimilation, pluralism, exclusion, and marginalization.  Two 
strategies, assimilation and pluralism, permitted people of Mexican descent to belong to 
the nation so long as they either conformed to an Anglo American identity or proclaimed 
a Spanish American one rooted in a European heritage, whiteness, and a certain class 
standing.  Exclusion denied entry into the U.S., or in the case of those already there, no 
role in society.  Marginalization, which became the predominant strategy by the 1930s, 
allowed people of Mexican descent to remain physically within the country so long as 
they stayed only temporarily or agreed to accept a subordinate status as second-class 
Americans.  The prevailing view changed depending on the economic and political power 
of people of Mexican descent, their desire to incorporate as Americans, and the demand 
for their labor or land by other Americans.   
One of the most significant findings of this project is that as the marginalization 
strategy gained adherents, the image of Mexican immigrants as temporary workers or 
“guestworkers” became the primary way in which Americans, Mexicans, and the 
immigrants themselves regarded the newcomers from Mexico.  Despite the fact that this 
image was often false, the notion of Mexicans as only temporarily in the U.S. proved too 
seductive for the many divergent voices to resist as this image theoretically allowed 
Mexicans to enter the country and to provide their labor without threatening extant 
notions of American identity. 
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Note on Terminology 
 
The United States has appropriated the word “American” for its citizens.  While 
many North, South, and Central Americans object to this imperialistic decision—and I 
understand why—I continue to use American because it is commonly used in the United 
States and other terms seem too cumbersome or equally problematic, such as North 
Americans.  I use Anglo Americans or simply Anglos to refer to persons considered to be 
“white” Americans—regardless of their actual ethnicity—during the time period studied.  
While it is becoming more common to use Euro American, I avoid this term to eliminate 
confusion since a part of my argument involves people of Mexican descent claiming a 
Spanish or European identity.  I analyze the views of Anglo Americans since they held 
the vast majority of the political and economic power in the nation during the first third 
of the twentieth century.  I also analyze the views of people of Mexican descent—mostly 
those of middle-class standing.  I use “people of Mexican descent” to signify people who 
have this ethnicity, regardless of their citizenship status.  Sometimes I make further 
distinctions such as “immigrant” or “Mexican American” when the need to differentiate 
is particularly relevant.  I use the terms “Mexican” or “Mexican national” to refer to 
someone from Mexico.  This could include Mexicans still residing in Mexico or Mexican 
immigrants in the U.S., depending on the context.  I use the term “nativos” to refer to 
people of Mexican descent in the territories during the era of the statehood debates since 
that was the language typically used for them, regardless of citizenship status.  I also use 
the term “American,” without quotes, when I mean Americans more generally, Mexican 








Today, Americans continue to struggle with definitions of what it means to be an 
American and the consequences of these decisions as they debate levels of border 
enforcement, the extent to which civil rights and benefits should apply to immigrants, and 
whether or not there should be any amnesty policy, guestworker program, or border 
crossing assistance.  Americans in the early twentieth century grappled with an earlier 
generation of these same questions surrounding national identity:  who was an American, 
who could become one, and who could enjoy the full rights of citizenship.  
Historians also have considered these questions and long studied how it was that 
second-class status or the denial of citizenship continued to exist in a nation that 
professes a commitment to equality.  They now recognize that Americans wove racism 
and inequality into the initial fabric of the nation, and even within its revered founding 
documents.  As a result, topics still being explored include the persistence of these 
traditions and the extent to which being American meant the barring of others based on 
race or ethnicity.  Historians interested in these problems of national belonging, however, 
often neglect the significance of class as a central factor in excluding others.  They also 
concentrate primarily on people of European, African, and Asian descent, and overlook 
how people of Mexican heritage fit within and participated in the debates about their 
status as Americans.    
During the first third of the twentieth century, heated discussions ensued 
regarding whether the door of American society should be open to people of Mexican 
descent and how these decisions would affect U.S. national identity.  Particularly in that 
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era of expanding empire and voluminous immigration, questions about who would be 
included or excluded as Americans, and the extent to which their presence would affect 
national unity, had great import.  While most Americans at the time agreed that a 
homogeneous population was necessary for unity, they differed in their understanding of 
just how Americans needed to be homogeneous, specifically if they needed to share the 
same race, class, or culture.  
Four major events brought the issue of who could be an American to the 
foreground:  the proposed statehood of the Arizona and New Mexico territories in the 
early twentieth century, the establishment of a temporary worker policy during World 
War I, the surge in Mexican immigration in the 1920s, and the push to repatriate many of 
these same immigrants in the 1930s.  This dissertation, “The Swinging Door,” explores 
the competing strategies (and the inclusionary and exclusionary elements embedded 
within each) for how Americans dealt with these newcomers of Mexican descent.  
Understanding the history of how these strategies developed and the arguments behind 
them helps to explicate not only why and under what circumstances people of Mexican 
descent would become American, but also what being American meant.  The central 
question, then, is what do we learn about how Americans define themselves when we 
examine the debates concerning the inclusion or exclusion of people of Mexican descent? 
“The Swinging Door” argues that in the course of these disputes about national 
identity, Americans initially relied upon the existing strategies of exclusion and 
assimilation when dealing with newcomers of Mexican descent.  Later, they forged new 
strategies grounded in notions of marginalization and pluralism when the former ones 
proved to be unsatisfactory.  A strategy’s predominance at any given time depended upon 
4
the socioeconomic clout of those espousing it, the class background and perceived race of 
the new arrivals, the newcomers’ interest in becoming full members of the United States, 
and the labor needs of the capitalists.   
Exclusionists, who included Anglo American nativists and their political allies, 
envisioned an America in which only people of northern and western European heritage 
(who they presumed would have a middle-class status) would continue to be admitted 
into the nation.  Assimilationists, including various types of reformers and their political 
supporters, had a broader vision for their ideal America, and viewed anyone with a pure 
European heritage as capable of entering the country and becoming American, providing 
that they agreed to forego their native language and customs in favor of the dominant 
Anglo American mores.  Regardless of the newcomers’ class status, these Americans 
believed that the new arrivals had the capacity to improve their economic position in 
society.  Much like the assimilationists, pluralists, who primarily lived in the Southwest 
and claimed an European heritage, imagined an America populated by people with a pure 
European lineage.  They disagreed, however, that these descendants, particularly those 
from Spain, should have to renounce their native language and culture.  Instead, they 
believed that those who held a Spanish heritage were every bit as American, and perhaps 
more so, than those with English ancestors.  Marginalizationists, including agribusiness 
leaders, other major employers, and their political cohorts, dreamed of an America in 
which Anglo Americans would continue to be in charge of the nation, but in which 
people of various backgrounds, including those not deemed to be European or white, 
would be allowed to enter the nation to work in the lowest class jobs in society.  These 
newcomers, then, would either enter only temporarily or remain permanently in jobs with 
5
no social or economic mobility.  By the mid-1930s, this image of America was the one 
that prevailed.  
A key conclusion of the “The Swinging Door” is that when Anglo and Mexican 
Americans debated the issues of statehood and immigration in the early twentieth 
century, they were actually discussing who could and could not be American.  
Previously, these topics have been considered matters of importance only to those 
studying the southwestern United States or Chicano/a history and were isolated from the 
narrative of most American histories.  Yet the debates over whether to extend the 
boundaries of the nation to include the people within the territories of Arizona and New 
Mexico, and whether or not to admit new immigrants from Mexico on a permanent basis, 
said as much about how Americans perceived themselves as it did about the newcomers’ 
possibilities for being American.  That is, in the process of deliberating over whether 
people of Mexican descent could enter the nation via statehood, through special 
exemptions, or as temporary workers, Americans defined themselves.  When they agreed 
during the statehood debates to admit people of Mexican descent because of their 
European heritage and middle-class status, Americans implicitly emphasized that those 
were the characteristics with which they identified as well. When, during the 1920s, they 
classified Mexican immigrants as outside the bounds of American society due to their 
mixed race, low class status, and transient habits, they were drawing an unspoken 
contrast to their own self perception as middle-class European descendants settled in 
permanent communities.   
Another significance of this dissertation is in unraveling how Mexican immigrants 
came to be defined as temporary workers.  During the course of the struggles over the 
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four nation-defining events, Mexican and Anglo Americans, the U.S. and Mexican 
governments, and Mexican immigrants all helped to establish and promote an image of 
Mexicans as temporary workers who (regardless of whether they had any such 
contractual stipulation or entered with legal sanction or not) would return to Mexico 
eventually.  This image of Mexicans as “birds of passage” was part of a marginalization 
strategy that balanced the demands of capitalists who desired an ongoing stream of 
workers and open borders against those who favored more restrictive policies that would 
preserve the nation’s homogeneity from the threat posed by the new arrivals. 
Finally, this dissertation also demonstrates how class status, along with race, was 
a central criterion in determining who could be American.  The class standing and 
socioeconomic clout of people of Mexican descent mattered greatly in decisions about 
whether or not they would be accepted into the nation.  Exclusionists and 
marginalizationists weighed the newcomers’ racial and class background and, deciding 
that they were of mixed heritage and low economic standing, used these as the rationale 
for excluding or limiting their participation.  Pluralists and assimilationists also 
considered the newcomers’ race and class status, but came to different conclusions.  They 
viewed the newcomers as having an European or white racial background and as either 
holding or capable of attaining a respectable class position in society.  Consequently, they 
argued that people of Mexican descent should be admitted into the nation with all the 
rights of citizenship.  
General Historiography  
The work of John Higham, a leading historian of U.S. national identity and one of 
the first scholars to consider questions about the making of Americans, has been 
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influential for this dissertation.  Higham argued that in the years following World War I, 
some Americans, frustrated by the unsuccessful liberal agenda of the war years and the 
resumption of high immigration levels, sought to re-establish a unified citizenry rooted in 
racial and cultural homogeneity.  These Americans believed that both the 
Americanization campaigns and existing immigration laws had failed them, since they 
had permitted the ongoing admission of nonassimilable immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe, places then suspected of harboring and breeding dangerous radicals.1
Consequently, the U.S. Congress approved various restriction bills to slow the tide of 
immigrants surging into the country, culminating in 1924 with the severely restrictive 
National Origins Act.  Interpreting this act as the highpoint of American nativism, 
Higham contends that the restrictionists failed to pass additional legislation after this date 
due to the improving economy and Americans’ weariness of any crusade reminiscent of 
the Progressive Era.2 Yet, because Higham omits Mexicans from his analysis, he fails to 
notice how nativism continued into the 1930s via the campaigns for Mexican repatriation.  
More recently, the historian Gary Gerstle and political scientist Rogers Smith 
examine the racial aspects of U.S. national identity; yet they, too, neglect how people of 
Mexican descent contributed to ideas about American identity and the notion that 
Americans were members of a white race.  Gerstle argues that in making Americans an 
ongoing conflict existed between exclusionary racial nationalism and a more open and 
inclusive civic nationalism, one that would accept people of various ethnicities.  He finds 
 
1John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York:  
Atheneum, 1965).  Aristide Zolberg contests this and argues instead that this quest for homogeneity has 
been embedded in the nation since its inception, and even earlier among the colonists.  See Aristide R. 
Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2006).  
2Higham, Strangers in the Land.
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that racial nationalism took hold in the post-World War I period, much as Higham 
concludes, and then interprets the 1930s as a period of expanding civic nationalism.  By 
leaving out people of Mexican descent from his analysis, he overlooks how Mexican 
immigrants failed to enjoy civic nationalism.  Instead, many were deported or pressured 
to return to Mexico.3
Rogers Smith adds another twist to how Americans were made, noting an 
“ascriptive” or inegalitarian tradition that existed alongside America’s liberal and 
republican ideologies.  Adherents to this tradition ascribed a status to people based on 
their race, religion, and sex (with white, Anglo-Saxon males at the top of this scale) and 
supported citizenship laws reflecting these hierarchies.4 Such an ideology provided a 
rationale for various forms of second-class citizenry, or the denial of citizenship 
altogether, in a nation with a professed commitment to individual and equal rights.  These 
ideologies intertwined in a variety of ways, sometimes rendering a more positive and 
open Americanism, at other times limiting the definition.  Just as the republican goals of 
a shared community could morph into the need for a racially homogeneous society, 
thereby narrowing the definition of Americanism, the opposite result also could occur 
such as in the case of the 1897 Rodriguez decision.  The judge in this federal case 
reluctantly designated the Mexican immigrant, Rodriguez, as “white” for naturalization 
purposes, relying on the precedent established under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo (ending the Mexican American War).  Pursuant to the terms of this official 
document, the United States granted full citizenship to all Mexicans in the newly 
 
3Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 162-63, 185, and chaps. 3 and 4 more generally.   
4Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997), 2-3. 
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acquired territory.  In applying its terms to Rodriguez, the judge expanded the definition 
of “American” to include Mexicans.  In doing so, he allowed the liberal tradition to 
prevail over an ascriptive one.5 Yet Smith explores this interesting development no 
further—as his primary objective is to prove the existence of the ascriptive tradition—
leaving unanswered questions about how this ruling affected future conceptions of 
Mexicans’ American qualities.    
Historian Lawrence Fuchs also deals with the question of what it meant to be an 
American and does include Mexicans in his analysis.  He believes that Mexicans could 
find a place within American society through “sojourner pluralism,” which he sees as less 
restrictive than those who faced “caste pluralism,” or a second-class American status.  
Fuchs argues that while Mexicans initially experienced a more limited incorporation in 
the Southwest, they did not have the same difficulties when they moved outside it.  Yet 
his interpretation neglects to consider how the words “sojourner,” “transient,” and 
“temporary” reflected a lack of permanent belonging in the nation, and how the use of 
these words would shape the Mexican immigrant experience in the U.S.  This leads Fuchs 
to neglect the repatriation campaigns of the 1930s, many of which occurred outside the 
Southwest.6
None of these historians of national identity spend much time considering the 
class status of the new arrivals as a key criterion, along with race, for being American.  
Often the two are so entwined that it is difficult to discern them separately, yet this 
dissertation argues that the newcomers’ inclusion or exclusion had much to do with their 
class standing as well as the perception of their race—or that one would determine the 
 
5Smith, Civic Ideals, 370-72.  
6Lawrence H. Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and the Civic Culture 
(Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 111, 121. 
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other.  The participants in the struggles over statehood and immigration often spoke in 
terms of excluding newcomers due to their racial origins.  Yet, underlying this language 
of race were intimations of concern about the newcomers’ class status as well. 7 
Recently historians have begun to grapple with the place of Mexicans in the 
American nation, particularly in how they have defined themselves—as Mexicans, 
Mexican Americans, or Spanish Americans—and the constraints hindering or aiding 
these processes.  But mostly these studies have concentrated on specific locales, primarily 
in New Mexico and California, and do not consider how people of Mexican descent 
contributed to and changed overall definitions of what being American meant at the 
national level.  An example of this is George Sánchez’s well-regarded study, Becoming 
Mexican American, which focuses on how people of Mexican descent understood 
themselves in Los Angeles during the first decades of the twentieth century.  More 
recently, Gabriella Arredondo applies Sanchez’s model to Chicago in the 1920s and 
1930s and looks there at how people of Mexican descent defined themselves in relation to 
black and white Americans.  Historian John Nieto-Phillips skillfully describes the 
creation of a Spanish American identity in New Mexico in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  These works also do not address how the debates over the four 
 
7When I refer here to the significance of class status, I am arguing that it is a key component in 
determining who could or could not become American as Americans would consider this economic 
standing when making decisions about whether or not to accept new arrivals into the nation.  My intention 
is not to present the views of working-class people of Mexican descent—as Russell A. Kazal does for 
Germans in Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity (Princeton (NJ): Princeton 
University Press, 2004)—as there are few extant sources for this. I do include their views when I have 
them, and indirectly as filtered through the interviews of middle-class reformers and their own actions such 
as returning to Mexico and retaining Mexican citizenship.  In this way they affected the strategies forged by 
their middle-class counterparts and Anglo Americans. 
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nation-defining events discussed in this study have affected and changed understandings 
of what it meant to be an American.8
Theoretical Influences 
Other historians, while not specifically addressing either questions of U.S. 
national identity or the meaning of the debates over statehood, temporary workers, 
immigration restriction, or repatriation, have been influential in shaping how the state, 
class, and race are used in this dissertation.  Ian Haney López and Linda Gordon explain 
how the state racialized people of Mexican descent and how such racialization affected 
their citizenship and American status.  Haney López finds that the U.S. courts used a 
variety of methods to explain what being white meant in cases where plaintiffs claimed 
this racial status for naturalization purposes.  Increasingly the courts relied on “common 
knowledge” as the decisive factor in determining race since science failed to confirm 
what they believed they could see with their own eyes.9 The establishment of a new 
census category in 1930, which set Mexicans apart from whites, further indicated the 
fragile and shifting racial categorization and American standing of people of Mexican 
descent. 
 
8See Gabriela F. Arredondo, “ ‘What! The Mexicans, Americans?’ Race and Ethnicity, Mexicans 
in Chicago, 1916-1939”(PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1999); John M. Nieto-Phillips, The Language of 
Blood: The Making of Spanish-American Identity in New Mexico,1880s-1930s (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico, 2004); George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in 
Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).  For more on why people of 
Mexican descent relied on a Spanish American identity, see Charles Montgomery, “Becoming ‘Spanish-
American’: Race and Rhetoric in New Mexico Politics, 1880-1928,” Journal of American Ethnic History 
(Summer 2001): 59-84. For a later period, see also Vicki L. Ruíz, Cannery Women, Cannery Lives: 
Mexican Women, Unionization, and the California Food-Processing Industry, 1930-1950 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1987). 
9In this spirit, the courts ruled in the early twentieth centuries that Chinese and Indian immigrants 
were not “white” and as such not qualified for naturalization and citizenship. Although the judge in the 
1897 Rodriguez case ruled that Mr. Rodriguez was white for naturalization purposes, this decision was not 
applied to other situations, leaving Mexicans’ racial status in doubt.  In fact, Haney López refers to a 1933 
court case that addressed this same issue, suggesting that the question of Mexicans’ racial background and 
American standing remained unanswered 36 years after the court’s decision.  See Ian Haney López, White 
By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 61 and chap. 2. 
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Linda Gordon also emphasizes the importance of the state in defining racial 
categories and effectively demonstrates how class affected racial status.  Gordon finds 
that Mexicans in mid-to-late nineteenth century Arizona occupied an intermediate 
position in the racial hierarchy.  Anglo Americans (whom Gordon refers to as Euro-
Americans) sometimes perceived people of Mexican descent as members of the white 
race, and socialized and intermarried with them.  Mexicans who married Euro-Americans 
improved their economic status and often gained an opportunity to move up the racial 
scale to become white.  This system worked so long as the Chinese immigrant population 
continued to accept the lowliest jobs.  But once the federal government implemented the 
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the Chinese population declined, thereby diminishing the 
“whiteness” and social standing of Mexicans as there was no longer any group beneath 
them.  As more Mexicans arrived to take the jobs of the Chinese, and a greater number of 
Euro-Americans migrated to the area, interaction between Euro-Americans and Mexicans 
declined.  By the first years of the twentieth century, people of Mexican descent had 
replaced people of Chinese descent on the bottom rung of society, and become foreign.10 
Historians A. Yvette Huginnie, Tomás Almaguer, and Alberto Camarillo all 
provide useful ways for thinking about how class factored into the formation of racial 
categories.  Huginnie argues that while race was one of the primary ways in which late 
nineteenth century Arizona society organized itself, class status helped to establish those 
racial categories.  She demonstrates this by showing how Euro-Americans wrote about 
the squalid living conditions and low wages of people of Mexican descent and then used 
these facts to justify why these people were not fit to raise white children.  In Euro-
 
10Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (Cambridge: Harvard University  
Press, 1999). 
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American eyes, a person of Mexican descent was someone who was lower class and had 
a low standard of living.  These same Euro-Americans believed that white people should 
not have to endure such a lifestyle.  This definition of Mexican helped to define white 
Americans as the antithesis of Mexican; if Mexicans were lower-class, so the thinking 
went, whites were middle- or upper-class.11 
Almaguer and Camarillo examine race relations during the same period in 
California and shed further light on how class contributed to racialization.  Although 
Almaguer argues that white supremacy and race were the primary explanations for how 
the society arranged itself, he discovers situations in which class status determined a 
person’s place in the racial hierarchy.  When the Anglo Americans expanded into the 
West, believing strongly in their own superiority and desirous of forging a white state and 
nation, they quickly wrested political and economic control from some groups in the 
West but could not do so from californios—people of Mexican descent who were native 
to California and of a higher class status than others indigenous to the area.  The 
californios not only held land titles but also retained control of local politics as a result of 
treaties that rendered them citizens with the right of suffrage.  The Anglo Americans did 
not fully accept the californios, and spoke of them as being indolent and extravagant, yet 
they could not discount their power.  They ended up acknowledging their partial 
European heritage and intermarrying with them.  This tenuous acceptance of the 
californios, however, did not extend to the lower-class people of Mexican descent; the 
Anglo Americans contested the latter’s claim to being white and instead identified them 
 
11A. Yvette Huginnie, “ ‘Mexican Labour’ in a ‘White Man’s Town’: Racialism, Imperialism, and 
Industrialization in the Making of Arizona, 1840-1905,” in Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labour 
and Difference in Britain, the USA and Africa, ed. Peter Alexander and Rick Halpern (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 2000). 
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as Indians without any rights of citizenship.  According to Almaguer, Anglo Americans 
began to perceive the lower-class newcomers who arrived in large numbers as “darker” 
than their predecessors, and therefore unable to make any legitimate claims to a European 
heritage, whiteness, and citizenship.12 
Historian Albert Camarillo shows how the californios with high status claimed to 
be white to improve their chances for becoming American.  Camarillo convincingly 
demonstrates that once these elites had lost their political and economic power to the 
upstart Anglo Americans, they began emphasizing their similarities to them.  In desperate 
attempts to cling to the remnants of their diminishing clout and status, these californios 
distanced themselves from Mexican laborers and touted their Spanish heritage to prove to 
themselves and to Anglo Americans their legitimate status as Europeans, as white people, 
as Americans, and hence their right to all the benefits associated with such a standing.13 
Drawing on the works of Almaguer and Camarillo, Neil Foley uses whiteness 
theory to demonstrate how people of Mexican descent fit into the “ethnoracial 
borderlands between whiteness and blackness” in East Texas.14 There, landowners 
replaced white tenants with sharecroppers of Mexican descent in the 1910s and 1920s.  
Rather than arguing against this practice in narrow economic terms, displaced white 
tenants appealed to a wider audience, claiming that such decisions jeopardized the future 
of the “white civilization” in the nation.  Middle-class people of Mexican descent also 
viewed the situation in racial terms.  They feared that an influx of Mexican immigrants 
 
12Tomás Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in  
California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 72 and chap. 2 generally. 
13Although Camarillo wrote before historians developed overt theories about racialization and 
whiteness, he recognized the significance of the californios’ emphasis of their Spanish heritage. See Albert 
Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society: From Mexican Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara 
and Southern California, 1848-1930 (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1979).  
14Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 211.  
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would overwhelm them, causing Anglos to see all Mexicans as workers at the bottom of 
the economic ladder and, as such, closer to “blackness” than “whiteness.”  Aware of the 
perils of blackness, as well as the benefits that whiteness conferred, middle-class people 
of Mexican descent encouraged one another to identify with the white race, to learn 
English, and to avoid associating with blacks.15 
All of these works improve historians’ understanding of where and how people of 
Mexican descent fit within the nation.  Gordon and Haney-López reveal the state’s power 
in defining the status of people of Mexican descent; Huginnie and Almaguer show how 
class standing affected their chances for being American; and Camarillo and Foley 
demonstrate how Mexicans made use of existing racial categories to improve or maintain 
their class rank.    This dissertation will make use of the ideas these authors raise—about 
the role of the state in making racial categories, about how class contributed to such 
categorization, and about how and why people claimed ‘whiteness’ and with what 
success—and apply them to the national debates concerning statehood, temporary worker 
policies, immigration restriction, and repatriation in the early twentieth century. 
Statehood Historiography 
While some historians have researched each of the nation-defining events 
examined within this dissertation, none of the topics has been studied very extensively 
nor has there been any monograph looking at all these events together, assessing how the 
debates surrounding them affected U.S. national identity.  Policies on the admission or 
expulsion of people through immigration, restriction, or repatriation all clearly concern 
decisions about who can be American.  Likewise, the granting of statehood also involves 
enlarging the national community in terms of population (and ethnicities) as well as land.  
 
15Foley, The White Scourge, chap. 2 and conclusion.  
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This dissertation demonstrates how questions of who can be American are as central to 
the matter of statehood as they are to disputes over immigration.  In fact, some of the 
definitions or strategies for who could be American grew out of the statehood debates and 
later affected the struggles over immigration. 
Although a rich literature on Arizona and New Mexican statehood exists, little of 
it addresses the residents’ suitability for statehood.16 One study which does consider this 
is Richard Melzer’s investigation of editorial cartoons about New Mexico in the national 
press.  Melzer finds that during the late territorial era, the newspapers depicted the 
residents there as “unruly Mexicans.”17 Following statehood, Melzer discovers that the 
sketches changed, reflecting a new understanding of the state and its residents as “a 
young, attractive, and coveted Anglo woman.”18 Melzer’s work provides interesting 
insight into Americans’ views of themselves and of people of Mexican descent, but 
leaves unanswered questions regarding how people of Mexican descent reacted to or 
contested such depictions.  
Temporary Worker Historiography 
The establishment of a temporary worker policy during World War I—or actually 
exemptions from existing immigration laws—helped to define the nation in terms of who 
 
16According to Robert Larson, New Mexico’s first 50 plus years of territorial status were mired 
in territorial divisions over the merits of statehood.  By the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
residents largely agreed on becoming a state. While Larson concludes that nativism, particularly with 
regard to the Mexican population, was the primary reason for the failure of statehood, he spends more time 
narrating the events leading to statehood rather than analyzing how nativism hindered the movement. See 
Robert W. Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood,1846-1912 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1968).  In the case of Arizona, Mark Pry argues that many factors contributed to the delay in 
statehood, including Americans’ reservations about the “alien” character of the territorial residents. Even 
so, Pry writes mostly of the political debates in the U.S. Congress and the territories without looking at 
Spanish-language sources or considering the role of people of Mexican descent in the debates. See Mark E. 
Pry, “Arizona and the Politics of Statehood, 1889-1912” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 1995). 
17Richard Melzer, “New Mexico in Caricature: Images of the Territory on the Eve of Statehood,”  
New Mexico Historical Review 62, no. 4 (1987): 335-60.  See p. 340 for quotation.  Although not studying 
Arizona, Melzer also finds that cartoonists typically illustrated Arizonans as Indians. 
18Melzer, “New Mexico in Caricature,” 358. 
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could be allowed in permanently as potential members, and who could not.  Of course, 
temporary workers or contract laborers existed long before the First World War.  Chinese 
immigrants came in the mid-nineteenth century on various kinds of agreements, which 
often stipulated their return.  Frequently, they did go back to China, especially since few 
Chinese women could emigrate after the 1870s due to Americans’ fears that they would 
bear children who would be American via jus soli or birthright citizenship.  By 1882, 
however, Chinese immigrants were dramatically restricted from entering the U.S. via any 
type of contract.19 Italian and Greek immigrants, although not admitted for only a fixed 
period, often emigrated as indentured workers to padrones or labor contractors in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Frequently, they returned home voluntarily at 
the end of their term, rendering their emigration temporary.  But when the U.S. imposed 
strict restrictions in 1921 upon these and other European immigrants, it effectively ended 
any tradition of their temporary immigration to the U.S.  In fact, until recently, most 
historians did not know that a large percentage of these Europeans returned home after 
venturing to America.20 
Some Mexicans immigrants entered into various short-term contracts with 
employers as early as the first decade of the twentieth century.  But this was not very 
common and was primarily coordinated by the Mexican and U.S. governments for the 
purpose of railroad work.  During World War I, however, agriculturalists demanded relief 
from recently established restriction laws (a literacy test plus a tax on entry) against all 
 
19Zolberg, A Nation by Design, 188-92.  
20See Donna R. Gabaccia, “Is Everywhere Nowhere?: Nomads, Nations and the Immigrant 
Paradigm of United States History,” Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 1115-34; Cindy 
Hahamovitch, “Creating Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World in Historical Perspective,” Labor 
History 44, no. 1 (2003): 69-94; Cindy Hahamovitch, The Fruits of their Labor: Atlantic Coast 
Farmworkers and the Making of Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997); Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrants Workers in the North 
American West, 1880-1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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immigrants and requested exemptions from them, especially for Mexican and Canadian 
workers who easily could be returned.  The initial restrictions and exemptions were all 
decisions defining who could enter the country and potentially become American.  Yet 
few historians even mention this first temporary worker or bracero program.  Those who 
do, such as Manuel García y Griego and Mark Reisler, do so primarily from the 
standpoint of describing the policy and how it affected immigrants, rather than in 
discussing how it impinged upon meanings of being American.21 Only in the last few 
years have historians really begun to explore the second bracero program during and 
after the Second World War.22 None of these historians address how this earlier program 
helped to fuel an image of Mexicans as only temporarily in the nation, never to become 
American citizens. 
Immigration Restriction Historiography 
Immigration restriction laws also defined the nation.  That is, in deciding who 
could enter the country and become a naturalized citizen and who could not, Americans 
shaped their nation and themselves.  Until recently, few historians have examined the 
immigration restriction debates pertaining to Mexicans.23 Robert Divine explains the 
demise of Mexican restriction in his 1957 study of U.S. immigration policy and argues 
 
21See Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 
1900-1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976) and Manuel García y Griego, “The Importation of 
Mexican Contract Laborers to the United States, 1942-1964: Antecedents, Operation, and Legacy” in Peter 
G. Brown and Henry Shue, ed. The Border That Joins: Mexican Migrants and U.S. Responsibility (Totowa, 
NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983).  
22See Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (New 
York: Routledge, 1992) and Barbara A. Driscoll, The Tracks North: The Railroad Bracero Program of 
World War II (Austin: University of Texas, 1999) for examples of the second bracero program. 
23Robert Lipshultz did provide a detailed analysis of the debates in the 1960s and argued that 
Mexican restriction failed because Americans chose to concentrate first on expelling or decreasing 
European and Asian immigrants.  After achieving success with the National Origins Act in 1924, the 
restrictionists influence waned in the face of employers’ organized opposition. See Robert J. Lipshultz, 
“American Attitudes Toward Mexican Immigration, 1924-1952” (master’s thesis, University of Chicago, 
1962). 
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that restriction was unsuccessful due to Americans’ concerns about angering Mexico and 
other countries of the western hemisphere.24 
Within the last twenty-five years, other historians have expanded on Divine’s 
work.  Foremost among these scholars is David Gutiérrez.  Gutiérrez concentrates on 
dissension among people of Mexican descent and explains that the story of restriction 
was never a simple one of Anglos versus Mexicans.  He finds that some Mexican 
Americans (whether naturalized or native-born) actively promoted their status as 
Americans and supported the restriction (and later repatriation) of new immigrants.  
Having attained or been born into citizenship, they feared that the influx of new 
immigrants would threaten their own claims to an American status.  Other Mexican 
Americans, however, embraced their Mexican heritage and defended the civil rights of 
the new immigrants.25 
In just the past few years, historians of immigration restriction have gone in new 
and interesting directions, exploring the racialization of Mexicans and their construction 
as aliens.  Mae Ngai explains how these processes developed in the 1920s and affected 
Mexican Americans and immigrants alike.  As European immigration subsided and 
Mexican immigrants became more visible and associated with migrant and unskilled 
labor, Mexicans came to be seen as alien in ways that they had not been before.  Various 
 
24Robert Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1957).  See also Lawrence A. Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1897-1931 Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1980) for an account of both Mexico’s and the United States’ perspective on 
immigration restriction. Cardoso concurs with Divine but expands on his work, showing that the U.S. 
wanted to keep Mexico stable and thought that by keeping the ‘safety valve’ of immigration open, it would 
reduce the likelihood of more revolutions in Mexico.  He also adds that missionaries argued against 
immigration restriction since they thought that Americanization would improve the immigrants.  Even if 
they returned home (as they suspected they would) the immigrants would take a favorable impression of 
the U.S. back to Mexico, helping to build and maintain good relations between the U.S. and Mexico. 
25David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and  
the Politics of Ethnicity in the American Southwest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
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policies and laws contributed to this development:  increased enforcement of existing 
laws that rarely had been applied to Mexicans before (e.g., the exclusion of those “likely 
to become a public charge” and collection of a head tax); demeaning inspection 
procedures; the creation of the Border Patrol; and deportation of illegal immigrants.  
These policies contributed to the construction of Mexicans as not white, foreign, and thus 
unassimilable, making them seem different from the dominant Anglo population and 
stripping them of membership in the nation.  (Housing and labor segregation further 
compounded this problem and emphasized Mexicans’ difference.)   The newly enforced 
policies reduced Mexican immigration by 76% from 1925 to 1930, offsetting the failure 
of the restriction bills. 26 
These works on immigration restriction all point to a clear pattern of increased 
racialization and alien-ness of Mexicans in the 1920s, and a hardening of border controls 
and related restrictions.  They also provide us with a variety of reasons for why official 
 
26Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America, 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2004). Ngai’s assertion that Americans did not view Mexicans as 
alien before the 1920s may be true on a grand scale, but there was certainly some concern about the 
Mexicans’ “American” characteristics prior to this period as evidenced by the statehood debates. See also 
another recent work by Alexandra Stern who looks at restrictionism in a new way, taking issue with 
Higham’s contention that crusades against immigrants declined in the 1920s.  Stern argues that the 
eugenics movement extended its influence in the 1920s and 1930s, especially with regard to Mexicans in 
the West.  Eugenicists believed that the environment had no impact or effect on an individual and thus did 
not believe in assimilationist theories.  They saw Mexicans as dirty, degraded and less intelligent than 
Anglos, with no ability to become American.  Other Americans shared the eugenicists’ ideas, interpreting 
the Mexicans’ lack of cleanliness as inherent and as a reason to de-louse and inspect them more thoroughly 
than most other immigrants.  Concurring with Ngai’s work, Stern uses this evidence as proof of the 
racialization process that affected Mexicans after World War I.  See Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic 
Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005).  See also the work of two recent scholars who have examined new aspects of the Mexican 
immigration restriction debates. Clare Sheridan argues that these involve competing ideas of citizenship 
and that concerns about the immigrants’ peon or class status increased fears that they would damage the 
American standard of living and undermine democracy. Kathleen Mapes, who limits her study to the 
Midwest, argues that neither the capitalists nor restrictionists were very interested in assimilating the 
newcomers. Instead the debate was over the immigrants’ labor.  See Clare Sheridan, “Contested 
Citizenship: National Identity and the Mexican Immigration Debates of the 1920s,” Journal of American 
Ethnic History 21, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 3-35 and Kathleen Mapes, “ ‘A Special Class of Labor’: Mexican 
(Im)Migrants, Immigration Debate, and Industrial Agriculture in the Rural Midwest,” Labor: Studies in 
Working-Class History of the Americas 1, no. 2 (2004): 65-88. 
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Mexican restriction failed to take hold—fear of Mexico’s retribution, other effective 
forms of restriction, the waning of movements, and the strength of the employers’ 
lobby—yet they do not include many of the voices of people of Mexican descent or an 
analysis of the role of the Mexican government.  Nor do most discuss the significance of 
the growing discussions of Mexicans as outside of (i.e., never to be considered for 
citizenship in) the American polity.  This promotion of Mexicans as only temporarily in 
the U.S. would shape the meaning of an American.  Americans, then, would not identify 
themselves as people who would do the lowliest of jobs for poor wages.  Increasingly, 
they believed that only Mexicans should do such work.   
Repatriation Historiography 
The repatriation of over 500,000 Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans in 
the 1930s was another nation-defining project in which Anglos (and some Mexican 
Americans) demonstrated their understanding of their national community as one which 
did not include Mexican immigrants.  It differs from the other such events in that the 
federal government did not play the predominant role.  Instead, local governments 
initiated and organized most of the repatriation activity, although they had some support 
from the U.S. and Mexican governments as well.  Such campaigns occurred nationwide 
with drives taking place all over the Southwest as well as in the Midwest, Seattle, New 
Orleans, and New York.    
Although the repatriation campaigns of the 1930s were the largest ever in the 
U.S., it was not the first time such pressure had been directed against Mexicans; similar 
activity had occurred in the early 1920s on a smaller scale.  Remembering this practice, 
Americans implemented this policy on a large scale in the 1930s when the economy 
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declined even further.  According to the movement’s first historian, Abraham Hoffman, 
repatriation, which included the massive round-up and deportation of Mexicans as well as 
tactics designed to encourage them to leave, occurred as a result of the Great Depression 
and restrictionist activity.  Anti-Mexican attitudes and calls for strict limits on their 
immigration had intensified throughout the 1920s, making Mexicans prime targets once 
the economy soured.27 
The large-scale expulsion of the Mexicans did not last much beyond 1934, 
however, because the proclaimed cost savings to other Americans never materialized and 
because various business owners and bankers recognized that a significant portion of 
their customer base had disappeared.  Pressure against repatriation also came from voices 
inside Mexico, various community organizations, and the Spanish-language press, all of 
which decried the action as racist since only Mexicans faced expulsion.28 Despite the 
significant number of Mexicans affected, few monographs have been written on this 
subject—none have addressed how this movement affected U.S national identity. 
Argument and Section Descriptions  
At the end of the nineteenth century, most Anglo Americans dealt with people 
that they considered to be foreign in accordance with one of two strategies—exclusion or 
assimilation.  Part I of this dissertation examines these two strategies as well as the rise of 
two new ones—pluralism and marginalization—to address the newcomers of Mexican 
descent who were attempting to become full members of the nation through statehood.  
 
27Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation 
Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974).  
28Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in 
the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).  For another recent work on repatriation, 
see Camille Guerin-Gonzales, Mexican Workers, American Dreams: Immigration, Repatriation, and 
California Farm Labor, 1900-1939 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994). 
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Exclusionists posited a very narrow view of American identity, asserting that only people 
from northwestern Europe with an Anglo-Saxon heritage would be welcome in the 
nation.  They advocated that all others should be excluded or drastically restricted from 
entry to ensure American unity.  These exclusionists viewed the immigrants’ class status 
as entwined with their background.  If immigrants did not have a northern European 
heritage, they were automatically seen as less than American due to their race and class. 
Assimilationists envisioned a slightly more inclusive version of American-ness, 
although one still rooted in an European heritage.  They believed that people with an 
European ancestry, regardless of where their families descended from in Europe, could 
enter the U.S. without harming national identity, providing that they assimilated 
completely by rejecting their first language and culture in favor of the English language 
and Anglo American customs.  Assimilationists had concerns about the class standing of 
some of the newcomers, but generally did not think that a low status precluded their 
inclusion.  They believed that immigrants could learn, work, and improve their economic 
standing in society as long as they had the requisite European heritage. 
Exclusionists and assimilationists dominated national debates over whether to 
incorporate or exclude foreigners from southern and eastern Europe and from various 
parts of Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  People of Mexican 
descent, however, posed a new challenge.  So when organized appeals for New Mexican 
and Arizona statehood intensified at the turn of the century, muddying the existing debate 
over the inclusion or exclusion of newcomers, exclusionists and assimilationists had to 
reevaluate their existing strategies to see which, if either, applied to people of Mexican 
descent within these territories.   
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This dissertation explains that while many Anglo Americans outside of Arizona 
and New Mexico continued to adhere to the strategies of assimilation or exclusion, the 
territorial inhabitants increasingly found these stark poles unacceptable.  Consequently, 
during the first decade of the twentieth century, some of the territorial inhabitants and 
their allies grouped around two new strategies—pluralism and marginalization.  Pluralists 
promoted a broader version of incorporation than the assimilationists.  Like the 
assimilationists, they believed that anyone of European descent could become American.  
They differed from their counterparts, however, in insisting that these descendents could 
retain their original language and cultural practices without jeopardizing national 
homogeneity and unity.  Unity, they argued, was rooted in a middle-class status, 
European background, and a common history, not in a specific language or culture.  In 
this way, a substantial number of people of Mexican descent could be incorporated into 
the nation via statehood since they shared an European heritage, history, and middle-class 
aspirations with Anglo Americans.  There was no need for them to change at all.   
Marginalizationists advocated a strategy with both inclusionary and exclusionary 
elements.  The inclusive component allowed people of Mexican descent, regardless of 
their class status, racial background, or the language they spoke to be admitted into the 
nation via statehood (and later by immigration) since the country would benefit from 
their labor.  The exclusionary aspect involved the idea that these newcomers would not 
threaten national unity because they would remain in lower-class positions or be in the 
U.S. for only a limited period as temporary workers.  
Pluralists evolved and flourished in New Mexico, which had a sizeable 
community of middle-class people of Mexican descent.  There, people of both Anglo and 
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Mexican descent spoke in terms of a broader kind of assimilation—pluralism—predating 
Horace Kallen who promoted a variant of this strategy for incorporation and national 
unity in 1915.29 These pluralists rooted their ideas in a Spanish or European background, 
allowing those willing and able to claim such a heritage to enter the nation as full 
American citizens with the same social and political rights as Anglo Americans while 
retaining many aspects of their ancestral culture.  Like other Anglo Americans, pluralists 
believed that people with this kind of heritage embraced modernity, pledged their 
allegiance to American institutions, and shared a middle-class rank or aspiration, 
education, and history with other European Americans.  While not all of the people who 
met this criteria knew English, the pluralists argued that it did not matter, for they were 
American despite the language that they spoke and could unite with others on the basis of 
their shared history of European colonization. 
Marginalizationists arose in Arizona and proliferated rapidly.  Like the pluralists, 
they promoted admitting people of Mexican descent into the nation via statehood and 
immigration.  Unlike them, they did not believe that the newcomers could become 
American  nor assimilate easily due to their “primitive” living standards, mixed or 
indigenous racial heritage, lack of education, and alien language and cultural practices.  
Adherents of this strategy conflated class and race, and regarded people of Mexican 
descent as non-white and as permanent members of the working-class; in short, as non-
American.  But they also thought that people of Mexican descent could be useful in the 
nation’s expanding economy as quiescent laborers.  Ideally, these workers would remain 
safely under their employers’ control and not threaten the status quo by organizing strikes 
or attempting to transform the Anglo-dominated national culture.  Instead, they would be 
 
29Horace Kallen, “Democracy vs. the Melting Pot,  Nation 100 (1915).  
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expected to accept their low-wage jobs, segregated schools, and English as the dominant 
language.  People of Mexican descent would be recognized as good, second-tier 
Americans or as temporary workers who would return to Mexico.  In other words, the 
marginalizationists allowed for the physical entry of people of Mexican descent, but 
excluded them from full rights and belonging in the nation.  In this way the 
marginalizationists exemplified America’s long history of inclusionary and exclusionary 
impulses. 
By 1912, the year in which both territories attained statehood, these two 
competing strategies—pluralism and marginalization—had become the primary ways for 
understanding how people of Mexican descent could fit within the nation without 
harming national unity.  But the strategies created during the statehood years were 
designed to maintain national homogeneity in the presence of people of Mexican descent 
who were long-term residents within U.S. territories.  The dramatic rise in Mexican 
immigration during and after the First World War forced a re-evaluation of these 
strategies.   
Part II of this dissertation focuses on how the strategies created during the 
struggle over statehood were applied and altered in this new environment.  Demography 
was central to the changes.  Because the recent immigrants came from the lowest classes 
in Mexico and moved into areas where Anglo Americans already dominated the political 
and economic landscape, it was easy for the latter to marginalize the new arrivals.  
Consequently, more Americans began to back the marginalization strategy as an effective 
way of dealing with the influx of Mexican immigrants.  In the view of most Anglo and 
Mexican Americans, these lower-class and racially suspect newcomers (due to their class 
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status, it was presumed that they were not Spanish) seemed good candidates for 
marginalization as second-class Americans or temporary workers.  By 1922, only ten 
years after statehood, marginalization had overtaken pluralism and assimilation as the 
dominant strategy for dealing with Mexican newcomers and maintaining national unity.  
Despite their strategy’s growing appeal, the marginalizationists faced serious 
challenges from Americans’ heightened fears of radicalism and immigration.  
Consequently, marginalizationists shifted from their original emphasis in admitting the 
new arrivals as second-class Americans to highlighting their temporary status and lack of 
belonging. 
In Part III, the Immigration Restriction debates, this dissertation discusses how 
the popularity of the pluralist and assimilationist strategies waned as the 
marginalizationists gained adherents.  Americans lost faith in Americanization and 
increasingly viewed the arriving low class immigrants as unlikely to have any European 
heritage, and thus incapable of becoming either Anglo or Spanish American.  As these 
strategies faded, the number of exclusionists and marginalizationists increased.  The 
marginalizationists were particularly successful due to the socioeconomic clout of the 
agriculturalists and other businesspeople who favored a steady inflow of immigrant labor 
so that they could continue to maximize profits.  The marginalizationists’ revised 
strategy, emphasizing Mexicans’ temporary status, spread rapidly in the 1920s.  The 
Mexican government and the immigrants themselves did much to bolster this image of 
Mexicans as temporary workers who would return to Mexico.  This change enabled the 
marginalizationists to balance their own interests in retaining immigrant labor against the 
exclusionists’ concerns about how the immigrants might subvert the nation.  In doing so, 
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they resolved the recurring struggle between capitalists who wanted to expand the 
economy through the constant infusion of new workers and those Americans who wanted 
to exclude newcomers so as to preserve their class and cultural dominance.30 
Yet as Part IV, Repatriation, demonstrates, the marginalization strategy proved to 
be enormously elastic.  For while the transnational creation of a temporary worker made 
it easier for Americans to admit Mexicans when they desired their labor, it also made it 
easier to send them back when they did not.  This unofficial policy of entry and eviction 
not only affected the Mexican immigrant experience, but also changed what it meant to 
be an American.  For when Americans defined Mexicans as temporary and called for 
their removal during the Great Depression, they redefined themselves as well.  Whereas 
they had previously viewed themselves as being of European heritage, middle-class, and 
permanently settled, the expulsion of temporary workers meant that Americans were then 
willing to re-consider themselves as a people who came from all class backgrounds and 
performed all types of jobs, including migratory ones.   
Over the years, the marginalizationists perfected their strategy.  They persuaded 
enough Americans during an economic boom that their policy of admitting allegedly 
temporary workers was sound.  Then, when bad times came, they had the political might 
to push those labeled as temporary back through the swinging door to Mexico.  This 
strategy, created by people from many different backgrounds and interests, would prove 
difficult to contest and would result in devastating consequences for people of Mexican 
descent. 
 
30See Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham, NC: Duke 










Chapter Two  
 
The Door is Shut: Exclusion Reigns Over Assimilation 
 
Miguel Antonio Otero, Jr. always considered himself an American.  He was one.  
Born in St. Louis, Missouri in 1859 to a father and mother of Mexican and Anglo 
descent, respectively, Otero moved with his parents to the New Mexican territory when 
he was two years old.  Well-educated, bilingual, and raised in a political family, Otero 
was bound to do well and he did.  Like his father before him, Otero eventually chose 
business and then politics for a career.  Soon, he befriended no lesser known figure than 
that of President McKinley who appointed him as governor of the New Mexican territory 
in 1897.  In this position, Otero ardently fought for statehood and recognition that his 
territorial constituents were full Americans entitled to self-rule.1
Like Otero, Carlos Corella Jácome believed he was an American.  Born in Ures in 
Sonora, Mexico in 1870, Jácome emigrated to Arizona as a young boy and later became a 
U.S. citizen.  After working in various low-end jobs—including one hauling mud for 
adobe bricks—Jácome eventually met and worked under the tutelage of a local 
businessman, Emilio Carrillo.  Sponsored by Carrillo, Jácome set up a shop and turned 
into one of Tucson’s most successful businessmen.  In 1894, he became a founding 
member of the Alianza Hispano-Americana, an organization devoted to improving 
 
1In 1885, Otero had not supported statehood as he initially believed, like many other businessmen 
of the territory, that New Mexico did not have sufficient resources to support a government.  By the time he 
became governor, the expansion of railroads in the area, along with the establishment of a public school 
system, led him to change his mind.  See Marion Dargan, “New Mexico’s Fight for Statehood, 1895-1912,” 
New Mexico Historical Review 14 (January 1939): 17-18, 24-29. 
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conditions for people of Mexican descent, and immersed himself in local and territorial 
affairs, supporting the cause of statehood.2
This matter of statehood once again brought up the awkward question of just who 
could be American.  For the debate over the territories’ status was in large part a 
discussion of whether or not people of Mexican descent could fit within the nation 
without threatening national homogeneity and unity.   In the early years of the twentieth 
century, Americans re-evaluated the existing strategies for including or excluding 
newcomers—exclusion and assimilation—and if and how they pertained to people of 
Mexican descent.  
* * *
The final years of the nineteenth century were a time of much uncertainty due to 
high levels of immigration, territorial expansion, and continued problems between capital 
and labor.  The United States had accepted an enormous number of people from Europe 
and the stream of immigrants showed no signs of slowing.  This ongoing influx caused 
many Americans to wonder how long they could continue to absorb and assimilate such a 
diverse group of people without jeopardizing national cohesion.  These same Americans 
had similar questions and concerns with regards to the people residing in the territories 
acquired through the Spanish American War.  In addition, labor unrest in the 1890s 
brought more attention to the unresolved problems between the upper- and working-
classes.  Consequently, many Americans feared that working-class newcomers would 
exacerbate class conflict and undermine the nation.  As scholars William V. Flores and 
 
2Thomas E. Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses: The Mexican Community in Tucson, 1854-1941 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1986), 52, 96, 111, 212; John S. Goff, Arizona Biographical Dictionary (Cave 
Creek, AZ: Black Mountain Press, 1983), 54; Alex G. Jácome, “Letter to the Editor,” Arizona Star, April 
29, 1970 in Biofile-Carlos Jácome, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library. 
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Rina Benmayor have argued, “homogeneity is assumed to be the basis for political 
stability and growth,” and Americans at the time saw anything but uniformity in their 
nation.3 It was during this period of great consternation that Arizonans and New 
Mexicans decided to press for statehood and full inclusion in the nation. 
Before statehood became a prominent national issue, most Americans had already 
aligned themselves with one of two extant strategies for dealing with newcomers and 
ensuring national unity:  exclusion or assimilation.  Facing increased immigration and 
territorial expansion, nativists or exclusionists had pursued closing the borders and 
preventing the extension of the U.S. Constitution to areas outside of the continental 
United States.  In 1882, they succeeded in limiting some new arrivals with the passage of 
the first major restriction law, the Chinese Exclusion Act, which drastically reduced 
Chinese immigration, particularly those immigrants who held a lower-class rank in 
society.   
A few years later, more exclusionists organized themselves into various anti-
immigration groups and strove to lessen the tide of Europeans, especially those coming 
from southern and eastern Europe.  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, MA) 
actively worked with these nativists in an attempt to exclude Europeans through the 
imposition of a literacy requirement.  Although he and his allies failed in this venture 
(later succeeding in 1917), it was clear that the exclusionists had a strong and growing 
cadre of supporters.  Their rationale for exclusion was closely tied to the perceived race 
and class of the newcomers.  As with the Chinese, exclusionists were skeptical about the 
racial background of the southern and eastern Europeans, categorizing them as either not 
 
3William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor, eds., Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, 
Space, and Rights (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 46. 
33
white or as a kind of “inbetween peoples,” neither white nor black.4 The immigrants’ 
status also mattered as the exclusionists tended to view the southern and eastern 
Europeans as mostly peasants, forever locked into a feudal mindset, who were incapable 
of improving their economic situation.   
Late nineteenth-century assimilationists, whose ranks included reformers and 
businesspeople who desired a continuous supply of workers, argued that newcomers 
could become American through education.  Unlike the exclusionists, they believed that 
anyone who claimed a European heritage—regardless of where their descendants had 
come from in Europe—could assimilate.  While class status was an important element of 
American identity for these assimilationists, they thought that people of European descent 
had the capability to improve their economic position.  By the close of the nineteenth 
century, these assimilationists had staved off the first challenges to reducing European 
immigration and retained open borders.5 Yet, this assimilation also contained 
exclusionary elements.  For like the exclusionists, few assimilationists believed that 
people who were neither European nor white could integrate successfully into the nation.   
In 1900, neither exclusionists nor assimilationists thought much about people of 
Mexican descent and whether or not the existing strategies of exclusion or assimilation 
would be appropriate in their case.  Mexican immigration was not a topic of discussion 
since so few Mexicans emigrated that most government agents did not report their 
 
4See James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality, and the ‘New 
Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic History 16, no. 3 (1997): 3-44.  
5Besides Chinese immigrants, a few others were excluded if they were prostitutes or criminals 
(1875) or “idiots,” “lunatics,” or “likely to become a public charge” (1882).  See table in Daniel J. 
Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 3. 
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crossing.6 The last time Americans had debated what do with Mexicans was at the close 
of the Mexican War.  Then, some Americans had proposed expanding the nation’s 
boundaries to include all of Mexico.  But as the usual trajectory for new territories had 
involved a quick transition to statehood and equality with the existing states, many 
Americans worried that the infusion of eight million Mexicans—whom they regarded as 
primitive peoples of mixed race or Indian heritage—would impair the nation.  
Consequently, the U.S. government instead decided to wrest a smaller area with only 
80,000 Mexicans widely dispersed throughout the region.  Government officials believed 
that this seizure would pose less of a threat to American identity and unity.7 In the 1848 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the signers agreed that all Mexican citizens who remained 
within the ceded territory would be granted U.S. citizenship within one year, unless they 
chose otherwise.  Only a few thousand opted to remain Mexican nationals.8 The treaty 
further stated that the U.S. Congress would incorporate the territories into the nation as 
states “at the proper time.”9 In the mid-nineteenth century, few legislators made any 
serious attempts to grant statehood to the New Mexican territory, especially with civil 
war looming.  Even after Arizona separated from New Mexico in 1863, the residents of 
 
6Erika Lee explains how Chinese immigrants would dress as Mexicans and learn a few words of 
Spanish so that they could cross, unobserved, into the U.S.  See Erika Lee, At America’s Gate: Chinese 
Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003), 172.  
7Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), chaps. 5 and 7 and 256-57.  Also see John M. Nieto-Phillips, The Language 
of Blood: The Making of Spanish-American Identity in New Mexico,1880s-1930s (Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico, 2004), 52-58. 
8The residents in the territories would be granted citizenship, automatically, one year after the 
treaty went into effect, unless they opted to retain Mexican citizenship and made this declaration formally 
(or moved to Mexico).  Pueblo Indians, who had been able to vote since they were considered Mexican 
citizens during the period of Mexican rule, had this right removed after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  
The U.S. viewed the Pueblos as wards of the state who therefore could not vote.  Nativos were considered 
white for the purpose of suffrage.  See Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 37-40, 47, 54. 
9From Articles VIII and IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in Richard Griswold del Castillo, 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 
189-90. 
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both territories remained divided on whether or not they wanted statehood, making it easy 
for the U.S. Congress to reject all such petitions.10 But by the turn-of-the-century the 
bickering had stopped, with the Republican and Democratic party leadership of the 
Arizonan and New Mexican territories, and the major Spanish- and English-language 
papers within them, all united in support of more self-government.11 Their demands for 
statehood once again brought the question of what to do about people of Mexican descent 
to the forefront. 
 Although most New Mexicans and Arizonans in 1900 were already U.S. 
citizens, their rights as territorial inhabitants were circumscribed.  The territorial residents 
had no direct representation at the national level, save for one non-voting delegate in the 
House of Representatives, and they could not vote for president nor select their own 
governor.  Furthermore, they faced the threat of a congressional veto on any of their 
territorial legislation.12 As the Supreme Court reviewed the status of the islands acquired 
during the Spanish American War, Arizonans and New Mexicans increasingly worried 
that they might become associated with the overseas territorial population and lose their 
own access to statehood.  Some legislators had already declared that the U.S. Constitution 
did not necessarily follow the flag; therefore, the rights it bestowed might not apply to 
 
10President Lincoln signed the Organic Act establishing the Territory of Arizona in February, 1863 
to stem various secessionist movements and to have more control over the territory’s rich minerals.  There 
were few serious attempts at statehood until the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.  See Robert 
W. Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1968), 89, 302.  Also, see Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 76. 
11See Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 79-80; Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 
195, 202; Mark E. Pry, “Arizona and the Politics of Statehood, 1889-1912” (PhD diss., Arizona State 
University, 1995), 56; Karen Underhill Mangelsdorf, “The Beveridge Visit to Arizona in 1902,” Journal of 
Arizona History (Fall, 1987): 243-60, especially see 248.  
12See Pry, “Arizona and the Politics of Statehood,” 5-7. 
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new or existing territories.13 But if the territories did become states, then the residents 
within them would have their rights secured.  Also, their votes would influence national 
politics, a possibility that worried many Americans outside of the territories, especially 
given the significant number of nativos, or people of Mexican descent, who resided 
within the disputed region.   
Once Arizonans and New Mexicans succeeded in getting their territories included 
within a 1902 statehood bill in Congress, many Americans outside of the area supported 
one of the strategies they had established previously to deal with Asian and European 
immigration:  exclusion or assimilation.14 Exclusionists opposed statehood since they 
viewed the territorial residents as being peons of mixed blood (Spanish and Indian) and 
thus not fit to incorporate into what they hoped would be a pure, white nation.15 
Assimilationists favored statehood since they thought that people of Mexican descent 
could assimilate and become like Anglo Americans.   
Not all territorial residents agreed that assimilation was the best strategy for 
maintaining national homogeneity and unity.  Some residents, generally people of 
 
13The Supreme Court ruled on the Insular Cases in 1904 and declared that the Philippines would 
be considered an “unincorporated territory,” rather than incorporated like New Mexico and Arizona. This 
distinction presumed that the incorporated territories were on the path to statehood and would eventually be 
admitted.  See Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History, 256-58.  
14The omnibus bill included proposals for the statehood of Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.  
The battles over Oklahoma revolved around the presence of American Indians, rather than people of 
Mexican descent, and took a different path from Arizona and New Mexico.  In 1907, the territory attained 
statehood.  For a full discussion of this debate, see David Anthony Y.O. Chang, “From Indian Territory to 
White Man’s Country: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Land Ownership in Eastern Oklahoma, 1889-1940” 
(PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002). 
15The term “peon” has been used in many ways.  The historian Friedrich Katz notes that during 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Mexico, people used the word for agricultural workers 
and sometime laborers in the mines.  I believe that the exclusionists in the U.S. are using this term in a 
general way, or even more broadly, for any worker of Mexican descent.  Katz, himself, applies a narrower 
definition, using it only for permanent laborers on an hacienda who were indebted to the owner or 
hacendado. See Friedrich Katz, “Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and 
Tendencies,” Hispanic American Historical Review 54, no. 1 (Feb., 1974): 1-47, specifically see p. 2, note 
3. 
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Mexican descent and their Anglo American allies, believed that the people within the 
territories did not need to change as they were already American.  These residents were 
pluralists who believed that people of Mexican descent should be allowed to maintain 
their language and cultural practices, and that these differences would not harm the 
nation.  Other territorial inhabitants—the marginalizationists—believed that the people of 
Mexican descent among them would not threaten the country for they had little political 
clout and remained under the control of their Anglo American employers.  The 
marginalizationists included many Anglo Americans in both territories, although their 
voices were strongest in Arizona where they dominated the local government.  While the 
pluralists and marginalizationists participated in the debates over statehood, initially their 
views were not widespread either inside or outside of the territories.  From 1902 to 1904, 
it was the exclusionists and assimilationists who controlled the debate, with the 
exclusionists succeeding in staving off statehood and the inclusion of people of Mexican 
descent for ten more years. 
Background on Statehood 
 One challenge in creating states from territories was that there were no fixed 
regulations as to what a territory had to do for statehood other than to obtain 
congressional approval.  Traditionally, as stipulated in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, 
territories merely had to attain a population of at least 60,000 people and the support of 
the majority of its inhabitants to secure statehood.16 Later, legislators also looked for 
assurance that the territory had sufficient taxable wealth to support a government.  By 
 
16The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, one of the few documents that prescribed the criteria for 
statehood, stipulated that a territory have a population of at least 60,000 persons.  See Peter S. Onuf, 
Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1987), 67. 
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1900, Arizona and New Mexico both had met these tests easily as Arizona had over 
122,000 residents and New Mexico, 195,000.17 Other states had been admitted with far 
fewer people, with Idaho and Wyoming entering the polity in 1890 with approximately 
84,000 and 60,000 residents respectively.  Yet, despite the territories satisfying the 
requisite population test and the residents’ overwhelming support for statehood, many 
U.S. legislators lacked an equivalent amount of enthusiasm for the idea.   
Exclusionists believed that the racial and class background of the newcomers in 
the territories made them less than desirable Americans.18 The 1900 U.S. Census 
classified 180,207 of the approximately 195,000 New Mexicans as white, while also 
noting that nearly half (90,000) of the whites were persons of Mexican descent.  This 
statistic worried the exclusionists, despite the fact that over ninety percent of the people 
of Mexican descent had been born in the New Mexican territory and were native 
American citizens.  The remainder of the population included just over 13,000 American 
Indians, 1,610 “Negros,” and 349 persons classified as “Mongolian.”  Because many 
people of Mexican descent had voting rights and owned land as well, they retained 
substantial political power in the territory and had a significant voice in the statehood 
debates.  This socioeconomic status would contribute greatly to the assimilationists’, and 
later the pluralists’, strength in New Mexico. 
The Arizona territory also included a great number of people of Mexican descent.  
In 1900, over 28,000 or more than twenty percent of Arizona’s population were of 
Mexican descent.  Approximately one-half of them, or 14,172, had been born outside of 
 
17US Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Twelfth Census, 1900, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: GPO, 
1904). 
18Larson argues that nativism was the major reason for the long delay in statehood. Larson, New 
Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 303-4. 
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the U.S.; the rest were native-born Americans.  The territory also included 26,480 
American Indians, most of whom lived on reservations with scant political clout, and a 
small number of African Americans and Asians.19 Unlike in New Mexico, the number of 
middle-class people of Mexican descent had dwindled relative to the rest of the 
population.20 This occurred both as more Anglo Americans continued to migrate there 
from other states in the late nineteenth century and as poorer Mexicans emigrated to 
Arizona for mining jobs.  Subsequently, intermarriage between people of Anglo and 
Mexican descent dropped from 22.8 percent in the 1870s to 9.1 percent in the decade of 
the 1890s, further reducing one way in which the native population had retained their 
wealth (for intermarriage had meant that the property remained in the family versus 
seeing it taken in the courts).21 Due to their reduced numbers, middle-class Arizonans of 
Mexican descent did not have as much influence in the statehood debates as did their 
counterparts in New Mexico.  This lesser status would have great import as it would 
make it easier for the marginalizationists to dominate in the territory. 
The Exclusionists 
Exclusionists did not want to incorporate anyone whom they believed would 
threaten national unity or their own class standing in society.  Consequently, they sought 
to prevent statehood for Arizona and New Mexico and thereby exclude people of 
Mexican descent—whom they regarded as of mixed heritage and belonging to the peon 
class—from becoming equal members of the nation.  These exclusionists included the 
 
19US Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Twelfth Census, 1900. Also, see Senate Committee on 
the Territories, New Statehood Bill, Rpt. 2206, 57th Cong., 2d sess., (1902), 14 (hereafter cited as New 
Statehood Bill Report) and Karen Jean Underhill, “Albert J. Beveridge’s Congressional Report on Arizona 
Territory in 1902” (master’s thesis, University of Arizona, 1990), 45. 
20Eric Vaughn Meeks, “Border Citizens: Race, Labor, and Identity in South-Central Arizona, 
1910-1965” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2001), 52-53.  
21Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, 149.  
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nativists from the earlier debates and hailed from both major political parties and all 
regions of the country.  In addition, they were joined by some eastern politicians who 
feared statehood would enhance the western states’ strength in the legislature.  Because it 
was not exactly clear which way the territories would vote (although most suspected 
Arizona would be Democratic and New Mexico Republican), support along partisan lines 
was less apparent with major Republican legislators on both sides of the debate.22 
One Republican exclusionist, Senator Albert J. Beveridge (IN), had substantial 
control over the fate of New Mexico and Arizona in his position as chairman of the 
Committee on Territories.  While the members of the House of Representatives had 
approved statehood for the territories in May 1902, the bill then stalled in Beveridge’s 
Senate committee.  Beveridge, an imperialist who had supported the acquisition of 
territories after the Spanish American War and called for further expansion into Mexico 
and Central America, narrowly defined who could become an American.  He did not 
favor granting statehood to any of the new possessions, much less those previously 
acquired during the Mexican War.  Pressured to address the issue or see it removed from 
his committee, Beveridge decided that he and his colleagues would make a better 
decision if they investigated the territorial conditions first-hand.23 
Beveridge’s congressional committee quickly became notorious in the territories 
as it charged through them in only two weeks, touring the most dilapidated areas of the 
towns, and meeting primarily with people selected by Beveridge to confirm the 
committee members’ pre-existing views against statehood.  One newspaper alleged that 
 
22Karen Underhill Mangelsdorf, “The Beveridge Visit to Arizona in 1902,” 244 and John 
Braeman, “Albert J. Beveridge and Statehood for the Southwest, 1902-1912,” Arizona and the West 10 
(Winter 1968): 313-42, especially see 340. 
23Braeman, “Albert J. Beveridge and Statehood for the Southwest,” 313-17.  
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the committee’s characterization of the territories had done much to firm up residents’ 
support for statehood and convince the few remaining doubters that it was essential.24 
Another critic vividly described the event, writing that Beveridge “tore through New 
Mexico with his eyes under his coat” in order to avoid seeing anything that he might 
like.25 Not surprisingly, the committee members drafted a report which recommended 
against statehood for Arizona and New Mexico, concluding that only at some 
undetermined point in the future, when the “Mexican” population had “become identical 
in language and customs with the great body of the American people,” and when English-
speaking people from the other states had emigrated there to do their “modifying work 
with the ‘Mexican’ element,” would the territorial populations “finally come to form a 
creditable portion of American citizenship” and be entitled to statehood.  It was clear 
from the report that the authors believed it unlikely that this would happen any time 
soon.26 
Beveridge and his fellow exclusionists saw race as central to their definition of 
what it meant to be an American and believed that only those of the proper background 
could assimilate fully.  They argued that most Americans had an Anglo-Saxon heritage 
and northwestern European background (and thus were white) and that only those with a 
similar history should be added to the nation.  Otherwise, Americans would be in danger 
 
24Article, “Against a Minority,” retyped from Citizen, February 4, 1903, Marion Dargan Papers, 
MSS 120 BC, box 10, file 11, Center for Southwest Research, General Library, The University of New 
Mexico (hereafter these archives will be identified as CSWR). 
25See Jesse de la Cruz, “Rejection Because of Race: Albert J. Beveridge and Nuevo México’s 
Struggle for Statehood, 1902-1903” Aztlán 7, no. 1 (1977): 81-82 for information on Beveridge’s 
propensity to arrange for speakers who would help to prove his case against statehood.  For the quotation, 
see handcopied editorial, El Paso Herald, January 16, 1909, box 2, file 10, Dargan Papers, CSWR.  Also 
see Mangelsdorf, “The Beveridge Visit,” 249. 
26The authors of this report were referring, in this case, specifically to New Mexico.  But they 
recommended against the admission of Arizona as well due to the  presence of people of Mexican descent 
in that territory.  They expressed concern about the large numbers of Mexicans they believed to be 
immigrating to Arizona. Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Report, 5-9 (quote from 
page 9), 14-20.   
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of losing their racial homogeneity and thus national unity.  When Senator Beveridge was 
asked whether people of Mexican descent were white, he baldly asserted that there was 
“no ground for such an assumption.”27 Senator John Kean (Republican, NJ) thought that 
people of Mexican descent would not make desirable Americans because they had a 
pliant trait—causing them to vote as they were told—which he believed was biologically 
inherent and associated with their mixed racial background.28 
A few exclusionists briefly resurrected the “black legend” to disparage anyone 
who claimed a pure Spanish heritage.  Created by Northern Europeans shortly after 
Spain’s settlement in the Americas, the black legend portrayed Spaniards as particularly 
cruel, lazy, and despotic because of their aggressive Catholicism and success in the 
Americas over the Indians.  While this myth had spread among many Anglo Americans 
since the beginning of colonial settlement in the Americas, its explanatory power faded in 
the late nineteenth century as Spain ceased to be a significant threat to the United States, 
especially after the Spanish American War.29 Senator Joseph Quarles (Republican, WI) 
relied upon this dying concept and suggested that Spain, corrupted by its decadence, had 
lost its colonies, become inferior, and passed its “racial infirmity” on to its descendants in 
New Mexico.30 But Quarles was an anomaly since he was one of very few who raised 
this point.  Most exclusionists concentrated on the notion that people of Mexican descent 
were not white because they had a mixed racial heritage.  
2757th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Jan., 1903), 568. 
28Appendix to 57th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Feb. 4, 1903), 182.  
29Although exclusionists would continue to express alarm at the number of southern and eastern 
Europeans (including Spaniards) who made their way to America’s shores, Spaniards were primarily feared 
as representative of yet another among the “hordes” coming to the U.S. rather than specific fears about the 
Spaniards themselves who emigrated in small numbers relative to other southern and eastern Europeans.   
3057th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Feb., 1903), 1642. 
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The exclusionists also entwined class with race, seeing that people with the proper 
racial make-up had the potential to rise to a higher class status.  The converse of this 
argument was that those who were not white did not have the capacity to improve their 
class standing beyond the level of a peon. Senator Kean disparaged people of Mexican 
descent for their willingness to live on very little, almost as little “as a Chinaman” eating 
“a few mesquite beans and a little bacon fat” to sustain themselves.31 The implication 
was that no white person would tolerate such circumstances.32 The members of the New 
England Shoe and Leather Association felt so strongly about the lower-class composition 
of the people in the territories that it submitted a resolution against statehood because 
“the population of New Mexico and Arizona is largely composed of miners and persons 
whose occupation is not conducive to permanent residence.”  They further added that 
census statistics showed that the territories had a racially diverse population and a 
significant number of illiterates, which proved the territories “so much below the 
standard” that they could not “be considered as states for many years.”33 
Because of the residents’ race and class, exclusionists concluded that people of 
Mexican descent were incapable of assimilating for they lacked the biological 
wherewithal to transform themselves or to progress, characteristics which both 
 
31Appendix to 57th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Feb. 4, 1903), 182-84. 
32As historian Lawrence Glickman explains, Anglo American workers since the end of the 
nineteenth century have argued that greater needs and demands (consumption rather than production) 
defined the American worker in contrast to those who subsisted on much lower wages.  See Lawrence B. 
Glickman, A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997).  Another scholar, Yvette Huginnie, adds to our understanding of this by 
demonstrating how living conditions could define racial categories.  In late nineteenth century Arizona, 
Huginnie finds that some Anglo Americans believed that people who willingly ate beans or lived in slum-
like conditions could not be “white” as white people would not accept such an environment.  See A. Yvette 
Huginnie, “ ‘Mexican Labour’ in a ‘White Man’s Town’: Racialism, Imperialism, and Industrialization in 
the Making of Arizona, 1840-1905,” in Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labour and Difference in 
Britain, the USA, and Africa, ed. Peter Alexander and Rick Halpern (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000). 
33Letter from New England Shoe and Leather Association, June 2, 1902, Records of the House of 
Representatives, Record Group (RG) 233, file HR 57A-H26.4, National Archives, Washington, DC. 
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assimilationists and exclusionists considered to be essential components of being 
American.  Senator Knute Nelson (Republican, MN) alleged that New Mexico was more 
backward than any other territory between the two oceans.34 The Beveridge committee 
condemned the adobe buildings in which many people of Mexican descent resided and 
compared them to the “common and usual homes of the Chinese people,” by which they 
meant that they were primitive and un-American.35 Senator Quarles believed that people 
of Mexican descent were so detrimental to the nation that they inhibited civilization—
preventing ongoing progress and modernization—because “they think the same thoughts 
and sing the same songs as their fathers had for centuries before.”36 Morris Watson, a 
journalist for Outlook magazine, observed that “the spirit of progress do[es] not appeal to 
them” after observing the “common food” eaten by people of Mexican descent and their 
lack of silverware and practical furnishings.37 
Mostly, however, exclusionists stressed language differences to convince other 
Americans that people of Mexican descent could not assimilate.  They believed that 
Americans had to speak English and perceived territorial residents’ lack of use or 
knowledge of the English language as evidence of their inassimilability and a threat to 
national cohesion. Senator Nelson argued that, “homogeneousness in language and in 
fitness for self-government is one of the fundamental elements and essentials for the 
American Union.”38 In fact, Senator Beveridge and his entourage were so concerned 
 
3457th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Jan., 1903), 525. 
35Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Report, 9.  See Alexander Saxton, The 
Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971) for Anglo American views on people from China.  
3657th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Feb., 1903), 1641-2.  
37Morris P. Watson, “The People of New Mexico,” Outlook, Feb. 7, 1903. 
38Quote from Senator Nelson is in 57th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (Jan.-Feb., 1903), 
574.  For more on language and national unity, see Senator Lodge discussing his views on the importance 
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about language that most of their questions revolved around this subject as they quizzed 
almost everyone interviewed about how many people spoke Spanish, which languages 
were taught in the schools, whether the courts used Spanish to maintain their records, and 
to what extent interpreters used this language to translate opening statements, cross-
examinations, and jury instructions.39 
Upon discovering that the New Mexican courts permitted the use of the Spanish-
language in a variety of ways, the exclusionists presented this as additional proof that the 
people of New Mexico had not, and actually could not, Americanize.  A California 
senator argued that if people of Mexican descent did not “care enough about our 
institutions to learn the language of the country, if the business of the courts must be 
carried through an interpreter” then the territory was not worthy of statehood.40 Senator 
Nelson, himself an immigrant from Norway, vociferously attacked the New Mexican 
territory for its reliance upon interpreters.  He added that he knew of no place where such 
a policy was followed except in the newer territories such as the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico.41 In making this reference, Nelson unmistakably connected New Mexico—a 
territory he saw as failing to meet the essential language requirement for being part of 
America—with those entities unquestionably (at that time) deemed as un-American.  The 
territorial papers enjoyed lampooning Nelson with their characterization of his thick 
 
of having a shared language for national unity, 57th Cong., 2d. sess., Congressional Record, (Jan.-Feb., 
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Norwegian accent, “ ‘Ay tank does fellairs en Arizona not beene enofe Amaracaines.  To 
bay goot seetyzain, a fellair moost bay Amaracaine.’ ”42 
Other exclusionists were not impressed by information suggesting that people of 
Mexican descent were learning English and becoming American.  When touring the 
territories, they seemed more interested in knowing which language children spoke at 
home and on the playground.  Georgia Murray, formerly from Wisconsin, reported that 
the children she taught in New Mexico did not speak “perfect English” and admitted 
when asked that they “drop the English” after school.43 When the interrogators asked if 
the children “relapse” into Spanish, a justice in New Mexico affirmed that the kids 
switched “right back to the Mexican.”44 Maggie Bucher, a superintendent of schools and 
a statehood supporter, valiantly tried to answer the same question with an assimilationist 
perspective, emphasizing that the children seemed “very anxious not to give up their 
English,” and that the Spanish-speaking kids mingled with other students and spoke a 
mixture of languages when they played.45 Despite Bucher’s best attempts, Beveridge’s 
committee remained fixated on the fact that the children of Mexican descent continued to 
speak Spanish.  In its official report to Congress, the majority of the committee members 
recommended against statehood, concluding that the residents of the territories, especially 
those in New Mexico, needed more time (if it was even possible) to become American.46 
It would prove to be a very damaging report for the assimilationists. 
 
42Quoted in Jay J. Wagoner, Arizona Territory, 1863-1912: A Political History (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1970), 411. 
43Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Subcommittee Hearings, 8. 
44Ibid., 18. 
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The Assimilationists 
Notwithstanding the exclusionists’ success in delaying statehood for a decade, 
their efforts did not go unchallenged.  Many statehood supporters—within and outside of 
the territories and of both Anglo and Mexican descent—argued that people of Mexican 
descent had a pure Spanish and European heritage and thus could become American.  
These assimilationists belonged to both major political parties and all sections of the 
country, although those in the West were more likely to advocate for statehood and 
assimilation since the new status would result in greater political clout for their region.  
Assimilationists did not limit American-ness to only those with a northern or western 
European heritage, but extended it to anyone who claimed an ancestry from any part of 
Europe.  A few assimilationists noted that some of the territorial residents had a slightly 
mixed heritage, but justified this lack of European purity by asserting that they were 
overwhelmingly of European descent.  Since assimilationists considered people of 
Mexican descent as mostly European and white, they also thought that they had the 
potential to rise to a higher class standing.  Assimilationists further believed that because 
of this background, people of Mexican descent could learn, change, and merge with the 
dominant culture, just as European immigrants had done before them.47 Consequently, 
assimilationists emphasized the territorial residents’ white heritage (by contrasting them 
against people deemed not white), pointed to the many people of Mexican descent who 
had attained a higher class standing, and provided a barrage of evidence that the 
newcomers had already assimilated or were adopting Anglo American ways rapidly.   
 
47While some assimilationists genuinely believed their statements about people of Mexican 
descent, others may have used such language primarily to achieve their goal of statehood.  Some like 
Marcus Smith later became marginalizationists. 
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One of the foremost assimilationists, Governor Otero, considered himself 
Spanish, white, and American.  Otero did his utmost to convince others that most nativos 
or nuevomexicanos were of the same pure European heritage as himself.  He avoided 
using the label “Mexican,” since this then signified someone who had a mixed racial 
background and was inferior to white people.48 When an interviewer persisted in 
pressing him with questions about “Mexicans,” Otero usually replied with “Spanish,” or 
made it clear that the label was not one of his own choosing by stating that “the 
‘Mexican’ as you call him is a first class citizen.”49 Mostly, however, Otero downplayed 
his ethnicity.  Instead, he emphasized his American status and the fact that he and other 
nuevomexicanos already had become, or always had been, like Anglo Americans.50 Early 
in his career, Otero had arranged to greet his guests in the new territorial capitol at Santa 
Fe by positioning himself directly under the folds of an American flag.  His implicit 
message was that he, the territorial governor, a nuevomexicano, was an American.  By 
association, all other nuevomexicanos were as well.  Otero congratulated his fellow New 
Mexicans in a border town for their ardent celebration of the Fourth of July and wished 
that people from outside the territories had been there to witness their impressive display 
of patriotism.51 
48Nuevomexicanos means New Mexicans of Mexican descent and was a term commonly used at 
the turn-of-the-century.  Nativos was also a term used at the time and refers to people of Mexican descent.  
See Anthony P. Mora, “Mesillaros and Gringo Mexicans: The Changing Meanings of Race, Nation, and 
Space in Southern New Mexico, 1848-1912” (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2002) for background 
on what being “Mexican” signified in this era as well as notions about people viewed as having a mixed 
racial heritage. 
49Interview of Miguel A. Otero by William E. Curtis, El Trovar, Grand Cañon, AZ on July 1, 
1905, 10, box 4, file 3, Otero Collection, MSS 21 BC, CSWR. 
50For more on Otero’s assimilationist views as compared to those of others of Mexican descent, 
see Doris Meyers, Speaking for Themselves: Neomexicano Cultural Identity and the Spanish-Language 
Press, 1880-1920  (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 200.    
51Otero speech, July 4, 1902, box 4, file 12, Otero Collection, CSWR.  Despite this 
commendation, some nuevomexicanos alleged that Otero was dismissive of others of his racial background 
since he did not appoint nuevomexicanos to positions of authority nor select any of them as delegates to a 
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Politically savvy, Otero recognized the dangers in being associated with people 
deemed as not white.  Instead of working with such groups to improve the standing of 
people of Mexican descent, Otero wanted to make it clear to Anglo Americans that New 
Mexicans were not like the racially questionable residents of the recently acquired 
territories.  When the Spanish American War erupted and the loyalty of Spanish speakers 
became a concern, Otero quickly recruited New Mexicans to fight against Spain and then 
the Philippines.  Once the wars ended, Otero arranged to send Spanish-speaking teachers 
and officials to the overseas territories to assist with daily government and the 
Americanization of the islands.  Otero’s actions highlighted the very American-ness of 
New Mexicans as compared to the racially mixed Puerto Ricans and Filipinos who 
needed American tutelage.52 
Not content with this strategy alone, Otero adroitly manipulated symbols at the 
1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis to emphasize just how American the New Mexicans were.  
At the fair, Otero displayed the coat that the leader of the Filipino resistance movement, 
Emilio Aguinaldo, had worn when he was captured.  In doing so, Otero not only 
reminded viewers that New Mexicans had helped the U.S. to fight in the Philippines, but 
again emphasized that nuevomexicanos were not like the troublesome Filipinos.  Otero 
made sure that the only association New Mexicans had with Filipinos—who were a focal 
 
national Republican meeting in Chicago.  They alleged that he saw them as only good enough for manual 
labor, not people to have dinner with or be treated as equals.  For this, see “Otero y los Hispano-
Americanos,” La Voz del Pueblo (Las Vegas, NM), March 26, 1904. 
52Letter from W. Atkinson, General Superintendent of Public Instruction for the Philippine Islands 
to Miguel Otero, Sept. 18, 1901; Letter from Gustave L. Solignac of law firm of Hartigan, Marple, and 
Solignac, Attorneys in Manila, Philippines to Miguel Otero, Nov. 23, 1901, box 1, file 12, Otero 
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point of the St Louis exposition as curiosities and people near the bottom of the racial 
hierarchy—was as conquerors over them.53 
Otero and other assimilationists also made it clear that when they spoke of 
nuevomexicanos, they did not mean Indians who held a seriously circumscribed place in 
American society and were not considered white.  In one of Governor Otero’s reports to 
the Secretary of the Interior he included a section entitled “Indians,” in which he 
highlighted them as different from the general population.  He did not make such a 
distinction for any other group.54 Otero later explained in an interview that Pueblo 
Indians’ transition to “civilization” had been slow and difficult because they were not 
very bright.  He added, however, that they would not harm New Mexico or the nation 
since their population was declining and they were docile.55 The New Mexican delegate 
to the U.S. Congress, Bernard Shandon Rodey, a naturalized American from Ireland, 
followed Otero’s lead in distinguishing nuevomexicanos from Indians.56 A New Mexican 
attorney clarified for congress members that he did not consider Pueblo Indians to be the 
same as “Mexicans” (people of Mexican descent).57 Another assimilationist, Senator 
Joseph Foraker (Republican, OH), also demonstrated that he did not see Indians as the 
same as people of Mexican descent when he remarked that the territorial residents 
deserved statehood because it was in the country’s best interest to “subdue the forest, to 
 
53“New Mexico Shows Much of Antique,” c. 1903/1904, box 6, scrapbook, Otero Collection, 
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drive out wild beasts, and to drive away the redman.”  Foraker welcomed people of 
Mexican descent who had political influence in both of the territories and argued on 
behalf of statehood.  It was only Indians whom he sought to ostracize.58 
With a fairly small African American population in the territories, assimilationists 
did not have to expend much energy contrasting people of Mexican descent against 
African Americans.  The few references to African Americans, however, indicated that 
the assimilationists wanted no affiliation with them.  Governor Otero mocked the anti-
imperialists who professed concern over the Filipino leader Aguinaldo and “his dusky 
minions” because they had not consented to the U.S control of their government, while 
pointing out that these same voices had denied the “dusky citizen” of the American South 
any say in government.59 Otero did not take a public position on Jim Crow in the South, 
but his willingness to support and associate U.S. control over the Filipinos with white 
rule over blacks in the South suggests his low opinion of African Americans’ capacity for 
full citizenship.  When he later criticized a movement to combine the New Mexican 
territory into one state with Arizona, Otero disparaged those who liked the idea as so 
desperate for statehood that they “would willingly accept jointure with the Jungles of 
Africa,” implying that any affiliation with such a place and the people therein would be 
negative.60 Bernabé Brichta, a Mexican-born Arizonan of Mexican and French descent, 
argued that a local labor union should not put people of Mexican descent in the same low 
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category as Asians or black Americans.  He only criticized the union’s exclusionary 
policy when it affected people of Mexican descent.61 
Assimilationists believed that people of Mexican descent could rise to a higher 
class standing due to their European heritage and thus pointed to many examples of them 
having done so.  Harry Pierce, a letter writer to the Washington Post, touted the fine 
citizenry in New Mexico and specifically cited those with a middle-class standing 
including Mariano Otero, the president of the Commercial National Bank in 
Albuquerque; Antonio Joseph, a merchant; Tranquilino Luna, a businessman whose son 
died fighting in the Philippines and lay buried in an unmarked grave; and J. Francisco 
Chavez who fought in the Civil War for the Union before becoming an attorney.62 Judge 
A. B. Fall provided an equally long list of prominent nuevomexicanos, “the Lunas, the 
Chavezes, the Armijos, Oteros, Pereas, Romeros, and others” who had the resources to 
educate their children in the state of Missouri.63 
When assimilationists did acknowledge that some people of Mexican descent had 
a lower-class standing, they argued that this group possessed the wherewithal to improve 
their economic position and status.  The former mayor of Albuquerque, asserted that he 
had seen “a wonderful improvement in the Mexicans” since 1889, adding later that they 
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liked “the American methods” and were “very rapidly adopting” them.64 A few years 
later, Judge Fall reported that many of the sheepherders whom Americans viewed as the 
“lowest classes of Mexicans” were literate, read newspapers, and kept informed on 
political issues.65 In short, they acted like middle-class Anglo Americans, and had the 
potential with the right kind of tutelage to become so. 
Although assimilationists thought that people of Mexican descent could become 
American since they had the requisite racial background, they also agreed with 
exclusionists that nativos needed to conform to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture.  They 
argued, however, that people of Mexican descent either already had “Anglo-Saxonized” 
or were doing so at a fast rate.  By this they meant that they were becoming literate, 
learning English, and rejecting former customs and lifestyles in favor of Anglo American 
ways.   
Governor Otero touted the substantial improvement in New Mexico’s literacy rate 
as proof of nuevomexicanos’ increasing American-ness.  He noted that while illiteracy 
had been as high as 44 percent in 1890—the year before a public school system was 
implemented—by 1898 it had fallen to 21 percent.66 Otero further argued that if the 
federal government had provided the territory with the necessary resources to provide 
free education, as it had done to support “the Indians in indolence,” then literacy would 
not be a problem in New Mexico.67 Under the circumstances, he believed that the 
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territory had performed admirably with the residents themselves raising the additional 
funds necessary to establish public schools.  Delegate Rodey charged that the government 
had not assisted New Mexico since 1846 and complained that while it was sending 
revenue and teachers to Puerto Rico and the Philippines, it had never done so for his 
territory.68 Clearly, the assimilationists asserted, people of Mexican descent were making 
progress and becoming like Anglo Americans.  Only a lack of federal support and 
statehood continued to hinder them.  
Assimilationists also emphasized how many people of Mexican descent already 
knew or were learning English.  A Boston scholar informed the nation that while “ten 
years ago English was an unknown tongue over most of the area of new Mexico…today 
it is taught to the children of every county.”69 A New Mexican poet, J.W. Knaebel, 
agreed and drafted a witty poem on the subject, including a stanza with the demand that 
Beveridge and his ilk acknowledge “that the children you talked with were quite bright.  
And with few exceptions spoke English right.”70 Another assimilationist testified to the 
congressmen that if the Spanish speakers did not already know English, there had been so 
much progress toward achieving that aim that soon it would be only the elderly, and 
perhaps women (who had begun to attend school only recently), who would lag behind.71 
Delegate Rodey argued that most nuevomexicanos already spoke “English as well as 
Spanish” and that one could travel through New Mexico for hundreds of miles and 
“probably not hear a word of Spanish.”  Furthermore, he noted how the Spanish-language 
 
68“New Mexico’s Brave Fight for Statehood,” Houston Daily Post, September 20, 1903, 
scrapbook, box 1, Bernard Rodey Papers, MSS 175 BC, CSWR. 
69Senate Committee on the Territories, Statehood for the Territories: Papers Relating to the 
Question of Statehood for the Territories, 57th Cong., doc. 153 (Jan.-Feb. 1903), 13. 
70J. W. Knaebel, poem, box 14019, file 58, Prince Papers, NMSRCA.  
71Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Subcommittee Hearings, 96, passim; 
Thomas B. Catron Papers, New Mexico Political Papers, series 404, reel no. 2, CSWR. 
55
newspapers regularly informed their readers that “it is the duty of every father to see that 
his children learn the language of the country, and that is English.”72 Senator Porter J. 
McCumber (Republican, ND) alleged that the residents would have learned English even 
faster if they had not been isolated from the rest of the nation in their territorial status.  
He believed that statehood would enhance their facility with the language.73 
To convince others that the people of the territories were becoming more 
American, assimilationists pointed to how modern and progressive the territorial 
residents were becoming:  establishing institutions of higher learning, adopting the latest 
technology, and embracing civilized culture.  Assimilationists from Arizona submitted 
petitions to Congress asserting that their territory was “as much civilized as Indiana,” the 
state of the despised Senator Beveridge.74 In New Mexico, the former New Mexican 
Governor, L. Bradford Prince, noted how many institutions had been built in recent years: 
the capitol, a military institute, and various asylums for the blind, the deaf, and the 
insane.75 Delegate Rodey informed congressional representatives that the cities and 
towns of New Mexico exhibited the most recent technology and signs of modernity 
including “street cars, electric lights, waterworks, gas works, telephones, clubs, postal 
city delivery, etc.”76 Governor Otero complained incessantly about visiting easterners 
like Senator Beveridge who remarked upon every adobe building while remaining 
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oblivious to the region’s modernization.  He expressed irritation that camera-toting 
tourists noticed only what differed from the East as they “press[ed] the button upon every 
burro that they meet.  They are delighted to catch the features of a worthless old Indian.  
They photograph the oldest adobe building erected over three hundred years ago.”77 
Otero’s grumbling about the East’s fascination with “difference” is apt.  Many magazine 
articles of the day visually depicted Arizona and New Mexico with pictures of adobe 
structures in need of repair, creating an image of the territories’ backwardness and 
inferiority.78 
Assimilationists also attempted to convince other Americans that some people of 
Mexican descent already were like Anglo Americans and had proven themselves to be so 
through military service.  Governors Otero and Prince and Delegate Rodey all cited the 
soldiers who had died in the Civil War battle at Glorieta, the number who had 
volunteered for the Spanish American War, and the personal sacrifices that New 
Mexicans had made on the distant battlefields of “El Caney,” “Santiago,” “San Juan 
Hill,” and more.  They reminded other Americans that a greater percentage of New 
Mexicans had volunteered for service during the Spanish American War than had done so 
from any other state or territory.  Furthermore, Theodore Roosevelt’s famed Rough 
Riders owed much to people of Mexican descent for its acclaimed feats as over half of 
the group came from New Mexico and Arizona.79 Otero alone had energetically recruited 
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an impressive number of soldiers for the conflict with Spain, later winning a medal for 
helping to organize Roosevelt’s regiment.80 
Finally, assimilationists argued that not only were the territorial residents capable 
of becoming like Anglo Americans—due to their pure European heritage—but that they 
already were American because of their birth on U.S. soil or via agreements written into 
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  Delegate Rodey reminded Congress that most of 
the territorial residents of Mexican descent who were 56 or younger had been born 
“under the American flag” in the New Mexican territory.81 Judge Fall of New Mexico 
informed the U.S. congressmen that former Mexican officials had taken an oath of 
allegiance to the United States in 1846.  He stressed that “these people are not in any 
sense Mexicans.”82 He continued by noting that they “appreciate our Government, and 
not one of them would go down into old Mexico if he were offered in exchange for his 
American citizenship one of the princely cattle ranches of that Republic.”83 The Denver 
Republican opined that the nation should fulfill the promises it made under the treaty 
with Mexico and asserted that people of  “American or Mexican” descent made good 
Americans.84 Despite the assimilationists’ arguments, many Americans remained 
skeptical about the heritage of people of Mexican descent and their ability to improve 
their economic situation and assimilate as Anglo Americans.  
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Exclusion Reigns 
New Mexico and Arizona did not become states in 1903.  Although the 
assimilationists had succeeded in getting the omnibus statehood bill through the House of 
Representatives, the bill remained mired in the Senate (and under the control of Senator 
Beveridge’s committee) until it eventually died without ever coming to a vote.  By the 
end of 1902, Beveridge and his committee further helped their exclusionist objectives 
when they published their committee report, recommending against statehood. 
Initially, Theodore Roosevelt had expressed the utmost confidence in his diverse 
band of Rough Riders from the territories and other parts of the nation.  He considered 
them ideal Americans because of their valorous deeds in the Spanish American War and 
because they were representative of America’s success in fusing and assimilating 
different peoples into a new American mold.85 In 1899 he was so enthusiastic that he 
came out in favor of statehood.86 But a few years later, after reading Senator Beveridge’s 
negative report on the territories, then President Roosevelt began to worry about how 
people of Mexican descent might damage the nation.  Consequently, he approved of 
Senator Beveridge’s covert tactics to prevent statehood from coming to a vote and 
avoided mentioning statehood in his 1903 annual message to Congress.87 
Other Anglo Americans shared Roosevelt’s nascent reservations.  One reporter, 
while initially accepting some of Delegate Rodey’s arguments about the wonders of New 
Mexico, opined at the end of his article that perhaps the territory was not as ready for 
statehood as Rodey had implied for one may “see many things which sort of weaken his 
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[one’s] belief in the advisability of making New Mexico a full-fledged State.”88 Morris 
Watson from Outlook doubted that people of Mexican descent in either of the territories 
could be good Americans because he believed that their Spanish blood had “so 
degenerated and mingled with the Indian tribes” that they did “little credit to their 
intrepid ancestors.”89 The Philadelphia Daily Evening Telegraph opined under the title, 
“Not Fit for Citizenship,” that “less than either Indians or negroes do these mongrel 
Mexicans afford the material of which citizens are made.”90 These views suggested that 
many Americans were not accepting the assimilationists’ claims that people of Mexican 
descent were predominantly European and thus became skeptical about their potential for 
becoming American. 
The 1903 strike against the owners of the copper mines in Clifton and Morenci 
(AZ) further hindered the assimilationists’ cause.  A total of 3,500 miners, most of whom 
were of Mexican or Italian descent, walked off their jobs to protest a change in working 
hours and pay.  As historian Linda Gordon has shown, the strike eventually led to a 
hardening of racial lines in Arizona as both sides began to emphasize the participation of 
people of Mexican descent.  The owners did so to divide the workers whereas the strikers 
emphasized their ethnicity for solidarity and continued support for their cause.  After the 
strike, there were clearer delineations between who could be white and accepted into the 
dominant community and who could not:  Italians were white Americans, people of 
Mexican descent were not.  In the following year, when a group of Irish orphans arrived 
from New York to move in with their adopted families of Mexican descent, the newly 
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expanded white community (based on the Italian additions) decided that Irish (or white) 
children should not live with people of Mexican descent because they were not white.  
The event made national headlines.  This story, plus the strike, likely led many 
Americans to wonder about the wisdom of bringing more people of Mexican descent, 
especially those in Arizona, into the nation.  Like Anglo Arizonans, Anglo Americans 
questioned the whiteness of people of Mexican descent and their potential to assimilate.  
In addition, the strikers’ class position and perceived radicalism made them seem all the 
more dangerous and less American.91 
The exclusionists’ success in raising concerns about people of Mexican descent—
specifically with regards to their race and class—led to new proposals to merge the 
territories into one Anglo-dominated state.  The theory was that the larger group of Anglo 
Americans would be able to minimize the influence of people of Mexican descent.  The 
proposals to unite the territories came with various suggestions to re-name the new 
territory as well, including Montezuma after the Aztec emperor or Lincoln, an 
indisputably American name, or simply “Arizona” to appease the Arizonans while 
placing the new state government in Santa Fe, the former New Mexican capitol.92 This 
merger or “jointure” as it was then called resulted in a shifting of alliances as Delegate 
Rodey joined Senator Beveridge (who had given up on excluding both the territories) and 
 
91See Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999).  
92In the early 1880s, William Gillette Ritch, the head of New Mexico’s new Bureau of 
Immigration—whose role was to encourage people from other parts of the nation to settle there—was 
partially responsible for the idea of naming the territory Montezuma since he created the myth that the 
Aztec emperor Montezuma had initially resided in Santa Fe before following an eagle in 1325 A.D. to 
Tenochtitlán, the site of present day Mexico City.  See Nieto-Phillips, In the Language of Blood, 122-23.  
For more on naming the state Montezuma, see “New Mexico’s Claims,” New York Daily Tribune, January 
19, 1903 and “Letters to Constitutional Convention”  New Mexico Territorial Records, reel 38, NMSRCA.  
Also see reprinted article in the New York Evening Post from Albert E. Pillsbury in the Boston Post,
November 19, 1908 in Dargan Papers, CSWR. 
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President Roosevelt in calling for one new state.  But it also allowed other voices in the 
territories to become more audible.  These pluralists and marginalizationists, whom, 
although they had not been mute during internal discussions over statehood, now had a 
wider stage upon which to promote their understanding of what it meant to be American.  
The nation would become aware of their strategies for dealing with people of Mexican 




The Door Swings Open?:  
 Pluralism and Marginalization  
 
Octaviano A. Larrazolo, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Allende, Mexico, was 
educated in the U.S. and lived in Arizona and Texas before settling in New Mexico 
during the 1890s.  There, the teacher then lawyer ran for office, unsuccessfully, several 
times.  He blamed his defeats on the new and growing population of eastern Democrats 
whom he believed were not willing to support a nativo or person of Mexican descent.  
Eventually this frustration caused him to change parties and become a Republican.  
Despite Larrazolo’s initial failures in seeking office (he would later become a Republican 
governor and then senator for the state of New Mexico), he was a well-liked and gifted 
orator who impressed crowds with his fluency in the Spanish and English languages.  
Larrazolo took great pride in his ethnicity and did much to argue for and protect the rights 
of people of Mexican descent.  But he did not often embrace the label of “Mexican” or 
even “Mexican American.”  The local terms that he and other people of Mexican descent 
used were nativos (natives), nuevomexicanos (New Mexicans), and increasingly, 
hispanos (Spanish) or hispano-americanos (Spanish Americans).1
Larrazolo and his allies did more than just assert a Spanish American identity; 
they also advocated a new strategy, distinct from exclusion or assimilation, for 
 
1Octaviano Larrazolo Papers, MSS BC 614; Larrazolo Papers, 1-2, box 14, Edna Fergusson 
Papers, MSS 45; El Independiente (Las Vegas, NM) August 31, 1911, Larrazolo Papers, Center for 
Southwest Research, General Library, The University of New Mexico (hereafter these archives will be 
identified as CSWR). 
63
incorporating people of Mexican descent into the U.S. without threatening national unity.  
This pluralist strategy would be rooted in a Spanish American identity and call for the 
full integration of people of Mexican descent into the U.S. via statehood.  As most 
Americans at the time believed that there had to be homogeneity for national unity—
generally meaning that this unity would be based upon a homogenous race, class, and 
culture—pluralists argued that no conflict would result from including people of Mexican 
descent for they shared the same race (whiteness based on a European heritage), 
aspirations for a middle-class status, and a common history with other Americans of 
European descent.  They did not see sharing a language or traditions as prerequisites for 
unifying a nation. 
Background on Spanish American Identity 
 By the turn of the century, most people of Mexican descent in New Mexico had 
established a clear preference for a Spanish American or hispano-americano identity over 
a “Mexican” one.2 The principal historians in this field all point to increased negative 
encounters with Anglo Americans, the growing popularity of scientific ideologies 
 
2Historian Anthony Mora traces the history of this transition.  He finds that with the coming of 
Mexican independence in 1821, the new government granted all persons who performed a Mexican identity 
(by speaking Spanish, dressing in a certain way, and living a more settled lifestyle as opposed to Apaches 
who moved frequently) status as Mexicans.  In New Mexico (under the Mexican government), such an 
identity did not confer a new racial category but only a national one.  The existing multitude of castas or 
races remained although most New Mexicans began to use primarily two categories: indio and español.  
With the coming of the Mexican-American War and annexation to the U.S., persons of Mexican descent 
encountered American ideas about race.  Anglo Americans conceived of the newly annexed “Mexicans” as 
more of a racial group than a nationality, separating Indians into a distinct racial category and viewing non-
Indians as persons of mixed race whom they called “Mexicans,” without conferring either a Mexican or 
American nationality.  While New Mexicans initially contested these definitions of race and nationality, 
Mora finds that by the 1880s most non-Indians had come to accept “Mexican” as connoting race rather than 
a national affiliation and considered themselves racially “Mexican” (as opposed to Anglo or “white” 
Americans), even as they saw themselves as part of the United States.  They did not concede, however, that 
“Mexican” meant “mixed race.”  But by 1900, even this label has diminished as the residents began to 
favor hispano due to increased conflict with Anglos.  See Anthony P. Mora, “Mesillaros and Gringo 
Mexicans: The Changing Meanings of Race, Nation, and Space in Southern New Mexico, 1848-1912” 
(PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2002). 
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denigrating Mexicans as persons of “mixed blood,” and the concomitant rise of the 
Spanish-language press as factors in encouraging the embrace of a Spanish identity over 
a Mexican one.  Consequently, people of Mexican descent began to use the labels nativo 
and hispano or hispano-americano far more than mexicano and insisted upon this 
identity, correcting those Anglo Americans who referred to them as Mexicans.3
This greater insistence upon a Spanish American identity occurred alongside the 
intensified statehood debate.4 As the exclusionists attacked the racial, class, and cultural 
background of nativos who were attempting to come into the nation via statehood, people 
of Mexican descent became more intent upon asserting and proving their white racial 
status and ability to be full members of the nation.  Likewise, various assimilationists 
willingly adopted the term “Spanish American” as an effective way to encourage other 
Americans to accept New Mexico as a state.  The territory’s new Bureau of Immigration 
began to tout the Spanish history of nuevomexicanos in the late 1890s and into the next 
century as a way to boost Anglo immigration and improve the chances for statehood.5
3See works by Mora, “Mesillaros and Gringo Mexicans,” and Charles Montgomery, The Spanish 
Redemption: Heritage, Power, and Loss on New Mexico’s Upper Rio Grande (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002).  Also, see John M. Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood: The Making of Spanish-
American Identity in New Mexico, 1880s-1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2004), 2, 80-92. 
On pp. 84-85 Nieto-Phillips further explains that while there are few extant sources from non-literate 
nuevomexicanos, the oral history which exists confirms that they also proclaimed and supported the idea of 
a Spanish American identity.  See also John-Michael Rivera, The Emergence of Mexican America: 
Recovering Stories of Mexican Peoplehood in U.S. Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 
51.  Particularly, note Rivera’s chapter, “Constituting Terra Incognita: The “Mexican Question” in U.S. 
Print Culture,” 51-81 for more examples of articles about people of Mexican descent as people of mixed 
race in the late nineteenth century. 
4Arturo Fernández-Gibert, in his analysis of the newspaper La Voz del Pueblo (Las Vegas, NM), 
finds the paper consistently using hispano americano (Spanish American) after 1903.  See Arturo 
Fernández-Gibert, “La Voz del Pueblo: Texto, Identidad y Lengua en la Prensa Neomexicana, 1890-1911” 
(PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 2001), 331-32. 
5Both Mora, “Mesillaros and Gringo Mexicans,” and Montgomery, The Spanish Redemption, note 
the acceptance of a Spanish American identity among some Anglo Americans around 1900.  Mora further 
notes the creation of a New Mexican identity around the same time as a way to defuse the “race” issue by 
providing a more neutral label that could be used in promoting statehood to outsiders.  This is an interesting 
view but I found that nativo, hispano-americano, and their equivalents in English were used more in the 
Spanish- and English-language press and that there was more overt discussion about the racial heritage of 
65
The popularity of this new identity depended, in part, on the decline of the “black 
legend,” which had depicted Spaniards as especially avaricious and cruel towards 
Indians.  Helen Hunt Jackson’s popular novel Ramona (1884) had begun to weaken the 
legend by romanticizing the Spaniards of the missionary period.6 The U.S. victory over 
Spain in 1898 helped to spur its decline as the Spaniards demonstrated that they were no 
longer a threat to the increasingly powerful American nation.  Always the savvy 
publicist, Governor Otero had capitalized upon and encouraged this changing attitude by 
arranging for silver objects and other items representative of Spanish colonial art to be 
displayed at the 1904 World’s Fair, thereby linking his territory with then favorable 
attitudes toward Spain.7
The racial component to this Spanish identity was not new.  The significance of 
purity of blood claims or limpieza de sangre had a long history extending back to 
medieval Spain before spreading to colonial Latin America.  Spaniards brought this idea 
to Mexico and helped to create a suspicion of people of mixed heritage.  The infamous 
eighteenth-century castas (caste or race) paintings, especially popular in Mexico, later 
made these views abundantly clear.  This artwork depicted an elaborate array of castas, 
from indios [Indians] to españoles [Spaniards], which categorized people into rigid 
groups and a hierarchical structure according to the racial heritage of their parents. Yet 
intermarriage, wealth, and other factors made the system more fluid than it appeared, 
 
the population in the territories than Mora concedes.  For evidence of Anglo Americans using the label 
“Spanish Americans” to promote the territory, see Nieto-Phillips, In the Language of Blood, 118-42 where 
he notes how the editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican, Max Frost actively encouraged this identity to add 
supporters to the cause of statehood and describes the actions of the Bureau of Immigration.  The bureau’s 
publications, which had previously focused on Indians, portraying them as recently civilized and docile, 
began after 1894 to concentrate more on the positive role of Spanish conquistadores.
6Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 151 reports that Helen Hunt Jackson’s Ramona was a 
bestselling book, like that of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin in the nineteenth century.  
7“New Mexico Shows Much of Antique,” n.d., c. 1903/1904, in box 6, scrapbook, Otero 
Collection, MSS 21 BC, CSWR.  
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allowing people to alter their caste, identity, and status in society.  Certain jobs bestowed 
a higher status regardless of one’s heritage, with all military men identified as 
“españoles” in the census.  Those who had power appropriated the label of español,
making this the identity sought after by those eager to advance in society.8 Historian 
Eric Meeks found that in the late nineteenth century, wealthy Mexican ranchers near the 
U.S. border emphasized their European heritage and displayed it by marrying women of 
European descent and purchasing European goods.9 In the early twentieth century, 
people of Mexican descent vigorously denied any attempt to categorize them as mestizo 
or of mixed heritage and asserted their purity of blood and Spanish ancestry.  In 1901, 
600 people in Las Vegas (NM) rose up in the streets to protest allegations in a local 
newspaper that they were inferior and of  “mixed blood.”  A local attorney informed the 
then assembled crowd that he was “ ‘Spanish American[,] as are those who hear me’ ” 
and that he had no other heritage except “ ‘that which was brought by Don Juan de 
Oñate,’ ” the Spaniard who had claimed New Mexico for Spain in 1598.10 
Nativos in the territories saw themselves as Spanish, European, and white, and 
capable of rising to the highest class like that of Don Oñate.  Therefore, they saw no 
contradiction in becoming part of a nation in which many of its dominant members 
considered themselves white and middle-class; they did not believe that they needed to 
change or learn any new ways as they already saw themselves as sufficiently American in 
the ways that mattered, in terms of their agreement with the nation’s political and 
 
8Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 9, 17-22, 25-37; Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, 
the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 271-97.  
9Eric Vaughn Meeks, “Border Citizens: Race, Labor, and Identity in South-Central Arizona, 1910-
1965” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2001), 46. 
10Quoted in Nieto-Phillips, The Language of Blood, 13-14. 
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economic system.  In their view, sharing the same language and culture was irrelevant to 
national identity. 
The Pluralists  
Pluralism evolved from a confluence of factors:  the growth and increasing use of 
a Spanish American label among people of Anglo and Mexican descent, the 
exclusionists’ recent challenge of the nativos during the statehood debate, and the 
recognition among some people of Mexican descent that the assimilationists had failed to 
convince others that nativos were sufficiently American.  Most pluralists were people of 
Mexican descent who were well educated, bilingual, and the political and economic 
leaders of their communities.  They were merchants, teachers, lawyers, politicians, and 
the editors and journalists of the Spanish-language press.  Most of them lived in the 
Arizonan and New Mexican territories.  The pluralists would gain more Anglo allies as 
their message spread outside of the territories.  
Pluralists and assimilationists agreed on two key issues:  both groups called for 
the incorporation of people of Mexican descent based upon their Spanish heritage and 
both believed that the nativos who were not yet of the proper class standing could change 
to become so.  But on other issues they disagreed.  While assimilationists argued for the 
nativos’ eventual sameness and unity with Anglo Americans on the basis of race, class, 
and Anglo-Saxon culture, pluralists believed that their membership in the white race, 
their middle-class status, and their Hispanic European origin should suffice.  While the 
pluralists explained that most nativos wanted to and were learning the English language, 
they did not think it was a necessary criterion of American identity.  Furthermore, they 
promoted their right to continue to speak Spanish, encouraged others to learn and 
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maintain it, and worked hard to ensure that once integrated into the U.S., they would not 
be marginalized.  
 Most historians have credited philosopher Horace Kallen with coining the concept 
of pluralism or “cultural pluralism,” in an article published by the Nation in 1915.  Yet, 
Kallen acknowledged that his idea built upon what he had already observed.  The nativos 
in the Arizonan and New Mexican territories did not identify their strategy as pluralism, 
but coalesced around ideas promoting their belonging in the nation, emphasizing their 
Spanish American identity, and stressing their right to continue using their native 
language and cultural traditions.  In other words, they argued that they belonged in the 
nation and could become good Americans just like any other person of European descent.  
This pluralism, however, included an exclusionary component, for these pluralists did not 
recognize or acknowledge pluralism for everyone.  Instead, they argued that they would 
unify with Anglo Americans on the basis of their shared European history.  They did not 
promote a common history with people of Indian descent, and patently avoided 
discussing or adamantly denied any mixed heritage.11 
Some of the clearest examples of a pluralist strategy emerging among nativos first 
become apparent during Senator Beveridge’s 1902 whirlwind tour of the territories.  In 
these hearings, Senator William P. Dillingham (Republican, VT) closely questioned a 
probate clerk, Isidor Armijo, about his ancestry.  Armijo replied that he was “of Spanish 
extraction …. but I was born in the United States and I am an American.”  He saw no 
conflict in being both Spanish and American.  When Chairman Beveridge responded that 
 
11Kallen’s pluralism may have included similar exclusionary elements.  For while he did not think 
cultural differences threatened national unity, he mostly concentrated on people of European descent and 
did not extend his argument to people descended from other parts of the world.  See Horace Kallen, 
“Democracy vs. the Melting Pot,” Nation 100 (1915).  
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the committee was “just getting at the racial blood; that is all”12 and pressed him on his 
Mexican heritage, Armijo retorted, “Yes [his parents were Mexican],…and yours were 
German, but that doesn’t make you Dutch.”13 Armijo did not see heritage as dictating 
national affiliation and made sure that Beveridge understood this.     
 Armijo’s views were shared by others from New Mexico.  Pablo Jaramillo, a 
census enumerator, identified himself to the Beveridge committee as a “Spaniard,” 
explaining that he had been born in and always lived in New Mexico.  The Beveridge 
committee interviewed another census taker, Clementa Ortíz, about whom she had visited 
for the census, asking, “And to what race did those inhabitants mainly belong, Mexican 
or American?”  Like Armijo, Ortíz replied using her own terms, “Spanish; that is not any 
Indians.” According to Ortíz’s response, there were very few Mexicans in New Mexico 
since she understood Mexican to mean either a Mexican immigrant or someone of a 
mixed racial background, people whom she did not see as present in New Mexico.14 
Another interviewee interspersed his own terms with those of his interviewers, but 
demonstrated that he had no intention of concealing his heritage.  Thus, when the 
Beveridge Committee grilled a New Mexican justice of peace about the language used 
for recordkeeping, José Maria Garcia answered that they were generally kept “in Spanish, 
because the people here are Spanish …and of course I like my own language better than 
any other, the same as I like the United States better than any other country in the world.”  
Garcia’s clever response made it abundantly clear that he considered himself a member 
 
12Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Territories, 57th Cong., 2d sess., (1902), 100-101 (hereafter cited as New Statehood Bill Subcommittee 
Hearings.)
13Quoted in M.G. Cunniff, “The Last of the Territories” World’s Work 11 (Jan., 1906), 7115 in 
Ephemera files (EPH-HAIV-14), Arizona Historical Society, Tucson.  
14Senate Committee on the Territories, New Statehood Bill Subcommittee Hearings, 20, 35. 
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of the U.S., but that did not mean that he felt he needed to speak or maintain records in 
English in order to belong.15 
In reporting on the statehood hearings and subsequent debates, the Spanish-
language press emerged as one of the foremost proponents of pluralism.  After hearing of 
Beveridge’s trip, La Voz del Pueblo (Las Vegas, NM) speculated that if statehood was 
denied, it would be solely because of the number of Spanish-speakers in the territories.  
The editors wondered openly what this had to do with whether or not New Mexico was 
sufficiently prepared for statehood and denied the validity of any argument requiring a 
single language for national unity.16 El Labrador (Las Cruces, NM) mocked Beveridge’s 
observation that he had heard schoolchildren speaking Spanish and ironically remarked, “ 
‘Tremendo descubrimiento! [Tremendous discovery!]’ ”  They reminded their readers 
that speaking Spanish was not a crime and did not threaten the republic.17 On a more 
serious note, La Voz del Pueblo sadly lamented the problems existing between English 
and Spanish speakers, stating that there should not be such differences between 
“miembros de una misma nación [members of a same nation].”  Its editors saw no 
difficulty with two languages in one country and argued that speaking Spanish did not 
imply any lack of loyalty.18 
Slowly, the nativo pluralists began to receive some support from outside the 
territories.  In 1903, for example, the Omaha World-Herald questioned why New Mexico 
 
15Ibid., 41.   
16“El Estado in Dudo,” La Voz del Pueblo (Las Vegas, NM), November 22, 1902.  
17Although these newspapers had a vested interest in maintaining the Spanish-language, they 
would not continue to print the voluminous number of articles on the subject if their readers disagreed. “La 
Admision de Nuevo Mexico,” El Labrador (Las Cruces, NM), December 5, 1902, my trans. 
18Repr. From La Voz del Pueblo, August 5, 1911 in Gibert, “La Voz del Pueblo,” 382, my trans. 
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was being denied admission because of its Spanish-speaking residents when people in the 
states of Louisiana and Missouri continued to converse in French.19 
Amongst themselves, the nativo pluralists, and the Spanish-language press in 
particular, continued to do much to encourage Spanish-speakers to maintain their 
language skills and instruct their children.  La Revista de Taos (Taos, NM) chided New 
Mexican schools for promoting Latin over Spanish.20 La Voz del Pueblo criticized the 
people of Mexican descent who discouraged their children from speaking “‘mejicano’” 
and taught their kids to pronounce Spanish words like non-Spanish speakers by 
eliminating the rolling sound of the letter “rr” used in Spanish.  They admonished those 
readers who did this and reminded them of the beauty of their language—a  “ ‘jewel’ ” 
from the ancestors that they should respect and admire.21 El Independiente (Las Vegas, 
NM) cajoled its readers not to be ashamed of their language or the rate at which they 
learned English, and noted how many foreigners to the country did not speak English 
despite the vast resources provided to them.22 Journalists for La Voz del Pueblo 
proclaimed the superiority of those who knew more than one language and noted how 
Spanish would aid business transactions, particularly with other countries.23 A clever 
poem in the same newspaper, reacting to the pressure being brought on the peoples of the 
territories to learn English, declared that statehood would not occur until “frogs grow 
hair, mules have children, and donkeys learn to read” at which time no one would speak 
 
19“Admit the Territories,” Omaha (NE) World-Herald, January 23, 1903.  
20“De la Capital de Nuevo Mexico,” La Revista de Taos (NM), August 19, 1910. 
21“El Idioma Castellano,” La Voz del Pueblo, December 24, 1904, my trans. 
22“El Idioma Castellano,” El Independiente, repr. in El Labrador, December 30, 1904. 
23“Defensa de Nuestra Idioma,” La Voz del Pueblo, February 25, 1911. 
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Castilian any longer, it having been abolished.  Instead “all the neighboring donkeys” 
would “bray in English.”24 
Many in the Spanish-language press supported learning English since they 
recognized the opportunities that such a skill would bring in the United States.  These 
pluralists adopted what the Spanish scholar, Arturo Fernández-Gibert, identifies as a 
“dual discourse.”  They encouraged nativos to learn English while they simultaneously 
promoted the use of Spanish as a community language, one tied to the collective memory 
of their ancestors.25 Usually the periodicals affirmed the need to learn English first, and 
then concentrated on explaining to their readers why they should maintain Spanish and 
have pride in their native tongue.  La Voz del Pueblo included an article which sums up 
this view: “we need to learn the language of our country, and that we are doing; but we 
don’t need to, with such motive, deny our origin, our race, our language…”26 
In addition to promoting both the English and Spanish languages, pluralists 
sought to change the minds of those who believed that a common language was central to 
national identity and unity.  They criticized Arizonans for passing a 1909 law (literacy 
law) which required its residents to read and understand a section of the U.S. Constitution 
in English in order to vote.27 But they did not dismiss the idea of having something in 
common to keep a diverse set of Americans unified.  They replaced the idea of a 
 
24“Cuando Será Estado Nuevo México?” La Voz del Pueblo, February 16, 1908, my trans. 
25See Fernández-Gibert, “La Voz del Pueblo,” chap. 7.  Erlinda Gonzales-Berry discusses these 
language issues in her article, “Which Language Will Our Children Speak,” in The Contested Homeland: A 
Chicano History of New Mexico, ed. Erlinda Gonzales-Berry and David R. Maciel (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2000) and argues that nuevomexicanos used arguments about the 
practicality of learning Spanish and using Spanish to help native speakers learn English, rather than making 
arguments about native-language rights because they feared these arguments would not help their case for 
statehood.   
26Repr. from La Voz Del Pueblo, February 25, 1911 in Fernández-Gibert, “La Voz del Pueblo,”
415-16, my trans. 
27“La Villania Arizoniana,” La Voz del Pueblo, March 13, 1909.  
73
universal language with that of a common heritage, one rooted in a shared European 
ethnicity and a history of conquering the Americas together.  Unlike the Beveridge 
committee, which had seemed to delight in the fact that one school superintendent did not 
know who Christopher Columbus was, the pluralists—led by the talented Larrazolo—
spun a tale of a common history which began long before the Pilgrims looked upon the 
revered Plymouth Rock.28 
Octaviano Larrazolo spoke eloquently and frequently on behalf of his European 
past.  In 1907, Larrazolo reminded the assembled crowd at the Coronado 
Commemorative Convention that intrepid Spaniards had crossed the mysterious seas to 
the New World, willingly burnt their ships to aid in their conquest over the powerful 
Aztec empire, and then christianized the Indians in New Mexico and other places long 
before the English had even thought about settling at Jamestown.  Their bold actions had 
resulted in future conquests in the Americas.  As a result, their descendants did not need 
any special tutelage on how to become American.  Moreover, they deserved credit for 
making the U.S. possible.29 Through these speeches, Larrazolo worked to build a shared 
memory and history among persons of Mexican descent by connecting them to the 
Spanish conquistadores. At the same time he linked them to other Europeans by pointing 
out how the Spaniards were the first among many Europeans to venture to the New 
 
28Miguel Antonio Otero, Otero: An Autobiographical Trilogy (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 214; 
Newspaper clipping, no source, n.d., box 1, scrapbook, Bernard Rodey Papers, MSS 175 BC, CSWR. 
29Larrazolo speech, Coronado Commemorative Convention, Albuquerque (NM), October 9, 1907, 
box 1, file 11, Larrazolo Papers, CSWR.  Larrazolo’s mention of ship-burning refers to the conquest story 
in which the Spaniards voluntarily burned their ships to force themselves to fight harder, knowing they 
would have no easy method of escape.  
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World, so that he and other people of Mexican descent would feel a sense of belonging 
and community with the dominant Anglo Americans in the nation.30 
Benjamin Maurice Read, a prominent attorney, territorial legislator, and a native-
born New Mexican of Anglo and Mexican descent, also promoted pluralism.  Raised 
primarily by his nativo mother, after his father had died when he was still a boy, he 
preferred Spanish to English.  Troubled by the lack of New Mexican history written in 
the Spanish-language and the Anglos’ growing control over territorial affairs, Read 
researched the territory’s history from the perspective of people of Mexican descent.  He 
worried that if he did not do so, the Anglo view and narrative of events would prevail, 
consigning nuevomexicanos and their culture to a secondary place in society.  In his first 
book on the history of the U.S.-Mexican War (1910), Read emphasized the early roots of 
American expansionism.  In his second book on the history of New Mexico, he sought to 
treat the Spanish conquerors more objectively than he believed that Anglo historians had 
done.31 
Some Anglo Americans accepted these pluralists’ arguments and promoted a 
connection between the history of nuevomexicanos and other Americans.  In 1909, 
journalist John Cowan informed his readers that a Spaniard, Juan de Oñate, had 
established “European civilization at Santa Fe” before “a Saxon had set foot in New 
England.”32 At times, even President Theodore Roosevelt supported the idea of a 
common history, as he did when he noted that “some [Spaniards] had come to New 
 
30This concept of building collective memories is from George Lipsitz and is discussed in William 
V. Flores and Rina Benmayor, eds., Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 266-68. 
31Doris Meyer, Speaking for Themselves: Neomexicano Cultural Identity and the Spanish-
Language Press, 1880-1920 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 193-205.  
32John L. Cowan, “Two More Stars for Old Glory,” Pacific Monthly 22, no. 3 (Sept. 1909): 232. 
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Mexico, as did your ancestors, Governor [Otero], at a time when not one English 
speaking community existed on the Atlantic seaboard,” and praised them for their spirit 
of adventure.33 
Like Anglo Americans who admired their English forebears more than they 
necessarily identified with modern England, pluralists associated themselves more with 
their ancestors and Spain’s former glory than to current relatives in that nation or to 
modern-day Spain.  Such connections meant that they could be proud of (and convince 
others to acknowledge and respect) their Spanish past without conflicting with Anglo 
Americans’ negative ideas about impoverished southern Europeans (including Spaniards) 
who continued to emigrate to the states.  For the most part, however, there was very little, 
if any, discussion about the relationship between people of Mexican descent and recent 
Spanish immigrants.34 
Pluralists continued to emphasize their European and conquistador tradition 
through a variety of celebrations and speeches.  When exclusionists tried to smear them 
for not knowing American history, pluralists countered by suggesting that perhaps Anglo 
Americans did not know the history of their country and the role that Spanish conquerors 
had played in dominating and settling it.  Pluralists believed that people of Mexican 
descent were just as American as those with Anglo ancestry, and thus felt their was no 
need for them to change or assimilate.  In 1911, Benjamin Read lauded Don Diego de 
Vargas’s 1693 conquest over the Pueblo Indians as one of the most important events in 
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New Mexican history.35 Other prominent men agreed as George Armijo—a famed 
Rough Rider—dressed as Vargas at the Santa Fe Fiesta in 1911, visually highlighting his 
and other festivalgoers’ Spanish heritage and role in helping to civilize the territory.36 
But as these accounts attest, there was also an exclusionary element to the 
pluralists’ strategy.  Like the assimilationists, they believed it was best to associate 
themselves with the groups deemed most American, rather than allying with those 
outside the corridors of power.  In particular, the pluralists enhanced their standing by 
stressing their conquistador history while remaining silent about the place of Indians in 
their narrative of the past.  Although many people of Mexican descent in the territories 
were likely the progeny of people of a variety of backgrounds (Europeans had 
extensively intermarried with Indians and Africans or others of diverse backgrounds in 
the region), pluralists did not mention Aztec or Pueblo leaders, except when they were 
conquered, and effectively erased them from their histories.37 While prominent pluralists 
such as Read, Armijo, and Larrazolo chose to remember Vargas’s conquest in New 
Mexico, they ignored the bold story of the Pueblo Indian, Popé, who led the successful 
1680 Rebellion, in which the Indians expelled the Spaniards from their communities and 
prevented their return for thirteen years.  
Although the pluralists did not explicitly discuss the class status of people of 
Mexican descent, it was clear that the most active proponents of pluralism were those of 
eminent stature who considered themselves equal to those of Anglo descent.  While they 
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spoke in terms embracing all nativos, it seemed that those with a higher class standing 
could more easily sell this heritage within and beyond the territories.  Historically, class 
status had helped to determine racial status in Mexico and much of Latin America as 
those who had achieved a high economic standing often attained whiteness as well.  Even 
some exclusionists and marginalizationists like the Harvard-educated editor of World’s 
Work, Michael Glen Cunniff, seemed inclined to concede that people of Mexican descent 
with the highest stature had a pure Spanish heritage.38 He would not grant this same 
racial status to an ordinary worker of Mexican descent.  As the statehood debates raged 
on, the pluralists would continue to promote and disseminate their strategy of formally 
including people of Mexican ancestry into the nation, primarily on the basis of their 
shared European heritage and history with Anglo Americans.  But theirs was not the only 
new strategy to arise from the dispute over the territories.   
The Marginalizationists 
Marcus Aurelious Smith, known as the “octopus” by his enemies for his 
formidable campaigning techniques, moved to Arizona from Kentucky in 1881.  He 
became Arizona’s delegate to Congress in 1902 and later one of the state’s first senators.  
In the first years of the twentieth century, Arizona leaders such as the influential Smith 
worked closely with New Mexico in their joint aim to attain separate statehood.  As an 
avid supporter of this cause, Smith seemed more like an assimilationist when he argued 
that people of Mexican descent in the Arizonan and New Mexican territories could learn 
new ways and become like Anglo Americans.39 But when the members of Congress 
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began to rally around the idea of bringing in a new mega-state, combining the territories 
of Arizona and New Mexico into one, Smith began to speak differently about New 
Mexico and its denizens of Mexican descent.  He argued then that Arizona was more 
American than New Mexico since people of Anglo descent dominated the territorial 
government.  Smith further noted that the nativos within his territory were diminishing in 
number relative to Anglo Americans, and that the few who remained were safely under 
the control of their employers.  In making this argument, Smith and his allies created a 
new strategy for dealing with newcomers:  marginalization.   
 The first marginalizationists were political and economic leaders, mostly of Anglo 
descent, within the Arizona and New Mexican territories.  While some of the men 
originally had aligned themselves with the assimilationists because they favored 
statehood for their territories, many of them did not believe that people of Mexican 
descent could or should be entitled to be full Americans like themselves.  Like 
exclusionists, they considered nativos inferior due to their status as lowly workers in the 
mines, ranches, and agricultural sectors of the territorial economies.  Because of the jobs 
the nativos held, marginalizationists did not believe that these workers were of pure 
Spanish descent and therefore did not consider them white.  They differed from the 
exclusionists, however, in that they favored statehood and believed that nativos within the 
territories would not threaten an Anglo American model of national unity nor overturn 
the existing class structure.  Thus, they allied initially with the assimilationists in arguing 
that people of Mexican descent could fit within the nation and become full Americans, 
even as they were skeptical about it.  But when the debate over combining the two 
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territories erupted in 1904, the marginalizationists staked out a position distinct from that 
of the assimilationists. 
 Before that happened, a few statehood supporters offered a glimpse of the 
marginalizationists’ nascent strategy.  In 1902, the Arizona delegate to Congress, Marcus 
Smith explained that there was no need to fear that nativos would challenge the dominant 
classes because “we never have had any strikes down there, practically speaking….they 
[people of Mexican descent] never bother about that kind of thing.”40 Colonel Ira M. 
Bond backed him up, testifying that “we have no strikes out there.”41 Smith noted that 
while there were some “low and ordinary common laborers” from Mexico, there were 
only a few and they “had no appreciable effect whatsoever on an election or on the public 
spirit of the country.”42 The following year, the new Arizona delegate to Congress, John 
Wilson, explained to congress members that while his territory included some Mexican 
immigrants, only 719 of the territory’s registered voters were originally from Mexico.  
He added, “if they come they go back,” a statement that presaged future arguments 
concerning the immigrants’ transience in the country.43 Agreeing with these territorial 
representatives, Senator Stephen B. Elkins (Republican, WVA) jumped into the fray with 
his version of historical facts, arguing that “Mexicans” were becoming outnumbered as 
“no race can withstand the Anglo-Saxon.  The Latin races and the mixed Latin races give 
way before it.  That was the case in California; it was the case in Colorado, and it is the 
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case in New Mexico.”44 Senator Charles Reid (Democrat, AR) later agreed, describing 
how the “Mexicans” and “Indians” had disappeared from California and would soon do 
so in Arizona and New Mexico as well.45 As these examples demonstrate, the 
marginalizationists were beginning to stress that people of Mexican descent could be 
brought into the nation via statehood in ways that would not pose any threat to other 
Americans.  They argued that nativos were docile and marginal members of American 
society who would not threaten the status quo and would either return soon to Mexico or 
eventually die out as they became overrun by superior Anglo Americans.   
Once joint statehood became an official bill in 1904, Arizona marginalizationists 
promoted their nascent strategy more forcefully.  Fearing that joint statehood would 
cause them to lose their economic and political authority to the more populous New 
Mexican territory, many Anglo Arizonans began to distinguish themselves from New 
Mexicans.  They abandoned their assimilationist rhetoric in their efforts to convince other 
Americans that the Anglo population was the dominant group in Arizona, ran the 
territorial government, and controlled the few people of Mexican descent within it.   
Just as assimilationists like Otero had contrasted themselves against Indians, 
blacks, and islanders to persuade others that nativos were American, so too did the 
marginalizationists in Arizona demonstrate how they differed from the neighboring 
territory by stressing their Anglo population and culture.  R.E. Morrison, an attorney 
from Arizona, testified that “we conduct everything in the English language in our 
schools and in the courts of Arizona.  In New Mexico, where they have a large Spanish 
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and Mexican population, an interpreter is present practically all the time in the courts and 
frequently in the schoolroom.”46 Morrison’s language implied that Arizona was more 
English-speaking and Anglo, and thus more American.  In case there was any doubt 
about his meaning, he later added that white men had fought and taken Arizona from the 
Apaches and asked that “it be left to the white men…we say that we are entitled to 
that.”47 An editorial cartoon in the Arizona Republican portrayed the Arizona territory as 
a white woman in a flowing dress and about to be married—against her will as she is in 
handcuffs—to a mustachioed man representing New Mexico and wearing cowboy regalia 
and a sombrero.  The sketch reveals that the cartoonist thought that the elegantly coiffed 
Arizona would fit in well with the rest of the nation; New Mexico would not.48 Although 
there were some marginalizationists in New Mexico who used arguments similar to those 
in Arizona, there was a greater percentage of people of Mexican descent in New 
Mexico—and more with higher class standing—making it harder for Anglo 
marginalizationists there to say that they controlled the nativos or dominated the political 
scene.  
 Arizonan marginalizationists stressed that the “American white population” in 
their territory was larger than the census had shown, was growing relative to the people 
of Mexican descent, and that this group controlled territorial politics.  These 
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marginalizationists denied the territory’s racially diverse population by asserting that 
Arizona was more homogeneous than its opponents believed, and that the few non-whites 
who lived there had negligible influence on politics.  Thus, they argued that making 
Arizona a state would not threaten the nation’s homogeneity.49 Governor Joseph H. 
Kibbey of Arizona explained that most of the nativos in the territory did not vote and 
therefore would not affect the government of the potential state or the country.50 His 
successor, Governor Richard E. Sloan, reiterated that nativos would have little influence 
over government affairs. “The Mexican population,” he declared, “is not more than 
fifteen per cent, mostly itinerants, and likewise no important factor in politics, for the 
American population is increasing while the Spanish-American stands still.”51 
Some people of Mexican descent indirectly aided the marginalizationists’ efforts.  
Carlos Velasco, an intellectual from the elite class of Sonora, Mexico immigrated to 
Arizona for political reasons and ultimately decided to stay.  In Tucson, he published one 
of the first Spanish-language newspapers in Arizona, El Fronterizo, and helped to found 
the conservative Alianza Hispano-Americana (AHA) organization in 1894.  While the 
organization sought to help all people of Mexican descent in the U.S., its leaders 
concentrated on improving the workers’ moral character by admonishing them to eschew 
vagrancy, respect work, and remain in their lowly positions as the marginalizationists 
would want them to do.  The AHA’s modest agenda reflected the upper-class status of its 
members as well as the shaky political climate in which it found itself.  If AHA leaders 
worked too hard to contest the dominant Anglo American majority on behalf of the 
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workers, they might threaten their own tenuous political and economic ties with the 
Anglo community.52 
Velasco’s other mission was to encourage the repatriation of Mexicans to Mexico.  
This endeavor aided the arguments of the fledgling marginalizationists as they were 
beginning to argue that Mexicans would leave when the work was done.  Velasco printed 
numerous articles promoting repatriation as he hoped to make the immigrants as 
temporary as Governor Sloan had implied.  He also recommended that U.S. employers 
hire and repatriate Mexican labor rather than contracting for expensive Chinese “coolies” 
who were difficult to return.53 Some Mexicans agreed.  La Voz del Estado (Magdalena, 
Mexico) called upon its Mexican compatriots to return to Mexico where they would be 
treated better.  The newspaper noted that only those who were “totally Americanized or 
given to adulation,” would be accepted in the U.S.54 Other Arizonans of Mexican 
descent did little to help the recent immigrants from Mexico.  Although they shared an 
ethnicity with the new arrivals, the Arizonan nativos believed that they had nothing in 
common with them.  Whereas the immigrants before the 1890s had been skilled workers 
from the mines of Mexico, many of the newcomers emigrated from farms and did not 
possess any special skills.  In general, the small Spanish-language press in Arizona did 
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not reach out to support them and frowned upon any type of class uprising, which might 
jeopardize their own standing in society.55 
The growing number of marginalizationists joined the pluralists and 
assimilationists in quashing the movement for joint statehood.56 In doing so, they helped 
to spread their views about Arizona’s American qualities as well as in how they would 
deal with people of Mexican descent.  Influenced by the marginalizationists, a 
Republican representative from Wisconsin, J.W. Babcock agreed that the people of 
Arizona represented “sturdy Americanism in its best form” and regarded New Mexicans 
with great suspicion.57 Michael Glen Cunniff, the World’s Work editor concurred, 
viewing Arizona as better and more American than New Mexico.  With regards to New 
Mexico, he noted that “the chief problem lies in the people of the territory.”  He 
portrayed one of its cities as having “unlighted streets flanked by squat lines of adobe 
dwellings….the scene is all Spanish or all Mexican, as you will.  It is not American.”58 
Cunniff later decided to move to Arizona (to improve his failing health from 
tuberculosis) one year after he published this article.  He soon became one of the 
territory’s key delegates to the state constitutional convention, serving as convention 
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secretary as well as a member on many key committees.  In these positions, he helped to 
create the state’s governing document, which did little to protect nativos’ rights.59 
Charles Moreau Harger of Outlook repeated much of the marginalizationists’ 
arguments and helped to disseminate them nation-wide.  He noted how people of 
Mexican descent were decreasing in numbers and influence in the territories because 
while “some go back to their native country, others scatter as laborers,” adding that 
“American [Anglo] immigration” had changed the territories such that “to-day, the 
‘native’ occupies a secondary place.”  He further explained that people of Mexican 
descent would not threaten the nation since they did not conduct strikes or stay long 
enough to have any effect on the country.  Harger finally observed that they could be 
grouped into two classes—a laboring class and a business one—and quoted a manager of 
a large ranch as saying that, “ ‘they [people of Mexican descent] do not strike, and, 
treated well, they remain with you …. We must have laborers and this class furnishes 
them.’ ”60 In other words, the marginalizationists wanted a limited or marginal 
incorporation for people of Mexican descent. They wanted them to provide their labor 
without threatening the status quo. 
Like the exclusionists, marginalizationists did not think that nativos had the 
requisite racial or class background to become full Americans.  But in contrast to the 
exclusionists and assimilationists, they did not worry much about whether or not they 
learned English or adapted to Anglo American ways since they perceived the nativos as 
permanently working-class or transient, and thus unlikely to affect territorial or national 
politics.  The marginalizationists also thought that Arizona increasingly would be 
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dominated by Anglos as more such Americans—including Delegate Smith from 
Kentucky and the editor Cunniff among others—arrived in the territory every year.  But 
the marginalizationists were also not just talkers, for while they argued that people of 
Mexican descent posed no threat to national unity, they did their utmost to ensure that 
this remained the case by passing and attempting to enact laws that would restrict nativos 
to marginal positions in territorial society.  In 1909, the Arizona territorial legislature 
succeeded in passing the literacy law for voter eligibility.  Although this was not directed 
solely at people of Mexican descent (many in Arizona were concerned about the 
expanding European immigrant population as well), it removed the vote from many who 
had held that right since 1848.  It would be difficult for nativos to have much political 
power as long as this law remained in force.61 
The Pluralists and Marginalizationists Succeed  
 Eventually, both the pluralists and the marginalizationists succeeded in 
acquainting and persuading enough Americans of the validity of their strategies for 
incorporating or excluding people of Mexican descent.  In 1908, shortly after the jointure 
bill had failed, President Roosevelt and his successor William Taft decided to abandon 
their efforts to sustain it.  They understood that the territories, and Arizona in particular, 
would not alter their stance against joint statehood.  The recent election of a Republican, 
Ralph Cameron, as the Arizona delegate to Congress—and the fact that New Mexico’s 
new governor, George Curry, was a close friend of Teddy Roosevelt’s—may have been 
factors in their acquiescence as the Republicans worried less about the new states 
boosting the strength of the Democratic Party.  By 1910, U.S. congress members, 
including the indefatigable Beveridge, had reconciled themselves to the fact that the 
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territories would never accept being merged as one state.  Thus, they approved enabling 
acts, placing the territories on paths to individual statehood after they drafted state 
constitutions.62 
The stipulations in these enabling acts demonstrated the effectiveness of each of 
the strategies for dealing with newcomers.  Exclusionists such as Senators Dillingham 
and Beveridge succeeded in adding requirements that both the U.S. Congress and the 
U.S. President approve the draft constitutions.  This specification had not been imposed 
upon any preceding state (generally only one or the other had to approve the document) 
and represented the exclusionists’ last attempt to prevent the territories and their diverse 
populations from entering into the nation.  The assimilationists also had some success as 
they inserted language mandating public schools to teach their primary coursework in 
English.  Before this bill passed, Senator Beveridge tried to include a ban on teaching 
Spanish in the schools.  The pluralists’ influence helped to overturn this amendment.63 
Pluralists also succeeded in overriding Arizona’s 1909 literacy law for the purpose of 
electing delegates to the constitutional convention and the new states’ first elections.64 
Finally, the marginalizationists contributed to the enabling acts as the final language 
directed that the new constitutions require that all state officeholders speak, write, read, 
and understand English effectively.  This specification would limit the opportunities of 
Spanish-only speakers in both of the new states.  
 Despite this setback, pluralists worked hard in New Mexico to maintain nativos’ 
existing rights in their new constitution.  They had a strong incentive to do so as they well 
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knew how nuevomexicanos had been attacked during the statehood debates and observed 
how nativos’ rights had been diminished in Arizona.  They succeeded because of their 
class standing, their ties across racial lines, and also because they had sufficient numbers 
and political clout to elect 32 people of Mexican descent (out of 100 delegates) to the 
territory’s constitutional convention.  In addition, Solomon Luna, a wealthy rancher and 
one of the most respected men of Mexican descent in the territory, was chosen to be the 
chair of the Committee on Committees, giving a nativo a substantial say in the 
composition of the committees that would draft various portions of the constitution.65 
Pluralists at the New Mexican constitutional convention pressed forward with 
establishing a number of protections for people of Mexican descent.  The constitution 
ultimately specified that no person could be disfranchised due to “religion, race, language 
or color” or be prohibited from serving on juries or holding offices (other than state-wide 
ones that were restricted to English speakers per the enabling acts) because of not 
knowing how to read, write or speak either English or Spanish.  They added language 
that gave people facing criminal prosecution the right to have charges and testimony 
interpreted to them in a language that they knew.  Furthermore, the pluralists made sure 
that the proceedings of the convention, ballots, and all public documents would be made 
available in Spanish as well as English.  They also made sure that the constitution 
stipulated that there would be no prohibition on the use of wine in any religious service 
and that “children of Spanish descent” would not be prohibited from attending public 
schools nor required to attend separate ones, and “shall forever enjoy perfect equality 
with other children in all public schools and education institutions of the State.”  The 
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constitution further declared that funding should be provided to train all teachers in 
Spanish as well as English so that they could teach Spanish-speaking students more 
effectively.  Within the state’s bill of rights, pluralists succeeded in maintaining all the 
rights originally extended to the New Mexican people in the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.  Finally, the convention members approved a constitution that was extremely 
difficult to amend in regards to certain provisions for people of Mexican descent.  For the 
sections on the franchise and education, the constitution required that three-fourths of 
each branch of the legislature approve the change as well as two-thirds of the population 
of each county.  This provision would make it less likely that nativos would see their 
rights evaporate.66 
Despite these inclusionary and protective measures, the pluralists also 
incorporated exclusionary elements in the state constitution.  Few provisions protected 
New Mexicans of African or Indian descent.  An early version of the document allowed 
school districts to establish separate schools for people of African descent when two-
thirds of the voters desired it.  Such a policy would have replicated the discrimination and 
segregation of the Jim Crow South.  Only three of the five nativos on the Education 
Subcommittee (and none of the six Anglos) opposed this provision.  Although this 
language was not included in the final constitution, there was no distinct wording 
protecting people of African descent from being placed in separate schools as had been 
spelled out for nativos.67 In addition to their complicity with African Americans’ 
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exclusion, pluralists kept silent about Pueblo Indians, creating no special provisions to 
allow Pueblo Indians to vote, as they had been able to do formerly under Mexican rule.68 
In general, pluralists expressed satisfaction with the final document, believing that 
it would help to protect their rights to speak and use Spanish and to continue following 
specific customs.  At the close of the convention, Nestor Montoya, a delegate and the 
editor of La Bandera Americana (Las Cruces, NM), presented a gold cane to H.R. 
Whiting, the Sergeant-at-Arms for the convention, in gratitude for all the delegates’ work 
in protecting the rights of nativos.  Montoya explained that “in the name of the Spanish-
American members of the Convention, I wish to say, that all delegates here have, as one 
man, helped to safeguard the rights of the two hundred thousand people of that blood in 
this Territory.”69 Benjamin Read was equally enthusiastic about the new constitution and 
its protection of the Spanish-language.70 The Spanish-language newspaper El Tiempo 
(Las Cruces, NM) agreed and lauded the convention results.71 Even former governor 
Otero adopted more of a pluralist stance and stumped around the territory on behalf of the 
proposed governing document.  He called upon “fellow citizens of Spanish-American 
blood, the same as I am and my ancestors were” to vote for the constitution.  While he 
acknowledged the limits of the document, specifically its ban against non-English 
speakers holding state office, he pointed out that New Mexicans did not need to speak 
English for county- and precinct-level positions and that the current, territory-wide 
officials all knew English anyway.72 When it was time for the territorial residents to 
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vote, “in English or in Spanish,” for or against the constitution, the residents 
overwhelmingly approved it.  Eventually both the U.S. Congress and President Taft did 
so as well with New Mexico becoming a state in 1912.73 As an additional symbol of the 
pluralists’ success, Octaviano Larrazolo became one of the state’s first governors in 1916.   
The pluralists did not do so well in Arizona.  Following the heated debates over 
joint statehood, the Arizona marginalizationists had persuaded many Americans that their 
territory was quite different from New Mexico, and more like the rest of the nation, since 
the Anglos controlled Arizona’s territorial politics.  In part, this had been achieved by a 
series of territorial laws or acts limiting nativos’ opportunities, including the 1909 
literacy law.74 Anglos had also worked to exclude people of Mexican descent from key 
elected positions.  Even in Tucson, where the nativos or los tucsonenses—as they called 
themselves there—held the majority, the Anglos dominated city politics.75 
A clear sign of Anglo control was the lack of nativo representation at the state 
constitutional convention.  Only one out of the territory’s 52 delegates to the convention 
was nativo—the assimilationist Carlos Jácome—despite the fact that people of Mexican 
descent comprised about 20 percent of Arizona’s population.  Furthermore, Jácome had a 
minimal role at the convention.  Although there were 21 subcommittees created to draft 
portions of the constitution, Jácome, a long term Arizona resident, served on only one.  
The upstart delegate Cunniff, who had arrived only three years earlier, served on four 
major committees and as convention secretary.  Another delegate, E.A. Tovrea, came 
 
73New Mexicans approved the constitution in January 1911 with 31,742 in favor and 13,399 
opposed. See Senate, New Mexico Constitution, 61st Cong., 3d sess., (Washington, DC: GPO, 1911), 6.  
While the U.S. Congress had some issues with the difficulty of the amendment process, it eventually passed 
and New Mexico became a state in January 1912.  
74“An Act Enabling the People of New Mexico and Arizona to Form a Constitution and State 
Government,” 4-6.  
75 Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, 121-22.  
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from Illinois and was of Italian descent, yet he served on three committees.  Furthermore, 
Jácome initiated none of the 150 or so propositions that delegates presented for inclusion 
in the constitution.  He was not recorded as saying anything substantial in the official 
minutes and journals of the convention.  Despite his exile to the minor subcommittee, 
“Schedule, Mode of Amending, and Miscellaneous,” Jácome and his fellow committee 
members grappled with one issue that sparked some debate amongst the other convention 
members.  Their five-person committee approved language prohibiting interracial 
marriage—which they defined as being between whites and “negroes” or whites and 
people of Chinese descent—for the state constitution.  But their fellow delegates thought 
differently, believing that the subcommittee members had shirked their duties by defining 
interracial marriage too narrowly.  One convention member called for the prohibitions to 
extend at least to Indians and Japanese as well while another thought it should cover all 
of the “obnoxious races.”  Ultimately, the delegates voted to cast the issue aside and 
leave it out of the constitution.76 
In their state constitution, the marginalizationists instituted a number of 
provisions to limit the opportunities of people of Mexican descent.  First, they restricted 
public works jobs to U.S. citizens, thereby excluding all Mexican immigrants and Indians 
(who were not citizens) from this line of work.  There was also an effort to restrict 
hazardous but desirable jobs, such as mining, to only English speakers.  
Marginalizationists argued that those speaking languages other than English would put 
their fellow workers in danger.  Some exclusionists (now present in the territory since 
statehood was virtually assured) called for an even stricter ban that would prohibit 
 
76Arizona Constitutional Convention. Minutes of the Constitutional Convention of the Territory of 
Arizona (Phoenix: Phoenix Printing Co., 1910), 22-24 and John S. Goff, ed., The Records of the Arizona 
Constitutional Convention of 1910 (Phoenix: Supreme Court of Arizona, 1991), Proposition 145, p. 732.  
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employers from hiring any alien labor.77 A representative of the Immigration Restriction 
League wrote to the chair (and future state governor) of the convention, George P. Hunt, 
warning that if such a prohibition was not put into place, “it will be New Mexico all over 
again only a good deal worse.”78 Both of these measures were rejected, but primarily 
because of a fear that such bans would result in an insufficient supply of workers, causing 
the major mines of Metcalf and Morenci to shut down and hurt the new state’s economy.  
Some marginalizationists also made an effort to codify the 1909 literacy law into the state 
constitution.  They failed in this, however, as some Democratic convention members 
feared that would be held responsible for disfranchising Arizonans and reap the negative 
consequences (by seeing Republicans elected) since the enabling acts mandated that no 
person be prevented from voting due to their lack of English-language proficiency for 
constitutional delegates and in the first state elections.79 
Initially, some marginalizationists also supported language providing for separate 
schools for whites and “coloreds,” whom they defined as people of African descent.  All 
other children would be deemed “white” for the purposes of education.  But like their 
New Mexican cohorts, Arizonans eventually avoided including this language and decided 
to retain their existing territorial laws on segregation.80 Despite the fact that the state 
constitution did not prohibit nativos from attending white schools, people of Mexican 
descent often did attend separate ones and frequently lived in segregated towns as well.81 
Although many of the proposed measures to limit nativos did not become part of the new 
 
77Goff, ed., The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, Proposition 91, pp. 
826-27, 1374. 
78Quoted in Pry, “The Politics of Arizona Statehood,” 273.  
79Ibid., 272-74.  
80Pry, “The Politics of Arizona Statehood,” 272; Goff, ed., Records of the Arizona Constitutional 
Convention, Propositions 15 and 73, pp. 1065, 1181. 
81Pry, “The Politics of Arizona Statehood,” 272 and Meeks, “Border Citizens,” 85-91.  
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constitution, the marginalizationists succeeded in keeping people of Mexican descent on 
edge and prevented them from having much power.  They would continue to propose 
similarly restrictive legislation in the years following statehood. 
Perhaps most damaging to the pluralists’ and assimilationists’ agendas in Arizona 
were the silences in the state’s governing document.  For unlike New Mexico’s 
constitution, which specified a variety of protections for nativos so that they could 
integrate themselves fully into the nation as either Spanish or Anglo Americans, there 
were no such provisions in the Arizona Constitution.  It made no allowance for public 
documents or ballots to be translated into the Spanish-language and offered no 
protections for monolingual Spanish speakers regarding education, voting or sitting on 
juries.  These silences were due to the much smaller middle-class population of people of 
Mexican descent in Arizona, most of whom were concentrated in and around Tucson and 
Pima County.  All five of the Republican representatives from Pima County, including 
Jácome, eventually voted against the constitution, but they were greatly outnumbered.  
The constitution passed with 40 in favor (mostly Democrats) and 12 (most Republicans) 
opposed.82 It was eventually approved by the U.S. Congress and President Taft and 
became the 48th state—the Valentine State—on February 14, 1912.  Marcus Smith, the 
marginalizationist, became one of the state’s first U.S. senators; Carl Hayden, who would 
soon become one of the more active marginalizationists of the 1920s, was elected as one 
of Arizona’s first U.S. representatives.  Their voices would resonate beyond their state as 
 
82Article, “Constitution Signers,” Arizona Statehood, 1911-1912 (HAV-22), Arizona Collection, 
Department of Archives and Manuscripts, University Libraries, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
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they explained how their residents fit within the nation without altering dominant 
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Chapter Four 
Changing Strategies for a New World 
 Born in Mexico in 1866, Pedro Garcia de la Lama later immigrated to New 
Mexico and became a U.S. citizen in 1894.  Two years later, he moved to Arizona and 
worked as the editor of a Spanish-language newspaper, El Progreso.   In 1902, he was 
called before the notorious Beveridge committee to provide testimony about the 
circulation of his periodical (1,500 subscribers) and whether or not he was born in 
Arizona.  The committee members asked him no other questions and Garcia likely knew 
it was futile to interject anything more to defend the merits of his adopted territory to the 
rest of the country.  After Arizona became a state, Garcia formed the Liga Protectora 
Latina, a mutual aid organization designed to help people of Mexican descent to cover 
the cost of illnesses and funerals, and to protect their rights.  Garcia was a pluralist.  
Unlike most other Mexican mutual aid organizations in Arizona, Garcia’s Liga 
Protectora worked as an advocate for recent immigrants, calling for bilingual education 
programs, fighting against discrimination in the criminal justice system, and advocating 
for people of Mexican descents’ right to vote and work, regardless of the language(s) 
they spoke.  While the Liga Protectora was hardly a revolutionary organization—it shied 
away from some strikes and unionization—most other local Mexican mutual aid groups 
operated even more conservatively, planning social functions and encouraging 
conformity rather than political activism.  
Initially, the Liga Protectora had supported workers.  But in the wake of fierce 
Americanization campaigns during and after the First World War, the Liga succumbed to 
the increasingly conservative environment, urging its members not to create problems 
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between capital and labor during wartime.  It increased membership dues to make it more 
difficult for working-class people, those most likely to pursue union membership or to 
organize strikes, to belong.  Within a few years, membership plummeted and the 
organization virtually disappeared.  Liga Protectora’s then withered state reflected the 
pluralists’ declining capacity to persuade Americans of the viability of their strategy for 
incorporating newcomers.1
The achievement of separate statehood in 1912 had represented a triumph for 
pluralism in New Mexico and marginalization in Arizona.  But no sooner had statehood 
been attained, than a surge in Mexican immigration and demands for conformity during 
World War I once again made the place of Mexicans in America unclear.  The more 
inclusionary strategies, however limited, declined under these pressures.  
Historical Background on Mexican Immigration and U.S. Immigration Policies 
Prior to the First World War, few Americans paid attention to Mexican 
immigrants as their numbers were insignificant compared to those coming from other 
countries.  So few people were concerned about their presence that Mexicans emigrated 
with virtually no restrictions since the head taxes for immigrant entry did not pertain to 
them.2
1See Thomas E. Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses: The Mexican Community in Tucson, 1854-1941 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 169-78; James D. McBride, “The Liga Protectora Latina: A 
Mexican American Benevolent Society in Arizona,” Journal of the West 14 (4) (1975): 82-90; Eric Vaughn 
Meeks, “Border Citizens: Race, Labor, and Identity in South-Central Arizona, 1910-1965” (PhD diss., 
University of Texas at Austin, 2001), 89-93, 102-116; Karen Jean Underhill, “Albert J. Beveridge’s 
Congressional Report on Arizona Territory in 1902” (master’s thesis, University of Arizona, 1990), 143-44, 
260. 
2Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-
1940  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 12.  Reisler further notes that these exemptions also did not 
apply for people from Canada, Cuba, or Newfoundland.  Technically, as early as 1891, Mexicans could be 
denied entry for being “likely to become a public charge” if they did not have sufficient funds when they 
crossed the border.  New York officials exercised this regulation vigorously in their crowded ports, 
weeding out potential burdens, but in the developing Southwest few inspectors enforced this provision as 
they anticipated that the newcomers would secure employment quickly.  In addition, while labor laws 
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During the first 50 years after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexican 
emigration continued to be minimal and unmonitored as the immigrants traveled back 
and forth across the newly created border for seasonal work on farms and ranches.  While 
more Mexicans began to cross the border to work in the mines, railroads, and agriculture 
in the late nineteenth century, southwestern inspectors made no effort to track the small 
movement and instead concentrated on documenting and prohibiting Asians and 
Europeans from entry.3 Mexican immigration was such a minor issue that the 
Commissioner-General of Immigration did not broach the subject in any of his reports 
until 1906.  Even in this annual summary, he merely observed that railroad companies in 
violation of contract labor laws had been actively recruiting laborers from Mexico, and 
vowed to watch the situation more closely.4
When Americans did notice the increasing Mexican population, they directed less 
animosity toward them than other immigrants.  Organized labor, not generally supportive 
of open borders, supported the marginalizationists’ position and considered a Mexican 
worker to be “something of an American,” provided that he performed only the lowest 
wage jobs and did not compete directly with white laborers for skilled work.  In the 
 
prohibited contracting with potential employees before they emigrated, railroads and other corporations 
frequently worked around this law and recruited workers directly from Mexico.  At times, the United States 
and Mexican governments negotiated formal agreements to permit contract arrangements in specific 
industries; presidents William Taft and Porfírio Díaz did just this in 1909, allowing for 1,000 Mexicans to 
pick sugar beets in the fields of Colorado and Nebraska.  This information may be found in Manuel García 
y Griego, “The Importation of Contract Laborers to the United States, 1942-1964: Antecedents, Operation, 
and Legacy,” in The Border That Joins: Mexican Migrants and U.S. Responsibility, ed. Peter G. Brown and 
Henry Shue (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), 55. 
3Samuel Bryan, “Mexican Immigrants in the United States,” Survey, September 7, 1912, 726-30. 
4US Department of Commerce and Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of 
Immigration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1906), 67.  
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words of one pro-union editor, these Mexican immigrants had “ ‘more right to be here 
than these Japanese and Italians and Greeks.’ ”5
Mexican immigration began to grow steadily after 1905 due to capitalist 
expansion in Mexico and the American Southwest.  After the Mexican president, Porfírio 
Díaz, intensified his efforts to modernize his country by repossessing communal land and 
selling it to foreign investors, many Mexicans who had been pushed off their land left 
their villages in search of opportunities in urban areas or the nascent mining communities 
of northern Mexico.6 This movement, combined with escalating population growth due 
to lower mortality rates, meant even more people vying for scarce jobs in the crowded 
mines and towns.  Some of these workers began crossing the border into the United 
States where prospects in agriculture, grazing, or mining appeared more promising.7 The 
 
5Victor S. Clark, “Mexican Labor in the United States,” Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor 78 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1908): 466-522, see 511 for quotations. 
6President Díaz achieved his objective by improving transportation networks and repossessing 
much of the land formerly held in common by indigenous communities and the Catholic Church.  These 
acquisitions permitted him to re-sell the land to investors interested in pursuing cash crops for higher 
profits than that possible by growing food staples for subsistence living.  The improved transit and land 
repossession destabilized rural communities such that people there could not compete with more affordable 
products coming from distant markets.  See Gilbert G. González, Culture of Empire: American Writers, 
Mexico, and Mexican Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 107. 
7The southwestern United States became an increasingly attractive option for these laborers.  Jobs 
proliferated in this part of the United States due to the recent implementation of the Newlands Reclamation 
Act in 1902, which spurred irrigation projects and large-scale farming enterprises in this formerly arid 
region.  The newly arable land combined with advanced refrigeration techniques in railcars transformed the 
U.S. Southwest into a major producer and supplier of fruits and vegetables for the nation.  Wages were also 
much higher in the United States and remained a significant factor in emigration as most of the emigrants 
in this early period came from the central states of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato.  On average, a 
worker in Jalisco earned about 12½ cents per day plus a handful of maize, and had no hope of saving any 
money.  In 1910, 90% of all Mexicans earned between 20 and 25 cents per day when they could earn $1.25 
per day in fewer hours in the United States, a differential that more than compensated for the higher cost of 
living.  See Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 136 for more information on the Newlands Reclamation 
Act and its effects.  See Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 3-5, 14-15 for a comparison of U.S and 
Mexican wages. 
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Mexican Revolution (1911) also spurred more immigration to the United States as 
Mexicans fled before the various armed factions.8
Although the exclusionists initially ignored this escalating Mexican immigration 
and instead concentrated their efforts on limiting Europeans and Asians, they succeeded 
in passing the Burnett-Johnson Immigration Act (literacy act) in 1917, which affected all 
entrants.9 The new legislation stipulated that all immigrants over the age of 16 be 
required to read in English or some other language/dialect.10 Furthermore, the law 
increased the head tax for entry to $8.00 and for the first time applied it to all immigrants, 
 
8Historian Gilbert González has minimized the role of the Revolution in fostering immigration, 
arguing that Mexico’s expanding market economy and interrelationship with the United States had more to 
do with encouraging the movement to el norte. This is likely correct, but the Revolution did spur some 
migration as a result of erratic farm production and violence, which forced people off haciendas.  See 
González, Culture of Empire, chap. 4 and Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 111.  Another reason 
Mexicans moved to the U.S. between 1910 to 1918, was because the production of corn and beans in 
Mexico declined dramatically due to the expansion of cash crops and the unstable farm production of the 
Revolution years, which resulted in soaring food prices, far beyond the reach of workers’ stagnant wages.  
Consequently, few could resist the lure of higher pay ranging from $1 to $3 per day for farming jobs and 
approximately $5 daily in the copper mines of the United States.  See Lawrence A. Cardoso, “Labor 
Emigration to the Southwest,” in Mexican Workers in the United States: Historical and Political 
Perspective, ed. George C. Kiser and Martha Woody Kiser (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1979), 16-18. 
9The origins of the literacy act date to 1887 when the economist Edward Bemis recommended that 
immigrants read or write in their native language before being accepted into the United States.  A few years 
later, the proposal’s popularity grew after Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, MA) recognized it as a 
convenient tool for denying entry of southern and eastern European immigrants, whom he considered 
unassimilable.  Joining together with members of the Immigration Restriction League in Boston, Samuel 
Gompers of the American Federation of Labor, and a growing number of western restrictionists, Senator 
Lodge worked feverishly to transform the literacy test into law.  Although many congressmen, particularly 
Republicans, favored the measure, they had expanding constituencies of naturalized Americans and feared 
electoral retribution.  Even so, the requirement almost became law several times before being vetoed by 
presidents Cleveland, Taft, and then Wilson.  But with war on the horizon and an intensified nationalism 
sweeping the country, the forces against immigration eventually proved strong enough to override 
President Wilson’s second veto on February 5, 1917.  See Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics 
of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 138-40.  
1042 Stat. 5; 8 United States Code 229.  The test could be administered in a variety of ways but 
generally U.S. officials showed the immigrants 30 to 40 words in their native language on a note card that 
they then had to read aloud.  An interpreter would then translate for the immigration official.  In more 
remote areas, the inspectors often handed the immigrants cards which required them to follow certain 
commands such as removing their hat, touching their right hand to their left shoulder, etc.  The inspector 
would have an English-language version and know the order in which the immigrants should perform the 
actions.  These details and more may be found in the US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the 
Commissioner General of Immigration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1917), xiv.   
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including those from Mexico.11 This literacy act drastically reduced Mexican 
immigration, even though Mexicans had not been the main target of the legislation, 
because over 50% of the potential immigrants were illiterate.  In addition, few Mexicans 
could afford the new tax.   
Shortly after the literacy act, the U.S. Congress passed the Selective Service Act, 
which had the effect of further decreasing Mexican emigration.  This act required all men 
living in the U.S. to register for military service, even though many of them would not be 
eligible for the draft due to their foreign status.  Many Mexicans opted not to emigrate 
rather than risk fighting on behalf of the United States.  Consequently, southwestern 
agriculturalists saw one of their major sources of labor dissipate at the same time as their 
European pool shrank from new literacy requirements, the increased head tax, and 
perilous wartime seas.  In addition, the United States army conscripted over one million 
Americans for the war effort, further reducing the number of available workers.  Still 
other native-born workers left the rural Southwest to seek higher paying opportunities in 
the war-related industries of the expanding cities.12 
At the same time as their sources of labor decreased, growers’ need for workers 
rose exponentially.  The world war had created greater demand for food products abroad 
as well as for raw materials such as long-staple cotton, which could be used for soldiers’ 
 
11The literacy act also established an Asiatic Barred Zone that excluded people from India, 
Polynesia, Afghanistan, Asiatic Russia, Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Arabia from emigrating.  See Bill 
Ong Hing, Defining American Through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), 
46, 60-61.  Also, prior to this act, the head tax did not apply to people from Mexico, Newfoundland, Cuba, 
and Canada.  See Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 12.   
12Lawrence A. Cardoso, “Labor Emigration to the Southwest,” Mexican Workers in the United 
States, ed. George C. Kiser and Martha Woody Kiser, 16-18.  See also Otey M. Scruggs, “The First 
Mexican Farm Labor Program,” Arizona and the West 2 (Winter 1960): 320.  The State Department 
reassured reticent Mexicans that they would not be drafted for service unless they became U.S. citizens.  
President Venustiano Carranza of Mexico explained this to his constituents as well.  Even so, the fear of 
being drafted reduced immigration during the war years.  See Jaime R. Aguila, “Protecting ‘México de 
Afuera:’ Mexican Emigration Policy, 1876-1928” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2000), 108-9. 
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uniforms, airplanes, tires, and other military supplies.  The pesky boll weevil contributed 
to the gap between supply and demand by eating the cotton crops in the Sea Islands off 
South Carolina and Georgia at the same time as the pink boll worm and the weevil were 
inflicting great damage on the Egyptian cotton supply.13 Anticipating a labor shortfall, 
farmers pressured U.S. Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson for waivers from the 
literacy act.  They requested that he use the hastily inserted language within it, which 
gave him the authority to admit “otherwise inadmissible aliens” when the situation 
warranted it.   
Concurring with the farmers’ assessment of a wartime emergency, Secretary 
Wilson permitted agricultural workers from Mexico to enter the United States for a short-
term period.  This edict exempted these agricultural laborers from the literacy test, the 
head tax, and applicable contract labor laws.14 It did not, however, mean open access for 
all Mexican immigrants but instead required potential employers to follow elaborate 
procedures.  These entailed requesting permission to bring in a specific number of 
laborers and spelling out the workers’ duties, rate of pay, housing conditions, and 
duration of their stay (not to exceed six months).  They further had to sign a contract 
stipulating their agreement to report if their temporary employees chose to work for 
someone else (necessitating the transfer of that contract to the new employer) or if their 
new hire deserted or disappeared.  The importing employer also agreed to arrange for the 
 
13House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission of Illiterate 
Mexican Laborers, Hearings, 66th Cong., 2d sess., (1920), 200, 262.  Hereafter cited as Temporary 
Admission Hearings. 
14US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1920), 7-8.  Wilson amended this circular a few days later to include Canadians 
willing to work in Maine, to relieve a labor shortage there.  This exemption was rescinded in 1918.  See 
Commissioner-General, Immigration to all Commissioners of Immigration, December 21, 1918, Records of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group (RG) 85, Entry 9, file 54261/202, National 
Archives, Washington, DC.  
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workers’ transportation to the workplace and for their return at the expiration of their 
contracts.  In addition, contracts required extensive documentation including multiple 
photographs accompanied by physical descriptions of all immigrant laborers to ensure 
that the workers could be tracked if they fled from their original employment.  These 
restrictions were meant to guarantee that Mexican immigrants would work only in the 
agricultural sector and remain only for the duration of their contracts.  Ideally, this would 
prevent them from competing with American workers or threatening the country’s 
presumed national unity.  The Department of Labor further noted that if the immigrants 
deserted, they would be deported when found.15 While the initial provisions provided 
only for six month terms, this soon was extended—first, for the duration of the war, then 
until January 1920, and eventually until March 1921 when the emergency rules finally 
expired.16 
By 1920, the number of Mexicans in the U.S. had increased significantly.  Despite 
a high return rate to Mexico, estimates indicate that roughly 500,000 Mexicans lived in 
the U.S. by that time, up from approximately 100,000 in 1900.17 As a result of 
Mexicans’ greater numbers and visibility, Anglos and Mexicans Americans would have 
to re-assess how the new arrivals would fit within the nation and determine if they could 
 
15Commissioner General, Immigration to all Commissioners of Immigration, Inspectors in Charge, 
etc., May 23,1917, RG 85, Entry 9, file 54261/202, National Archives.   
16The ongoing war needs combined with growers’ and other executives’ intense lobbying initially 
convinced Secretary Wilson to expand and extend the departmental waivers beyond their original confines.  
He briefly approved exemptions for Mexican workers to work in lignite mines or do maintenance-of-way 
jobs on railroads in June 1918, only to then later exclude them from these same industries.  Secretary 
Wilson later extended the existing policies and order while awaiting a decision from Congress.  The last 
extension ended on March 2, 1921, although it took some time to send the workers home.  See US 
Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1920), 7-8.      
17Figures from González, Culture of Empire, 112-13 and Lawrence A. Cardoso, “Labor 
Emigration to the Southwest,” Mexican Workers in the United States, ed. George C. Kiser and Martha 
Woody Kiser, 19.  See also Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, Revolution on the Border: The United 
States and Mexico 1910-1920  (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 127, 133. 
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use the former strategies to admit them as potential Spanish Americans through 
pluralism, Anglo Americans via assimilation, second-class Americans via 
marginalization, or if they should attempt to exclude them from the country entirely.  
Challenges to Pluralism 
Pluralism had always been tenuous, especially outside of its power base in New 
Mexico where people of Mexican descent retained some economic and political authority 
during the First World War.  But by 1922, pluralism would be seriously weakened as a 
viable strategy for dealing with immigrants as few people (not even the pluralists 
themselves) believed that the recent Mexican immigrants had the requisite traits to 
become Spanish American. 
Pluralism was at its peak in the immediate years after statehood, particularly in 
New Mexico.  The pluralists had succeeded in persuading many Americans that Spanish 
Americans could fit within the nation and speak Spanish without threatening national 
unity.  Signs of their success appeared in various articles in which Anglo Americans 
approvingly noted the admirable qualities of people of Spanish descent, seeing them as 
capable of being or already equal to Anglo Americans.  There were few objections to 
Spanish culture and traditions. If anything, such customs had become more revered since 
Spain no longer presented a threat to the United States.  Americans could afford to reflect 
nostalgically upon the past, and to imagine noble friars traversing the land to build 
mission communities and civilize the Indians.  Americans began to vacation in New 
Mexico in the 1910s, hoping to learn about the period of Spanish rule and to examine the 
intricate silver artifacts from previous centuries.  This interest was enhanced through 
educational institutions.  The University of Missouri offered the nation’s first course on 
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Spanish American literature in 1916.   Historians such as Hubert Howe Bancroft, Herbert 
Eugene Bolton, and Ralph Emerson Twitchell became fascinated with the region’s 
history, writing numerous books on Spanish colonization in the Americas.  Intrigued by 
the association between Spaniards and the New World that the pluralists like Benjamin 
Read and Octaviano Larrazolo had worked so hard to advance, Bolton wrote a book 
celebrating this connection between Spain and all of North America.18 In 1918, the 
Hispanic American Historical Review published its first issue to satisfy growing interest 
in the subject.  Enrollment in Spanish-language classes also increased dramatically, from 
5,000 students in 1910 to over 250,000 by 1922.19 
Yet Mexican immigrants presented a new challenge to the pluralists.  Pluralism 
had flourished when its advocates professed a Spanish heritage and held a middle- or 
upper-class standing in society.  Most new immigrants from Mexico, however, could not 
claim a similar status.  Approximately ninety percent of the immigrants were unskilled 
workers coming from the lowest levels of Mexican society, making it very difficult for 
them to assert a pure Spanish heritage since class and race were often conflated.20 
The geographical destination of the immigrants also contributed to the decline of 
pluralism as most of the new arrivals emigrated from Mexico to Arizona and other parts 
of the nation, rather than to New Mexico where there were more middle-class people of 
 
18Charles Gibson and Benjamin Keen, “Trends of United States Studies in Latin American 
History,” American Historical Review 62 (July 1957): 855-77, particularly, see 859. 
19Helen Delpar, Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United 
States and Mexico, 1920-1935 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), 8.  
20Hall and Coerver, Revolution on the Border, 128-31, 135-36.  Note that these authors find that 
90% of the immigrants entering the U.S. between 1910 and 1920 had no skill or profession.   See also 
Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 131-33, and statistics suggesting the greater poverty of later arrivals in, 
“The Mexican ‘Invaders’ of El Paso,” Survey, July 8, 1916, 380-82.    
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Mexican descent with socioeconomic clout to help define what being American meant.21 
During the First World War, Arizona employers alone imported 15,576 workers from 
Mexico or 31% of all Mexicans brought into the U.S. via Wilson’s wartime immigration 
policies.  New Mexican farmers contracted for only 411 laborers in the same period.22 
By 1920, only three percent of all Mexican immigrants in the nation lived in New 
Mexico; 14 percent lived in Arizona, a less populous state.23 
During the World War I era, Anglo Americans who previously had supported 
pluralism were not enthusiastic about the new Mexican immigrants.  They did not believe 
that the lower-class Mexicans could fit within the nation like the upper-class Spanish who 
had led the fight for statehood in New Mexico.  A journalist for Harper’s Weekly, a
popular magazine of the day, commented on how the Spaniards in New Mexico differed 
from the newcomers of mixed heritage in Arizona and Texas.24 Edith Shatto King, a 
California reformer, remarked: “I remember them [the De Soto kids, whom she described 
as having an extensive lineage in California] quick and proud, lighter complexioned, with 
long Spanish faces, in sharp contrast to Carmelita’s [described as a recently arrived 
 
21A Spanish American identity had been prevalent in California and some parts of Texas as well, 
but many of those claimants had since lost much economic and political power through the loss of their 
property.  Other people of Mexican descent then referred to these former ranch owners as “los tuvos” or 
has-beens.  From David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1987), 113-15. See also Albert Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society: 
From Mexican Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara and Southern California, 1848-1930 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 41-46 for information on the decline of the californios’ 
political power. The statistics on where the immigrants moved to are from Hall and Coerver, Revolution on 
the Border, 135-36. 
22US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1920), 7-8 and 429-30.  
23Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey, and Chiara Capoferro, “The New Geography of Mexican 
Immigration,” New Destinations: Mexican Immigration in the United States, ed., Victor Zuñiga and Rubén 
Hernández-León (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005), 5. 
24John Chávez, The Lost Land: The Chicano Image of the Southwest (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1984), 92.  
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Mexican girl] round dark face.”25 A Texas banker lamented to a congressional 
committee hearing in 1920 that no one could determine which of the immigrants were of 
Spanish or Indian heritage since they were all an amalgam of the two groups.26 
Associating these people with a pure Spanish identity and respecting them for their 
European Spanish culture had become impossible.   
Nativos in the Southwest—whether assimilationist or pluralist—also distanced 
themselves from the new arrivals, making it more difficult for Mexican immigrants to fit 
within the nation via pluralism or assimilation.  While middle-class Mexican Americans 
empathized with the plight of the recent immigrants and generally supported their 
presence as the newcomers’ labor yielded lower food prices, they also stressed the class 
and cultural divergence between themselves and Mexican nationals.  They referred to 
themselves as hispano-americanos and the immigrants as mexicanos, and kept the latter 
at arms’ length rather than embracing them as part of their Spanish-speaking 
community.27 
While these reasons alone were sufficient to cause pluralism to decline, few 
recent Mexican immigrants had much interest in accommodating themselves to a Spanish 
American identity.   Previous immigrants like Larrazolo had been more willing to declare 
a European heritage since respect for such an ancestry and “whiteness” had been 
 
25Edith Shatto King, “My Mexican Neighbors,”  Survey, March 3, 1917, 624-26.  Quotations on 
page 624. 
26House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission Hearings, 113 
(quotations) and 116-17.  
27For example, see Tomás O. Belada, “Los Braceros y El Costo de la Vida,” El Tucsonense 
(Tucson, AZ), February 19, 1920 and F.S. Moreno, ed., El Tucsonense, January 1, 1920.  For more general 
information on the conflict between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants, see Chávez, Lost Land, 
83-84 and David Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics 
of Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 56-65. 
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widespread in Mexico as well as the United States.28 But following the overthrow of 
President Díaz and the ensuing Revolution, major cultural changes spread throughout 
Mexico, causing ordinary Mexicans to question their former president’s affiliation and 
identification with European culture, and to learn more about their country’s indigenous 
heroes and history.  Consequently, Mexicans began to valorize the underclass in contrast 
to the elites who had preferred foreign countries and foreign cultures to their own.  All of 
this contributed to Mexicans’ growing sense of pride in their heritage.  As there was no 
concomitant movement in the United States to laud the efforts of the poor or indigenous 
persons, nor to characterize them as the true Americans, Mexicans saw few reasons to 
change their nationality and incorporate into the United States via pluralism, assimilation, 
or marginalization. 
Despite these problems, pluralist thought continued in three forms.  First, while 
most Anglo and Mexican Americans would not extend a Spanish American identity to 
the poorer, new arrivals, they continued to view resident high-class people of Mexican 
descent as being Spanish or Spanish American.  Secondly, pluralism persisted in New 
Mexico as the nuevomexicanos continued to have access to the political arena.  Finally, 
the pluralists had also succeeded in marketing their heritage to the American people such 
that Mexican and Anglo Americans became enamored with Spanish colonial history in 
the U.S.  But that growing fascination did not apply to the new immigrants.  
The Rise and Fall of Assimilation 
Initially, the assimilationists had been willing to extend their strategy to Mexican 
immigrants as they had to nativos in the territories.  They perceived the newcomers as 
 
28This can be found in many sources. For some recent examples, see Meeks, “Border Citizens,” 
45-46, 66 and Miguel Tinker Salas, In the Shadow of the Eagles: Sonora and the Transformation of the 
Border during the Porfiriato (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 26-27. 
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Spanish and European, but wanted them to become Americanized in the mold of Anglo 
Americans.  These assimilationists initially gained adherents and attention during the war 
years, but lost many in the aftermath of World War I. 
In the first years after statehood, most middle-class people of Mexican descent in 
Arizona—with the exception of Pedro Garcia de la Lama and some members of La Liga 
Protectora—advocated assimilation over pluralism.  Facing rampant discrimination and 
diminishing rights in the years after statehood, Mexican-American assimilationists 
believed it wiser not to call attention to themselves and instead to integrate into the 
dominant Anglo American community.  Middle-class organizations like the Alianza 
Hispano-Americana and the Spanish-language newspaper, El Tucsonense, contested 
labor activism and allied themselves with Anglos of a like class standing who criticized 
the strikes and walk-outs.  These Mexican Americans found labor troubles threatening 
due to their own middle-class status and because they feared being associated with 
radicals.  Consequently, they advocated conformity whenever possible.  Carlos Jácome, 
the former statehood advocate and merchant, was one of these men.  He prided himself 
on his American identity and urged his sons to volunteer for military service; he avoided 
radical positions.29 The Alianza continued to stress the work ethic and learning English 
rather than directing resources to help Mexican immigrants improve their economic 
circumstances.  Friendly House, a Phoenix organization with substantial Mexican 
American support, was designed to help immigrants but mostly emphasized teaching 
immigrants to become domestic workers, learn English, and improve personal hygiene.  
It lauded employers’ efforts to deport immigrant troublemakers who sought to organize 
 
29Alex G. Jácome [son of Carlos Jácome], Letter to the Editor,” Arizona Star, April 29, 1970.  
111
strikes.  These assimilationists wanted to Americanize the immigrants as a way of 
ensuring that the latter would conform to Anglo American cultural and class norms.30 
Other Americans also advocated assimilation for the immigrants during World 
War I.  In 1918, the residents of Phoenix established an Americanization Committee, 
which concentrated on teaching immigrants English and civics.  A similar group 
organized in Tucson the same year.  The American Legion set up a branch office in 
Phoenix and intensified its campaigns to teach English to people of Mexican descent, 
native-born and immigrant alike.  One eager Americanizer declared his motto to be “one 
flag, one language, one country.”31 As limited as these assimilationists may have been in 
their view of what constituted American identity, they offered a more inclusionary 
strategy for dealing with Mexican immigrants than the marginalizationists or 
exclusionists.  They believed that Mexicans could change and become like themselves.  
When debating Wilson’s wartime immigration policy, Representative Claude B. 
Hudspeth (Democrat, TX) pointed to evidence of Mexicans’ good citizenship.  He noted 
that they had proved their patriotism by volunteering for military service during World 
War I and contributing generously to liberty bond drives.  Representative Carlos Bee 
(Democrat, TX) emphasized that he knew of “Mexicans from the peon class [who] 
graduate[d] at the head of their class in high school” when attending integrated (Anglo 
and Mexican) schools and believed that they assimilated well, acquiring good 
occupations as clerks and merchants.32 There was no suggestion, as there had been 
 
30Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses, 102-12, 166-79; Carlos C. Jácome, Clippings Files, Arizona 
Historical Society, Tucson; Meeks, “Border Citizens,” 102-16, 267-69. 
31Bradford Luckingham, Minorities in Phoenix: A Profile of Mexican American, Chinese 
American, and African American Communities, 1860-1992 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994), 
28-34 (quotation on 34).  
32House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission Hearings, 
quotation from 17-18.  See also 14, 41, 82, 87, 113-15, 160. 
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among the pluralists, that the assertion of any cultural difference would be an asset to the 
nation.     
But this type of Americanization declined in the postwar era as Americans 
everywhere concluded that the campaigners had not succeeded in teaching immigrants 
English or Anglo American ways.  Consequently, the federal government decreased 
financial and rhetorical support for such programs, dooming various organizations’ 
efforts.   Frustrated reformers began to believe that Mexican immigrants were either 
incapable of learning or stubbornly resistant.33 
Another factor in the demise of Americanization campaigns was the rise of the 
eugenics movement, whose adherents argued that Mexicans could not assimilate because 
they did not belong to the white race and thus were too inferior to become any sort of 
American.  This pseudo-science provided an explanation for why the immigrants were 
not integrating in the ways in which the Americanizers thought that they should, and gave 
the reformers a reason for why they should give up their efforts.34 
Challenges to Marginalization  
During the statehood era, the marginalizationists had done quite well—
particularly in Arizona—in limiting the opportunities of people of Mexican descent so 
that they could not rise from their lowly economic position to compete with Anglo 
Americans for skilled jobs and political influence.  Marginalizationists in Arizona 
pursued a variety of laws to assure Anglo American control over the immigrant 
 
33See George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in 
Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 87-107 and Sarah Deutsch, 
No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the American 
Southwest, 1880-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 110-21.  
34For more on the rise of the eugenics movement, see Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenic Nation: 
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workforce.  In Arizona, they quickly reinstituted (in 1913) an English literacy 
requirement to determine voter eligibility.35 The marginalizationists also succeeded in 
asserting control over many people of Mexican descent by establishing segregated 
schools, pools, parks, movie theaters, and even religious services with Spanish-language 
masses held in church basements rather than inside the main chapel.  Signs warning “No 
Mexicans Allowed” proliferated throughout many parts of Arizona.  Segregated towns 
continued to exist immediately adjacent to one another and the dual wage system (lower 
wages for people of Mexican descent compared to Anglos) persisted.36 
Despite these victories, the marginalizationists had problems.  The Mexican and 
Russian Revolutions had broken out worrying elites everywhere about their ability to 
keep workers under their control and in their second-class positions in society.  No longer 
could employers convincingly assert that people of Mexican descent would remain 
contentedly in their lower class place forever or that labor strikes were isolated rebellions.  
Americans had read and heard much about those at the bottom rising up to overthrow 
their leaders in other parts of the world, resulting in violence and warfare.   
National events intensified these fears as people of Mexican descent participated 
in the disputes between labor and capital in Ludlow, Colorado (1913), in Ray (AZ) in 
1915, and then again in Bisbee (AZ) in 1917.  Such activity caused many Americans to 
be wary about declarations of Mexicans’ docility and acceptance of a second-class status.  
In the Bisbee strike, approximately 1,200 copper miners from a variety of backgrounds 
called for a walk-out against Phelps Dodge Corporation.  The company quickly 
 
35This stipulation would remain part of Arizona’s state law until 1972, even after federal law 
declared such provisions illegal in the 1965 Voting Rights Act.  See Bradford Luckingham, Minorities in 
Phoenix, 48. 
36Luckingham, Minorities in Phoenix, 28-31; Meeks, “Border Citizens,” 269. 
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intervened—as it did not want to risk missing any opportunity to earn exceptional profits 
during the wartime copper boom—by having the local sheriff, Henry F. Wheeler, arrest 
the participating workers.  Over ten percent of these strikers were of Mexican descent.  
The county official and nearly 2,000 armed men herded all of the participants onto cattle 
cars and transported them several hundred miles into the midst of the hot New Mexican 
desert; there they were told never to return.  Initially, much of the regional Spanish- and 
English-language press supported this deportation.  While the people in the town of 
Bisbee and the Phelps-Dodge employers later received substantial criticism from 
President Woodrow Wilson and the national press, ultimately they faced few 
consequences.  The men responsible for the deportation were brought to trial but soon 
acquitted.  In contrast, none of the men deported ever received any compensation for their 
suffering.37 What would be remembered from these events was the image of the striking 
Mexican workers and the resolution of the situation in which Arizonans shipped the 
laborers out-of-state via train.  After these uprisings, the marginalization strategy seemed 
increasingly implausible. 
The outbreak of World War I further contributed to the decline in Americans 
envisioning Mexican immigrants as docile, second-class Americans.  In February 1917, 
the notorious Zimmermann telegram became public.  In this communiqué, Arthur 
Zimmermann, Germany’s foreign secretary, requested Mexico’s wartime support in 
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exchange for his country’s assistance in recovering Mexican territory previously lost to 
the United States.  The exposure of this communiqué became one of the key factors for 
America’s entry into the war against Germany.  While the Mexican government quickly 
rejected Germany’s overture for an alliance, the very overture itself frightened Americans 
about their neighbor to the South and reduced the likelihood that they would view 
Mexicans as benign neighbors and immigrants. 
But even as some Americans questioned whether the newcomers could be safely 
integrated as second-class citizens at the bottom of society, growers and their allies in the 
World War I era continued to assert that these immigrants could become such 
Americans—marginal Americans—who would not harm the country.  When 
Representative Hudspeth introduced legislation (Hudspeth Resolution) to continue 
Wilson’s exemptions from immigration laws, growers and their supporters emphasized 
Mexicans’ docility.  As during the statehood era, these marginalizationists stressed that 
the immigrants had little interest in politics and would not foment any uprisings.  William 
H. Knox, the representative of the Arizona Cotton Growers’ Association, which had over 
2,000 agricultural members and ultimately ended up importing nearly 30,000 Mexican 
workers through the wartime temporary worker policy, informed the hearing committee 
that the Mexican immigrant “is quiet, docile, and peaceable, …does his work and takes 
his place.”38 
Most advocates for the extension of Secretary Wilson’s temporary worker policy 
contended that Mexicans came to the United States to sustain themselves and not to 
disseminate radical ideology.  When Representative Hays White (Republican, KS) 
queried one supporter during a congressional hearing about Mexicans’ opinion of 
 
38House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission Hearings, 192.  
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bolshevism, the agriculturalist responded, “he does not know the term; he does not know 
what it means; he does not care.  I never heard of any talking bolshevism in my life.”39 
Congressman Hayden (Democrat, AZ) explained that most of the Mexican laborers came 
from farms and small towns in the Sonoran state and were law-abiding people.  The only 
troublemakers were the few coming from mining communities, areas known to be more 
fractious in terms of capital-labor conflict.  Another agriculturalist disputed 
Representative Box’s (Democrat, TX) charge that Mexicans had been actively involved 
with the infamous Bisbee labor strikes, asserting that the primary responsibility lay with 
the Slavic and Irish activists and that few Mexicans had been implicated.40 
Marginalizationists in the World War I era continued to emphasize that people of 
Mexican descent would remain second-class citizens under the control of Anglo 
Americans.  They argued that even if some Mexicans, brought in through temporary 
worker policies, remained in the United States, it would not be a problem for these 
immigrants knew their place.  They did not compete with Anglo Americans and remained 
in the lowest wage sector.  A major grower from Texas, John Davis, informed the 
committee members that Mexicans were the most desirable people “to occupy the place 
that [they] can occupy,” and to perform menial labor, work most Americans refused to 
do.41 W.D. Mandeville, a labor agent for the rapidly expanding sugar beet industry in the 
upper Midwest, agreed and admitted a preference for Mexicans over Japanese workers 
whom he feared as future competitors.  Likewise, Knox, the representative for cotton 
growers in Arizona, viewed Mexicans as more desirable than the Pima Indians who had 
begun planting their own crops and competing against Anglo Americans in the 
 
39Ibid., 251.  
40Ibid., 116-17, 269, 275.  
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marketplace.42 Representative Hudspeth reinforced the image of Mexicans’ permanent, 
second-class status when he noted how such immigrants had lived on his ranch for 15 to 
20 years and assimilated or Americanized to the extent that they had painted their 
cottages, purchased stoves, and played the latest music, “Trip the Light Fantastic,” on 
their victrolas.43 In his view, this was all that they needed to do to become marginal 
Americans:  stay in their place as a steady source of labor and play a little American 
music.  J.A. Happer, spokesperson for the El Paso Chamber of Commerce, clarified for 
the committee that Mexicans in his area lived and ate separately from Anglos and seldom 
intermarried with them.  He believed, however, that Mexicans could become good 
citizens although “not as good as the whites.”44 In other words, Mexicans could become 
American, but they would be expected to remain second-class citizens and live a 
segregated existence. 
But these statements alone did little to quell Americans’ concerns.  Many 
congressmen continued to question the accuracy of Mexicans’ docility in the face of 
worldwide changes.  In the 1920 hearing concerning Hudspeth’s proposed legislation, 
Representative William N. Vaile (Republican, CO) expressed concern that the 
immigrants might eventually become radicalized as had the peasants in Russia and “like 
the Mexican mustang, might go wrong, might get ‘loco.’ ”45 Representative John Raker 
(Democrat, CA) speculated that the newcomers might be revolutionaries, like the violent 
Pancho Villa, who were exploring ways to export their ideology to the U.S.  The chair of 
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the congressional committee, Albert Johnson (Republican, WA), raised concerns about 
workers then striking in Mexico in the cotton mills of Veracruz, and the recent news that 
some of the Mexican labor leaders were settling around San Antonio (TX).  He implied 
that an uprising would be imminent if immigration continued unabated.46 Consequently, 
the marginalizationists had to adjust their rhetoric in order to maintain open borders.  
Exclusionists Regroup  
Although the exclusionists had failed to prevent people of Mexican descent from 
entering the nation via statehood, most of them did not immediately work to stem 
Mexican immigration.  Outside of the Southwest, they concentrated on the more pressing 
concern of European and Asian immigrants, barely pausing to notice the increasing 
stream of Mexican immigrants.47 Within Arizona, however, dormant exclusionists—who 
had allied previously with marginalizationists and pluralists in their mutual quest for 
statehood—now began to make their voices heard.    
These revived exclusionists decided to make it difficult for immigrants to 
continue living in Arizona.  In 1914, these exclusionists succeeded in codifying 
legislation, which stipulated that employers with more than five workers had to ensure 
that eighty percent of their staff were either U.S. citizens or had filed their first 
declarations to become ones.  When the U.S. District Court in San Francisco decided in 
1915 that the state had overstepped its bounds, violating the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S Constitution, exclusionists supplanted that law with the proposed Claypool-
Kinney bill mandating that only English speakers be hired for hazardous jobs such as 
 
46Ibid., 33, 163.  
47In 1917, the exclusionists succeeded in reducing European and Asian immigration by passing the 
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mining.  The bill failed, however, as some corporations feared the loss of employees and 
because Pedro Garcia de la Lama’s Liga actively protested against it.48 
This setback was only temporary.  In 1920, exclusionists—within and outside of 
Arizona—had begun to regain strength and successfully lobbied to prevent the extension 
of Secretary Wilson’s wartime, temporary worker policy.  Their victory had much to do 
with the fact that their efforts coincided with the beginning of a national recession and 
because the persuasiveness of the marginalization strategy had lost some of its initial 
appeal as Americans had become skeptical of Mexicans’ willingness to accept a 
subordinate status.  
* * *
The marginalization strategy had been undermined by world events, making it 
less likely that the majority of the U.S. legislators would accept the marginalizationists’ 
arguments that the new immigrants would become docile, controllable workers who 
would have no impact on American society.  At the same time that the 
marginalizationists saw the resilience of their arguments decline, exclusionists had 
become stronger, convincing many Americans of the threat that ongoing Mexican 
immigration would bring.  As a result, marginalizationists needed a new way to persuade 
Americans that Mexican immigrants could continue to enter the country without 
threatening American national identity.  Facing these difficulties, the marginalizationists 
began to alter their language.  Instead of emphasizing the immigrants’ second-class place 
in American society, they started to describe Mexicans as temporary workers with no 
permanent status in the nation at all. 
 




The Marginalization Strategy Evolves:  
Origins of the Temporary Worker Image 
 
For much of western history, people have scorned those who migrated frequently.  
Gypsies traveling around Europe without a fixed home or place were believed to possess 
evil spirits.  In the late nineteenth century, the permanent settlers of Arizona viewed the 
nomadic Apache Indians as barbarians who lived outside civilized society in part because 
they lacked a fixed domicile.  Prior to statehood, one of the arguments against the 
Arizona territory was that it was full of itinerant men without families who, as such, were 
presumed to be wild, without morals, and best left on the fringes of civilization.  Words 
associated with impermanence, such as temporary, rootlessness, and transience, 
suggested a lack of belonging.  People who embodied these terms were repeatedly 
excluded from civil society.1
During the statehood debates, the marginalizationists had begun to view Mexican 
immigrants as people who easily could be marginalized from mainstream American 
society and characterized the immigrants and nativos as under the control of their Anglo 
employers.  But this sort of thinking fell out of favor due to world revolutions in the 
World War I years and the associated fears of having a permanent and growing 
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underclass, which might spark such an uprising at home.  Subsequently, many Americans 
began to agree with the exclusionists that existing restriction laws should remain in place.  
The marginalizationists, however, desired more fluid borders so that they could maintain 
low wages and maximize profits with a steady supply of additional workers.  When their 
former arguments emphasizing Mexicans’ secondary status no longer proved persuasive, 
marginalizationists began to stress the immigrants’ temporary status and lack of 
belonging.  While they had used this language occasionally during the struggles over 
statehood, it had not seemed relevant since few Mexicans emigrated during those years.  
But as Mexican immigration increased, the marginalizationists found highlighting the 
immigrants’ temporary prospects an increasingly effective way to convince other 
Americans that Mexicans would not change what it meant to be American nor harm 
national unity. 
Origins of the Temporary Worker 
This linkage between Mexicans and a temporary status in the U.S. began with the 
historical pattern of Mexicans’ cross-border travel to shear sheep and perform other 
seasonal tasks in the late nineteenth century.  Few people studied or even commented 
upon the back and forth character of this movement.  Some Arizona marginalizationists 
mentioned circular migration during the statehood debates, but it was not something that 
anyone else remarked upon or thought important.  In 1908, the economist Victor Clark 
published the first official study on Mexican immigration in which he referred to 
Mexicans’ cyclical pattern of travel.  Mostly, however, Clark discussed how Mexican 
immigrants would fit into the nation in accordance with the marginalizationists’, 
pluralists’ and assimilationists’ views (although he did not use these terms, he provided 
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support for each strategy) even though these had been created in the context of the 
dispute over statehood and were not necessarily applicable to immigration.  Viewing the 
marginalization strategy as the most likely way in which Mexicans would be accepted 
into the nation—as potentially second-class Americans—Clark depicted the Mexican 
immigrants as docile.  He noted approvingly that the immigrants’ greatest assets were 
their “willingness to work for a low wage,” to accept a primitive standard of living, and 
their lack of radical thoughts.  In other words, Clark believed that these immigrants could 
safely enter the nation at the bottom of society, without threatening national homogeneity 
and unity.  To a much lesser degree, Clark also accepted that a few of these immigrants 
might integrate into the nation via pluralism or assimilation and become like Spanish or 
Anglo Americans.  He identified some traces of European heritage among the new 
arrivals, observing that although, “these laborers have acquired a certain vivacity of 
expression and demeanor . . . this Spanish manner varies in degree . . . and with the 
immigrants as a body is less in evidence.”  His writings suggest that while he was willing 
to acknowledge some European ancestry in the immigrants, he did not view most of them 
as purely European and thus hesitated to consider many of them as Spanish Americans, 
or as having the biological wherewithal to change and assimilate into Anglo America.  
He perceived Mexicans’ class status, and thus their racial background, to be very 
different from that of the higher class nativos in the southwestern territories.2
While Clark was aware of the ongoing debate over whether or not to incorporate 
people of Mexican descent into the nation via statehood, his writings hinted at a new way 
of viewing Mexican immigrants, beginning the transformation of the marginalization 
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strategy from its emphasis on newcomers becoming second-class Americans to one 
stressing the immigrants’ temporary stay in the United States.  Building on Delegate 
Wilson’s casual comments about the immigrants’ temporary status during the statehood 
debates, Clark highlighted the significance of Mexicans’ cyclical migration, noting that 
between 66 and 75 percent of the immigrants returned home.  Unlike European 
immigrants, Clark contended that Mexican immigrants did not become members of the 
community, and did “not acquire land or establish themselves in little cabin homesteads.”  
Neither, he argued, was their situation “analogous to that of the Negro in the South,” 
which he did not explain but presumably meant something akin to second-class 
citizenship.  Instead, he asserted that Mexicans “remain[ed] …outside of American 
civilization,” and observed that their willingness to travel from place to place to pick 
cotton or other crops fit well with their “half-subdued nomadic instinct.”  Clark’s 
interpretation suggests that he discerned something genetic, natural, and un-American 
about these itinerant practices.  He then concluded that the primary value of Mexican 
immigrants was in their status as “temporary workers,” rather than as a potential 
Americans.3
Shortly after Clark’s article, language regarding Mexicans’ temporary status 
appeared in various other writings.  In 1911, Daniel Keefe, Commissioner-General of 
Immigration, reported that the “Mexican peon laborer” worked in the United States 
“return[ing] to Mexico for a period of rest, and later reenter[ing], and so on indefinitely.”  
In this way he reiterated and bolstered the pattern first noted by Clark.4 Another writer, 
Wallace Kirkpatrick, concentrated on laborers rather than immigrants, but made 
 
3Ibid., 482, 485.  
4US Department of Commerce and Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of 
Immigration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1911), 120-21.  
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connections between Mexicans and physical movement, observing that a Mexican 
peasant was “by instinct, a rover” with “a fever to wander.” 5 His words suggest that he 
attributed this behavioral pattern to something inherent in Mexican workers.  In the 
following year, Samuel Bryan of Stanford University extended this theme of peasants and 
migration to immigrants when he criticized Mexicans in the U.S. for moving around too 
much.6
In 1911, the Dillingham Commission, chartered by Congress to investigate all 
immigrant groups, published a report using language similar to Clark’s.  Overall, this 
authoritative commission wasted few pages on Mexican immigration as many of its 
members instead concentrated on securing sufficient evidence to limit or exclude 
southern and eastern Europeans from the country, much as Congress had done to Asians 
in previous years.7 When the voluminous report mentioned Mexican immigrants, it did 
so mostly in accordance with the marginalizationists’ former version of their strategy as 
well as including some of the new perspectives provided by Clark.  Highlighting the 
previously developed notion of people of Mexican descent as harmless and controllable 
workers, the commission members noted how the immigrants lacked ambition, did not try 
to acquire their own property or compete with other Americans, and instead worked 
 
5Quoted in Gilbert G. González, Culture of Empire: American Writers, Mexico, and Mexican 
Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 81. 
6Samuel Bryan, “Mexican Immigrants in the United States,” Survey, September 7, 1912, 726-30.  
7The Chinese Exclusion Act passed in 1882, was extended in 1892, and then made permanent in 
1904.  See Bill Ong Hing, Defining American Through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2004), 36-43.  In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement with Japan to restrict Japanese laborers from emigrating to the United States (Hing, 40-44).   
Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, MA) and William P. Dillingham (Republican, VT) had been 
placed in charge of an investigation on immigration as part of a political compromise to get Lodge to drop 
the literacy requirement from a bill in 1907.  See Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of 
Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 124-27 for more 
information. 
125
primarily as unskilled laborers in mines, canneries, laundries, and factories.8 Still, they 
detected some disturbing traits or practices among the recent immigrants, specifically, 
that they did not fit well (not even as second-class Americans) because of their lack of 
literacy, English-language skills, and disinclination to obtain an education.  The 
Commission further noted the immigrants’ propensity toward crime and public relief if 
they lived in one community for an extended period of time.  As a result, the writers 
concluded that, “it is evident that in the case of the Mexican he is less desirable as a 
citizen than as a laborer,” foreshadowing the later promotion of Mexicans as only 
temporary workers rather than as potential Americans.9 Like Clark, however, the 
commission members believed Americans had little to fear from the new arrivals as they 
thought that few Mexicans would remain in the country due to their itinerant lifestyle.10 
Agribusiness leaders also began to promote Mexicans’ pattern of returning to 
Mexico after harvest as a means for addressing the exclusionists’ and other Americans’ 
concerns about unrestricted borders.  For if the immigrants did not remain in the country, 
Americans would not need to worry about how to include them, or to fear that they would 
subvert national identity.  At the beginning of the First World War, these growers, now 
marginalizationists, had lobbied the U.S. Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson for 
exemptions from the existing immigration rules, specifically from the literacy act of 
1917.  Secretary Wilson’s decision to grant them waivers from the literacy requirements 
contributed to the growing image of the immigrant as temporary.  Wilson’s action 
codified the immigrants’ “temporary” stay in the United States, making the practice seem 
 
8Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission, Immigrants in Industries (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1911), pt. 25, 2: 682-83.  Hereafter this will be cited as the Dillingham Commission.  
9Ibid., 690.  
10Ibid., 682.  
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more common, real, and even natural through its very formalization.  This would have 
enormous ramifications since it allowed the marginalizationists to accept the labor of the 
immigrants without worrying about them as permanent settlers.11 
The rhetoric of people who debated Wilson’s policy, the resulting articles in the 
Spanish- and English-language press, and the actions of the immigrants themselves all 
reinforced the growing notion of Mexicans as temporary workers.  After granting several 
emergency extensions for his ad hoc temporary worker policy, Secretary Wilson 
determined that once the war had ended he could no longer justify the exemptions from 
the literacy act without legislation to support his actions.  As a result, Wilson and the 
marginalizationists turned to the U.S. Congress for assistance.12 In the first few months 
of 1920, congress members debated the Hudspeth Resolution, which provided for the 
continued importation of otherwise inadmissible Mexican agricultural workers for one 
more year.13 Much of that discussion centered on the issue of whether or not the 
immigrant employees would actually be temporary.  If they were temporary, questions of 
incorporation or exclusion would not have to be considered for the Mexicans would not 
be in the country long enough to pose any threat to national unity.  But if they did remain 
permanently, then the familiar and sensitive issue of whether, and to what extent, to 
 
11In formulating this argument, I considered the concept of “policy feedbacks,” coined by Theda 
Skocpol.  See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
the United States (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 57-60.  As Skocpol 
argues, policies are important for they both expand the reach of the state and affect social groups and 
identities, which in turn can then impact the state, resulting in additional policy changes.  I view Wilson’s 
decision to issue this ruling as instrumental in that it leads to more Mexican immigration and a new way for 
Americans to view the immigrants and the immigrants to view themselves.  In turn, this results in a new set 
of policies such as, eventually, repatriation. 
12W.B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor to Representative Claude Hudspeth (TX), June 7, 1919, 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group (RG) 85, Entry 9, file 54261/202I, 
National Archives, Washington, DC.  
13Actually this resolution was somewhat different, providing for the admission of otherwise 
inadmissible Mexicans in the southwestern states of Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico, areas 
that presumably faced a shortage of laborers to harvest cotton and food crops.  
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admit the foreigners would arise once again.  Because many marginalizationists wanted 
to avoid this kind of debate, one that would lead undoubtedly to more restriction, they 
attempted to persuade their adversaries that the original exemptions under Wilson had 
succeeded in supplying growers with valuable interim labor and in getting the immigrants 
to return to Mexico. 
Representative Carl T. Hayden, a long time Democrat from Arizona, took the lead 
in promoting the immigrants’ temporary status.  He had imbibed the marginalizationists’ 
rhetoric from the statehood era and argued that nativos could become good second-class 
Americans under the control of their Anglo employers.  It was thus not a major shift in 
outlook for Hayden and the growers he represented to modify the existing 
marginalization strategy from one emphasizing a second-class American status to that of 
a temporary worker.   
Hayden worked assiduously to convince his fellow congressmen that the 
Hudspeth Resolution was itself only a temporary measure to address the immediate 
agricultural emergency.  He explained that Mexicans would want to emigrate only for a 
short while since their country’s political situation would soon stabilize and the 
immigrants would leave to develop their homeland.  Hayden used words like 
“temporary,” “return,” and “emergency,” repeatedly during his testimony in front of the 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to emphasize how Mexicans would have 
no long-term rights in the U.S.  To reassure nervous politicians that the short-term 
immigrants would not stray from their initial employers, Hayden added that the growers 
in his state had meticulously tracked the workers who had entered under Wilson’s initial 
exemption policy, and would continue to do so under the new resolution.  To politicians 
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concerned about extensive monitoring, bureaucracy, and the immigrants’ lack of 
freedom, Hayden argued that the immigrants had the choice not to come to the United 
States in the first place and that, “as an alien…he had no right to do anything here other 
than that which he agreed to do,” which was to work in a prescribed place, for a specific 
employer, for a finite period of time.14 
Other Arizona marginalizationists followed Representative Hayden’s lead, and 
promoted the image of Mexicans as only temporary workers.  William H. Knox, the head 
of the Arizona Cotton Growers’ Association, explicitly stated that that he and fellow 
association members only wanted the immigrants’ labor and were “not asking for the 
Mexican to come in here as a permanent resident …. We are asking only for him to come 
in here as a temporary resident.”15 These assertions, however powerful to Americans at 
the time in terms of emphasizing the image of Mexicans’ as transitory and temporary, are 
somewhat suspect given that some Arizona employers had been accused of pressuring 
immigrants to naturalize due to the state’s constitutional requirement for citizen labor on 
public works contracts.  This was likely an incentive for other employers to force 
naturalization as well.  Still, the growers’ rhetoric in the national forum implied that the 
immigrants would maintain only temporarily and not become Americans. 
Regardless of whether these new marginalizationists believed their own language 
about the short-term status of the newcomers, their repetition of certain themes and 
arguments in the congressional debate fueled the rise of an image of Mexican immigrants 
as temporary workers.  Representative Carlos Bee (Democrat, TX) argued that Mexicans 
 
14House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission of Illiterate 
Mexican Laborers, Hearings, 66th Cong., 2d sess., (1920): 263-75; quotation on 265.  Hereafter cited as 
Temporary Admission Hearings. 
15Ibid., 191, 196.   
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enjoyed warmer weather and would rather leave Texas for southern climes when the 
weather cooled.16 Texas cotton growers also tended to support the proposed legislation, 
reassuring cautious legislators of how temporary the immigrants would be.  John Davis, 
an agriculturalist, informed committee members that passing the Hudspeth Resolution 
would not only aid the farmers, but help to improve circumstances for Mexicans since he 
believed that those who “come over here with sandals on their feet,” return “with their 
shoes on.”  He perceived his role as part of a white man’s burden to lift up the lowly 
Mexican.17 Congressmen Claude Hudspeth and John Nance Garner, both Democrats 
from Texas, reported (although they supplied no hard evidence) that between 80 and 90 
percent of the immigrants returned to Mexico.  Garner added that of those who remained, 
only two percent had moved outside Texas, suggesting that the immigrants who stayed 
would remain safely within the confines of one state, and would not spread throughout 
the U.S. to compete with American workers for skilled jobs or endanger national 
identity.18 
Various middle-class, Spanish- and English-language periodicals reported 
regularly on these congressional debates and in doing so helped to feed and sustain the 
growing image of the immigrants as temporary.  El Tucsonense (Tucson, AZ), the 
middle-class and conservative Spanish-language newspaper, discussed Wilson’s 
exemption policy in a number of articles, enough to bolster the nascent link between the 
new immigrants and their temporary status.  In a seemingly unrelated story, a prominent 
Mexican American called upon the club members of his civic association to work with 
those Mexicans who were “simply passing through…enjoying the hospitality of the 
 
16Ibid., 36.  
17Ibid., 87-88. 
18Ibid., 3-14.  
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American nation,” emphasizing the short duration of the immigrants’ stay.19 Servando 
Esquivel, a writer for Outlook magazine and a member of the Mexican Frontier 
Committee of the YMCA, stressed Mexicans’ temporary prospects in the states even as 
he requested that more be done for them while in the country.  He argued that they should 
obtain some benefit in exchange for their hard labor and called upon the U.S. to provide 
funds for an educational center so that when the Mexicans returned to Mexico they would 
go back with more than only the “padrone” idea as a model for citizenship.20 Literary 
Digest emphasized the immigrants’ migratory tendencies by reporting how many 
Mexicans returned home after the harvest season to “spend their wealth in easy living in 
Mexico.”21 In Survey magazine, the columnist J. Blaine Gwin emphatically asserted that, 
“Mexicans have no intentions of coming to the United States to reside.”22 The titles 
themselves often reiterated the notion of Mexicans as temporarily in the U.S. such as with 
“Back and Forth to Mexico,” another of an increasing number of articles on Mexican 
immigration.23 
The immigrants’ own actions further deepened the image of them as temporary 
residents.  Most immigrants planned or at least dreamed of returning to Mexico in the 
future, waiting only until they had saved sufficient funds.24 Few made any effort to 
become citizens, due to the abusive treatment many experienced in the U.S. and the spirit 
 
19“Los braceros y el costo de la vida,” El Tucsonense (Tucson, AZ), February 19, 1920.  Quotation 
from “Brillante exito fue el segundo banquete del ‘Club Comercial Hispano-Americano,’ ” El Tucsonense, 
April 20, 1920, my trans. 
20Servando I. Esquivel, Asociación de Jóvenes, El Paso, “The Immigrant from Mexico,” Outlook, 
May 19, 1920, 131.  
21“Mexican Invaders Relieving Our Farm-Labor Shortage,” Literary Digest, July 17, 1920, 53-54. 
22J. Blaine Gwin, “The New Mexican Immigration,” Survey, August 3, 1918, 492. 
23J. Blaine Gwin, “Back and Forth to Mexico,” Survey, October 6, 1917, 9-10.
24Mark. A. Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 
1900-1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 111-112.  
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of nationalism growing in their native land.25 Efforts to pressure immigrants to 
Americanize during wartime had backfired, further reducing their interest in becoming 
residents.  But even before the war the Dillingham Commission had reported that of 978 
Mexican immigrants who had been eligible for U.S. citizenship during the period of 
study, a mere 16 had naturalized.  Only 17 others had started the process.  The 
commission also noted Mexicans’ especially slow progress in learning English compared 
to other immigrant groups.26 The immigrants’ decisions suggest that, at least initially, 
they separated where they worked from what they considered to be their home.  The 
ongoing trend of low naturalization, with less than five percent of Mexican immigrants 
naturalized in 1920, only solidified the idea of the immigrants as temporarily in the U.S.; 
for initially they hoped to be short-timers as well.27 
The immigrants’ lodging in the United States further emphasized their temporary 
status, in their minds as well as in those of the general public.  Initially, many of the first 
Mexican immigrants employed by railroad corporations moved in a serial fashion.  They 
transferred from one boxcar home supplied by a railroad company to another, and still 
one more, so as to be closer to their work when they moved down the line.  By the early 
1920s, enormous boxcar communities had been constructed for rail employees, with the 
largest two outside of Kansas City (which housed nearly 10,000) and Gary (IN).  During 
the war years, so many Mexicans entered the United States, either through the Wilson 
exemptions or otherwise, that the workers found housing wherever they could:  in the 
 
25See Helen Delpar, Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United 
States and Mexico, 1920-1935 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), 12-14 and Fernando Saúl 
Alanis Enciso, “No cuenten conmigo: La pólitica de repatriación del gobierno mexicano y sus nacionales 
en estados unidos, 1910-1928,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 19 (Summer 2003): 406. 
26Dillingham Commission, 58, 231, 690.  
27Regarding low naturalization rates, see Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 111 and G. Bromley 
Onnam, Pastor, Church of All Nations, Los Angeles, “The Mexican in Los Angeles from the Standpoint of 
the Religious Forces of the City,” Annals of the American Academy 93 (January 1921): 130-33.  
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deplorable tent camps in Arizona, among the railroads’ boxcar communities, in 
ramshackle hotels and basement units, or within the cramped rooms of run-down 
boarding homes.  The more desperate and resourceful slept in cars or local parks.  These 
overcrowded communities bred germs and disease, particularly the dreaded tuberculosis.  
Employers justified the poor housing quality by noting that there was little available 
lodging and that sanitation was not as dire as the critics alleged.  Regardless, the massive 
boxcar communities as well as the tent camps in Arizona emphasized to everyone that 
Mexican immigrants would not or should not be in the U.S. for long.  More permanent 
structures would not be necessary as the immigrants stayed in the United States only long 
enough to pick crops, earn a little money, and return home.28 
The growing emphasis on the workers’ temporary status had some validity as the 
employers ended up returning nearly half of the immigrants they had brought in—as 
stipulated by their contracts—via Wilson’s exemptions.  In March 1921, the Department 
of Labor instructed its participating employers to return “all such aliens then in their 
employ.”  By June of that same year the process was still underway and the 
Commissioner-General of Immigration reported that 34,922 or nearly 50 percent of the 
72,862 Mexicans who had contracted for temporary work had been sent back.29 
The statistics of their return, along with the writings and actions previously 
mentioned, all contributed to the notion of Mexicans as temporarily in the United States.  
As Anglo Americans continued to see and hear about Mexicans who lived and worked in 
 
28See Zaragosa Vargas, Proletarians of the North: A History of Mexican Industrial Workers in 
Detroit and the Midwest, 1917-1933 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 58, 67-68.  Also, see 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission Hearings, 195 regarding the 
existence of the tent camps and Eric Vaughn Meeks, “Border Citizens: Race, Labor, and Identity in South-
Central Arizona, 1910-1965” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2001), 106-7. 
29US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1921), 7. 
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the United States for only a short while—and who moved from job-to-job and place-to-
place—they began to view them as naturally restless and rootless.  They believed that 
people who tolerated such an unorganized and unnatural lifestyle must be primitive 
beings and incapable of becoming American.  No longer would Mexican immigrants be 
granted a marginal but permanent status in the United States.  Instead, their physical 
presence and hard work would be tolerated on only a temporary basis. 
Is the Temporary Worker Fictional? 
Even as the image of the temporary Mexican spread throughout the nation, there 
were signs that this notion was often more strategic than factual.  While many immigrants 
did indeed return to Mexico, a significant portion remained or later came back again, 
causing some Americans to question the reality of the immigrants’ ephemeral status.  
Representative John Box (Democrat), an exclusionist representing East Texas and an 
opponent of Secretary Wilson’s exemption policy, asserted that, “the swinging door is 
seen to swing in only one direction,” with the Mexican immigrants remaining 
permanently in the U.S.30 Furthermore, although almost half of the imported workers had 
been returned by June 1921, the Department of Labor reported that another 21,400 (29%) 
of those entering via the exemptions had deserted for unknown locations.  The growing 
Mexican colonias or neighborhoods in various cities also confirmed that significant 
numbers of immigrants were establishing roots and staying longer than anyone had 
originally envisioned.31 
30House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Imported Pauper Labor and Serfdom in 
America: Statement of Honorable John C. Box, Hearings, 67th Cong., 1st sess., (1921), 17.  Quotation is 
from a reprint of Dallas News, February 1, 1921 in the abovementioned hearing. 
31US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1921), 7.  
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In part, this more permanent status was a consequence of the immigrants’ own 
decisions.  Even though few had expressed any interest in citizenship, they remained in 
the U.S. for better paying jobs, more opportunities, and political stability.  Their actions 
confirmed this as many of the imported workers deserted their initial short-term contracts 
in favor of more lucrative jobs outside of the agricultural sector.  Although it was 
possible for an initial employer to transfer an immigrant’s exemption contract to another 
company for the remainder of their term, more frequently the immigrants left without any 
notice.  This freed them to remain in the country as long as they liked, or at least as long 
as their presence went unobserved.  Exclusionists opposed to the Hudspeth Resolution 
assembled an impressive array of statistics demonstrating how the immigrants, lured by 
the “bright lights of the city,” often violated their initial contract agreements.32 
Railroad corporations and other employers contributed to immigrant dispersal by 
moving them outside the Southwest.  This dissemination provided Mexicans greater 
access to cities and jobs distant from the Rio Grande while making it even more difficult 
for them to return to Mexico. Often, the distance and cost of returning were prohibitive 
since the imported workers were sent to pick sugar beets in faraway Idaho and Michigan 
or to maintain railways in distant Pennsylvania and various parts of the Northeast.  
Consequently, when the immigrants broke their contracts to work for other companies, 
subsequent employers felt no obligation to pay for their return trip.  As far as the current 
employer knew, the Mexicans could be legally admissible immigrants who did not have 
to go back to Mexico.  Undetected, the immigrants who had skipped out on their 
 
32House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Temporary Admission Hearings, 39.  
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contracts could remain long past the expiration of their temporary agreements, even 
permanently.33 
The problems inherent in this temporary worker policy became even more 
apparent in the immediate postwar years.  By 1921, the U.S. economy sank into a 
depression.  Job-hungry Americans had returned from the European theater of war, the 
federal government had cancelled war-related contracts, and the price of cotton and other 
agricultural products plummeted.  Amid this crisis, Mexicans were among the first to lose 
their jobs.34 During these years, many of the previously imported workers endured 
unemployment and became destitute and dependent on available charity.  Wilson’s 
exemption policy had required that the contracting companies return their temporary 
employees to the border within six months or whenever the extended contract term 
expired.  Frequently, the employers failed to do so because many of their immigrant 
employees had left before completing their contractual obligations.  Although some 
Mexicans may have desired to return to Mexico during the economic downturn, few had 
the resources to do so and instead congregated in cities throughout the U.S., hoping to 
secure jobs.  But the federal government had never committed to pay their return passage 
and neither the original employers (who had lost their workers’ labor when they deserted) 
nor any subsequent ones felt obliged to cover their fares.35 
Some immigrants wanted to remain in the United States regardless of their dire 
situation and the temporary worker rhetoric.  William H. Knox, the chief lobbyist for 
Arizona’s cotton interests, explained that while his organization was in the process of 
 
33Ibid., 106-7.  
34Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 49-56.  
35Supervisory Inspector at El Paso to Commissioner General, Immigration, January 28, 1920, RG 
85, Entry 9, file 54261/202, National Archives.   
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transporting its contract workers to the border, several Mexicans “deserted” from the 
truck, underscoring the immigrants’ strong desire to remain despite their impoverished 
conditions.36 An immigration inspector in Denver found that the unemployed immigrants 
knew what to say when picked up in local police raids, denying that they had entered via 
Wilson’s exemption policy and affirming that they had been in the country for more than 
five years, thus avoiding deportation as a public charge.  The inspector believed that their 
interest in staying in the U.S. was so strong that it was futile to round them up and deport 
them to Mexico, for they would only attempt to return at their earliest convenience.37 As 
a discerning Arizona inspector observed, all anyone needed to do to enter the country was 
“to simply walk across the line at either Morley Avenue or at the railroad crossing in 
Nogales, Ariz., without baggage.”38 
Some of these inspectors themselves contributed to keeping the imported workers 
in the United States.  One such immigration official argued that it was expensive to send 
the workers back to Mexico and cost about $120 per immigrant, not including the 
expense of a sleeping car fare, an attendant, and the time and effort to find the 
perpetrator.39 Other bureaucrats attempted to legalize literate contract workers by having 
them return to an immigration station with the appropriate head tax once they could 
afford to pay.  In this way the immigrants became free to stay and work for whomever 
they chose.  Some savvy inspectors understood that the immigrants had no desire to enter 
 
36W.H. Knox, Arizona Cotton Growers’ Association to Supervisory Inspector at El Paso, March 2, 
1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
37Supervisory Inspector at Denver to Commissioner General, Immigration, December 6, 1921, RG 
85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives.  See also Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 59 regarding how the 
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38US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
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39W. P. Mansfield, Office of Inspector, Denver to Commissioner General, Immigration, August 
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the U.S. temporarily and used the waiver policy only as a means for evading the literacy 
and head tax requirements.40 A few of these officials took decision-making into their 
own hands and attempted to legitimize even illiterate Mexicans if they believed that they 
would make good Americans because they had nice families or steady jobs (although the 
majority of immigrants were men traveling alone, a significant number emigrated with 
their families, likely contributing to their interest in remaining in the U.S.).  This policy, 
however, was not enforced at the national level as the Commissioner-General of 
Immigration reiterated the commission’s policy of admitting inadmissible Mexicans on 
only a temporary basis.41 
Employers, too, did not always abide by the official provisions of Wilson’s 
waiver.  The Department of Labor reported that managers could easily dodge contract 
labor prohibitions by recruiting literate laborers in Mexico, bringing them in under 
Wilson’s exemptions, and then returning them to the immigration office the following 
day to pay the head tax.  In this way the company owners would evade the applicable 
contract labor laws and allow the immigrants to remain as long as they chose; they would 
also avoid the bureaucratic hassle of tracking Mexicans when they quit.42 These 
employers frequently complained that they did not want to bear the cost of returning 
imported workers, some of whom deserted on arrival, when they had not benefited 
sufficiently from their labor.  Often they did not have any idea where their imported 
workers had gone, recording only “skipped” or “deserted” in their voluminous ledgers.  
 
40E.L. Flannery to Supervising Inspector, El Paso, June 2, 1919, RG 85, Entry 9, file 54261/202H, 
National Archives.  
41Supervising Inspector, El Paso to Commissioner General of Immigration, August 13, 1919 and 
from the Department of Labor to Commissioner General, Immigration, August 30, 1919 in RG 85, Entry 9, 
file 54261/202I in National Archives.    
42US Department of Labor, Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1920), 428.  
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Few bosses watched their workers carefully as they worried about the practicality and 
legality of doing so.  A representative of the Spreckels Sugar Company in California 
wrote to an immigration official in El Paso wondering if it was permissible to hire night 
guards to patrol the grounds to ensure that no immigrants slipped away in the dark for 
better employment prospects.43 
While the marginalizationists emphasized the effectiveness of the temporary 
worker policy during the postwar era, there was much evidence to suggest that Wilson’s 
exemption had also increased the number of immigrants who remained permanently in 
the United States.  Ultimately, this information helped exclusionists to table the Hudspeth 
Resolution, which would have extended the exemption policy.  In 1921, after the 
depression intensified and agribusiness took a financial beating from a steep drop in 
prices, few growers had any immediate interest in lobbying for additional laborers and 
waivers from restriction laws.44 
Enforcing the Temporary Worker Image 
Despite the increasing reality of many imported workers’ de facto permanent 
status, the temporary worker policy of the wartime era had helped to create an image of 
all Mexicans as transient and temporarily in the U.S., rather than as potential members of 
the nation.  Consequently, during the postwar depression, Mexicans and Americans 
debated how to enforce the immigrants’ temporary status and return the visiting workers 
to Mexico.  There was little discussion by anyone that the local or federal government 
should take responsibility for providing for the immigrants in their current locations 
throughout the country, or to assist them in becoming U.S. citizens.  Instead, the debate 
 
43J.M. Waterhouse, Spreckels Sugar Company Representative, to George Harris, Acting 
Supervising Inspector, El Paso, April 23, 1918, RG 85, Entry 9, file 54321/181, National Archives.   
44Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 41, 49-50. 
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centered on the immigrants’ temporary stay and lack of belonging in the United States.  
Even the many Mexicans who had every right to remain permanently as they had entered 
the country legally, paying the full head tax and meeting the applicable literacy 
requirement, became linked to this image. 
 By 1921, Mexican immigrants faced pressure to leave regardless of whether they 
had entered officially, come in under the special waiver provisions, or crossed illegally.  
As they lost their jobs, these immigrants found themselves dependent upon the largesse 
of charitable institutions, former employers, or local governments for their daily survival.  
They lived in makeshift housing in crowded tent communities or slept in the basement of 
churches.  Some of these immigrants then turned to Mexican consulates for relief, 
bombarding them with requests to return to Mexico where they thought they might fare 
better or at least be among a more sympathetic population.  The consuls generally agreed 
with their petitions and worked to assist their constituents in moving back.45 The 
Mexican government agreed to help transport its citizens from the U.S. border to the 
immigrants’ interior Mexican hometowns.  In a few cases, it funded the entire 
repatriation.  One Mexican consul arranged for 110 Mexicans stranded in New York to 
return to Mexico via a Spanish ship, the Antonio Lopez.46 Under pressure, the Mexican 
government also established a repatriation commission which operated until 1923 and 
disbursed at least $250,000 to bring its residents home.47 Some estimates indicate that as 
many as 100,000 Mexicans returned during the years 1921-22.  If this is accurate, more 
 
45For two examples of this, see article in Denver Post, January 19, 1922 and Letter from Charles 
M. Johnston, Department of State, February 11, 1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
46Inspector at Ellis Island to Commissioner General, Immigration, February 22, 1921, RG 85, 
Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives.   
47“Los mexicanos sin trabajo serán regresados,” El Tucsonense, February 22, 1921.  
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immigrants left for Mexico than the 72,000 who had legally arrived under Wilson’s 
waiver.48 
When funds from the Mexican government proved insufficient to the task of 
repatriating destitute Mexicans, the consuls lobbied U.S. and local government officials 
to at least fund the transportation of immigrants to the border.49 Their entreaties were 
generally rebuffed.  In one such case, the Mexican consul in Chicago, Francisco Pereda, 
appealed to the city’s mayor, William Hale Thompson, for repatriation assistance.  His 
request was denied as the city officials did not believe that they bore any responsibility 
for immigrants they had not imported.50 Other local governments and charitable 
organizations did come to the immigrants’ aid, but in the process reinforced the notion 
that all Mexicans were temporary.  While these agencies were sympathetic to the 
immigrants’ plight—organizing bread lines, bean lines, and finding places for the 
immigrants to sleep—they stressed that they could not continue to do so and that, 
moreover, the federal government needed to take responsibility for its actions and return 
the immigrants to Mexico.51 In Texas, the head of the Fort Worth Welfare Association 
reported that there were over 10,000 Mexicans without work and homes in his city.  He 
recommended that immigration officials “arrest” the immigrants and immediately deport 
 
48Manuel García y Griego, “The Importation of Contract Laborers to the United States, 1942-
1964: Antecedents, Operation, and Legacy,” in The Border That Joins: Mexican Migrants and U.S. 
Responsibility, ed. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shues (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), 52-53.  
49See “Se llega a un acuerdo para repatriar a los “Cottonpickers,” El Tucsonense, February 8, 1921 
and Charles Johnston, Department of State to Assistant Commissioner General, Immigration, February 11, 
1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives.   
50 Francisco Pereda, Mexican Consul to William Hale Thompson, Mayor of the City of Chicago, 
April 25, 1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
51Letter from Willows to Fieser, Division Manager of Red Cross, May 3, 1921, RG 85, Entry 9, 
file 55091/6, National Archives. 
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them to the border.52 The St. Vincent de Paul Society in Detroit gave up waiting for the 
government to do its part and relied upon its own resources to finance the return of 
approximately 400 people to Laredo (TX) near the boundary with Mexico.53 The City 
and County of Saginaw (MI) pooled their funds to send 200 Mexicans to the border in the 
hopes that the Mexican government would pick up the cost and administration from 
there.54 
During the early 1920s, the American press continued to report on the poor 
condition of the imported workers, emphasizing their lack of belonging and need to 
return home to Mexico.  They noted that the immigrants’ circumstances in Denver were 
especially dire in 1922 with over 3,000 unemployed there.55 The Great Western Sugar 
Company took charge of housing about 125-150 of its former employees in basements 
throughout the city while the Denver Sunshine Mission administered to many others.56 
When work opportunities vanished, newspapers portrayed the immigrants as a serious 
encumbrance and recommended that they be returned to their former homes in Mexico.  
In Denver, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the local District Attorney 
suggested filling a train with destitute Mexicans and sending it to the border.57 Although 
the conservative Alianza Hispano Americana Organo Oficial in Arizona was one of the 
 
52W.H. Robb, Fort Worth Welfare Association to C.N. Adar, American Federation of Labor, April 
6, 1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
53Inspector in Charge, Detroit, Michigan, to Commissioner General of Immigration, in RG 85, 
Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives.  
54Inspector in Charge, Michigan, to Commissioner General of Immigration, RG 85, Entry 9, file 
55091/6, National Archives.  
55Article in Denver Post, January 19, 1922, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
56Office of Inspector in Midwest to Commissioner General, Immigration, February 5, 1921, in RG 
85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives. 
57“La falta de trabajo entre el elemento mexicano,” El Tusconense, January 29, 1921.  
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few voices calling for Mexicans to remain in the United States, its complaints about the 
large exodus only served to confirm the growing notion of Mexicans as temporary.58 
Deportation, the threat of police raids, and violence all contributed to Mexicans’ 
return and enforcement of their temporary status.  In Denver, government officials called 
upon the municipal police chief to address the problems of Mexicans, whom they 
considered responsible for increased crime in their communities.  As a result, the Denver 
police chief raided pool halls and other establishments where he suspected he would find 
destitute Mexicans who had overstayed their temporary contracts.  In one such incident in 
November 1921 he arrested 300 people of Mexican descent, only 35 of whom admitted to 
entering through the exemption policy and were therefore subject to deportation.59 Fear 
of these raids influenced immigrants’ decisions to leave on their own, rather than being 
forced out at an inconvenient time and without all their possessions.  A Denver railroad 
agent reported increased ticket sales to the El Paso border after stories of stepped up 
enforcement spread throughout the community.60 Impoverished Anglo Americans in 
Ranger, Texas exercised their frustration by attacking Mexican workers and warning 
them to leave the next day.  These actions all emphasized that the immigrants’ sojourn in 
the U.S. had ended—at least for the moment.  The swinging door had swung back toward 
Mexico.61 
* * *
By the time Secretary Wilson’s exemptions from the immigration act had expired 
in March 1921, the previously identified strategies for including people of Mexican 
 
58Alianza Hispano Americana Organo Oficial, July 10, 1921, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson. 
59Letter from Denver Office of Inspections to Commissioner General, Immigration, December 6, 
1921, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55091/6, National Archives.   
60Ibid. 
61Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 53.  
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descent—pluralism and assimilation—had faded considerably in Americans’ minds, and 
with it their effectiveness in helping people to imagine how the newcomers might fit 
within American society.  Even the marginalizationists’ more limited form of 
incorporation—of Mexicans as marginal Americans, permanently consigned to the most 
menial of jobs—no longer prevailed.  Instead, the marginalizationists had learned that the 
best way to retain open borders for Mexican immigrants was to emphasize the 
newcomers’ temporary status and more limited presence in the nation.  This soon became 
the dominant strategy for justifying continued Mexican presence within the U.S.  
Mexicans were no longer second-class Americans, instead they were merely marginal, 
temporary workers.  Despite the fact that many of the Mexican immigrants had entered 
without regard to the temporary provisions, and that many settled permanently in the 
nation, Americans embraced this newly articulated strategy and the resulting image of the 
temporary worker as a way to sidestep seemingly irreconcilable battles over immigration.   
The revised marginalization strategy did not even offer the right of permanent 
belonging, which it previously had provided.  The notion of Mexicans as transients or 
only temporarily in the U.S.—as constructed by the state, the press, the immigrants, the 
Mexican consulates, and other Mexican and Anglo Americans—had serious 
consequences for all people of Mexican descent in the U.S.   For the assumptions 
embedded within this temporary worker image were that they did not belong and were 
forever foreign.  As Representative Benjamin Welty (Democrat, OH) had stated so 
bluntly (and critically) in 1920, the immigrants would be deported “at the end of a 
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bayonet” when their presence was no longer desired.62 His voice was prescient since 
such activities began in the following year.     
By the early 1920s, then, a discernible shift had taken place from the days of 
statehood.  Americans, tired of the former battles to ensure national homogeneity and 
unity, sidestepped the issue by admitting Mexicans as immigrants who came only for a 
short time.  In so doing, Americans reaped the benefits of Mexican labor without having 
to consider the inconvenient questions about how their presence would influence 
American identity since they would soon leave.  By the time Wilson’s exemption policies 
had ended, and it had become increasingly obvious that many of the previously admitted 
immigrants had remained far longer than anyone presumed, this linkage between 
“Mexican” and “temporary” had become well-established and resistant to any evidence to 
the contrary.   
 





Immigration Restriction Debates 
 




Closing the Swinging Door? 
 
By the mid-1920s, Americans and Mexicans had seen how the swinging door 
could work.  In 1917, the door swung inward to the U.S., exempting Mexicans from 
contract labor laws and new literacy and head tax requirements.  After the 1921 
depression, the door swung outward as many immigrants returned to Mexico as required 
by contract, via their own volition, or through a combination of financial assistance and 
pressure from Americans or the Mexican government.  These immigrants had provided 
needed labor at a low cost, acted as a safety valve for the Mexican state whose leaders 
feared economic uprisings, and in many cases had eventually returned to Mexico as 
desired by both the Mexican and U.S. governments.  Their brief or even continuous 
presence had not endangered American national identity as most had not naturalized or 
remained in the U.S.  Still, the marginalizationists—those who argued that Mexicans 
posed no threat to national unity—had not yet persuaded the majority of Americans of 
their case.  Alternate strategies for ensuring national unity and for addressing the 
Mexican question persisted.  Throughout the 1920s, increasingly powerful exclusionists, 
revived assimilationists, and a dwindling group of pluralists continued to promote their 
strategies for how to deal with immigrants while protecting national identity and unity.  
Despite their efforts, they would not be able to dislodge the marginalizationists from 
their growing dominance.  
Exclusion 
Exclusionists had reason to be confident that they could close the borders against 
Mexican immigrants since they had recently achieved many of their other goals.  In 1917, 
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they had succeeded in excluding virtually all Asian immigrants, and in imposing literacy 
requirements and an increased head tax on all potential immigrants.  This effectively 
reduced the total number of eligible entrants.  A few years later, exclusionists persuaded 
Americans that the continued influx of European immigrants was too high.  In both 1921 
and 1924 they had succeeded in passing restriction bills that reduced immigration to a 
trickle, especially from southern and eastern Europe, and that banned South and East 
Asian immigration completely.  They had some success with restricting Mexicans as well 
by denying the continuation of a temporary worker policy that had flourished during and 
immediately following the First World War.  With their increased political muscle, they 
then turned their attention to excluding Mexicans, whose presence was rendered more 
visible due to the decreased inflow of Europeans and Asians.  While the Democratic 
Senator from Georgia, William F. Harris, had attempted to add the western hemisphere to 
the 1924 restriction bill, his proposal failed 60 to 12 because few senators then worried as 
much about Mexicans as Europeans.  Besides, exclusionists knew that they needed the 
support of western senators (who generally favored open borders for Mexicans) to pass 
European restriction.  For the time being, they were willing to compromise on the issue 
of Mexican immigration.1
The exclusionists’ success in decreasing immigration from Europe and Asia, 
however, had the unintended consequence of contributing to greater emigration from 
western hemisphere countries, especially Mexico.  Continuing to face few employment 
options at home, Mexicans traveled in greater numbers to el norte to fill jobs left vacant 
due to the declining pool of Europeans and Asians.  In addition, from 1926 to 1929, 
 
1Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1957), 54.  
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refugees fled the outbreak of the Cristero War in central Mexico in which the Catholic 
Church and its followers protested the government’s crackdown on religion and 
enforcement of secularization.  These immigrants provided the labor to expand cotton 
and foodstuff production, including sugar beets, persimmons, avocados, lettuce, and 
cantaloupes, throughout the American Southwest and Midwest.  They also moved into 
the industrial cities of Chicago, Detroit, and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania to take better-
paying factory jobs and settle in growing colonias or neighborhoods.  They put down 
roots by dedicating churches such as Our Lady of Guadalupe in Detroit in 1923, founding 
labor organizations similar to Los Obreros de San José in Indiana in 1925, and 
establishing Spanish-language newspapers like El Amigo del Hogar in the Midwest. 
Although these new entities experienced financial troubles due to the transience of their 
patrons, their very existence suggests that Mexicans remained in the U.S. for more than a 
harvest season.2 Whereas Mexicans had represented only 3.8% of all immigrants coming 
to the U.S. during the decade from 1911 to 1920, this percentage had grown nearly 
fourfold by 1924 when Mexicans represented 12.4% or 87,648 of all immigrants entering 
the United States.3
As their numbers and visibility increased, exclusionists began to redefine 
Mexican immigrants as the newest and most serious threat to American national identity.  
One early observer compared the increase in Mexican immigration to that of a rising 
temperature on a thermometer, a dangerous foreboding of a virus embedding itself in an 
 
2Zaragosa Vargas, Proletarians of the North: A History of Mexican Industrial Workers in Detroit 
and the Midwest, 1917-1933 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 145-54.  
3Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-
1940  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 152-53.  The total number of immigrants officially entering 
in 1924 was 706,896.  The U.S. population in 1924 was 105,710,620. 
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unwary host.4 Taking note of such symptoms, exclusionists regrouped to protect the 
nation from this Mexican “menace” and to “ ‘close the back door.’ ”5 Heads of patriotic 
and eugenicist organizations, labor leaders, and other exclusionists now advocated that 
the restriction laws applied to Europe and the eastern hemisphere in 1924 be extended to 
the western half as well, or at least to Mexico (which opponents argued was their primary 
intention).6 Exclusionists successfully lobbied politicians to propose various restriction 
bills, which were debated extensively from 1926 to 1930.7 These bills, introduced by 
members of both parties, including Congressmen Albert Johnson (Republican, WA), 
John Box (Democrat, TX), and Senator Harris, all provided for quotas which would 
restrict Mexican immigration to approximately 1,500 to 2,200 entrants per year, 
depending on the particular proposal.8 This contrasted dramatically with the 
approximately 60,000 Mexicans legally emigrating to the U.S each year from 1926 to 
1929.9
In order to pass the bills they promoted, exclusionists adopted a two-fold strategy.  
First, they defined Mexicans as even more dangerous and unassimilable than the recently 
restricted Europeans due to their race and class.  Secondly, they contested the 
marginalizationists’ claim that the immigrants remained only temporarily in the United 
 
4Albert W. Atwood, “Where have the Miners Gone?” Saturday Evening Post, March 10, 1923. 
5Quoted in Divine, American Immigration Policy, 53.  The term menace was used to describe 
Mexicans in various articles and testimony.   See Remsen Crawford, “The Menace of Mexican 
Immigration,” Current History 31 (Oct., 1930-March, 1931): 902-7 for one example.  
6Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in 
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7Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 173. 
8Lawrence A. Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1897-1931: Socioeconomic 
Patterns (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980), 139.  
9US Department of Labor, Annual Reports, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
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States, arguing that Mexican immigrants did stay longer and that their presence 
endangered the nation.   
The exclusionists attempted to discredit the immigrants’ potential American status 
by emphasizing their mixed blood or Indian heritage.  Harry Laughlin, the eugenicist 
from the Eugenics Record Office in Long Island, recommended that only those Mexicans 
who had a pure Castilian ethnicity should be allowed to enter America.10 A Princeton 
University economist, Robert F. Foerster, reported that Latin American immigrants had 
90% Indian blood.11 Another restrictionist, Russell Bennett, editor of the California 
Holtville Tribune, asserted that the immigrants did not have more than a “dash of Spanish 
blood” and were, in fact, “Amerinds” rather than “Mexicans of Spanish descent.”12 
William C. Hushing, a representative of the American Federation of Labor, testified to a 
congressional committee reviewing immigration that Mexicans immigrants were 
“Indians” and not “of Spanish stock.”13 These exclusionists worked hard to make 
distinctions between the recent Mexican immigrants and those they considered to be 
Spanish American.  They viewed the former as being of mixed race or Indian heritage 
and having a low class status, and the latter as white, European, and of a higher class 
standing.  In doing so, they demonstrated the lingering influence of pluralist efforts to 
assert the equality of Spanish and Anglo Americans during the statehood era.14 
In fact, a growing number of Americans argued that the recent immigrants had a 
mixed or Indian heritage that was different from the Spanish Americans in New Mexico 
 
10Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 208.  
11Ibid., 206-7 and Divine, American Immigration Policy, 56-57. 
12House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 
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13House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 366. 
14The exclusionists may have been more willing to embrace Spanish Americans because of their 
recent success in restricting Spanish immigrants through the quota laws of 1921 and 1924. 
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and others parts of the Southwest.  In Foreign Affairs, Glenn Hoover summed up the 
distinctions between people of Mexican descent in New Mexico and recent Mexican 
immigrants, explaining that the latter were “almost all of the Indian type, and to this 
extent differ somewhat from the Spanish-speaking population in New Mexico, 
descendants for the most part of white settlers with but little admixture.”15 Policymakers 
in the Labor Department agreed with these assessments, noting that Mexicans were not of 
pure Spanish or Indian descent and instead had a mixed heritage.16 Because many 
Americans increasingly believed that the newcomers had a diverse background, they 
became more receptive to the exclusionists’ strategy of closing the border.   
The advocates of exclusion also sought to gain support for restriction by 
conflating class and race, suggesting that only Indian “serfs” would accept such 
migratory working conditions and miserable pay.  According to them, no self-respecting 
white man of any class in the United States would accept this type of work or pay.  
Norman Blaney of the California Farm Bureau explained that “a white man of any value 
at all, demands steady work to maintain their [sic] rightful standard of living.”17 Chester 
Rowell of Survey magazine found it astounding that while Europeans had been restricted 
primarily for “political and economic grounds” and Asians due to “reason of race,” 
Mexicans, “to whom all of these objections apply,” continued to be admitted.  He added 
that “the Mexican peon is racially as alien as the Chinese coolie” and less assimilable in 
his view than “the Balkan peasant.”  To clarify, Rowell explained that the “Mexican peon 
 
15A summary of Hoover’s article is in “Mexican Immigration,” New York Times, October, 1929 in 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group (RG) 85, Entry 9, file 55639/616, 
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is not a “white” man.  He is an Indian.”  But Rowell differentiated between the recent 
Mexican immigrants and those of “Latin American culture” in Mexico City, whom he 
viewed as better than the peons at the bottom of Mexican society.  Rowell’s considerable 
emphasis on the class status of all the immigrant groups, as evidenced by his use of 
pejorative terms such as peon, peasant, and coolie, suggests that there was no room in 
American society for this kind of an underclass or lower caste.  Americans, in his view, 
were not only white and of European descent, they were also independent workers of a 
higher class standing.18 
Other exclusionists agreed that class mattered in preserving American identity. 
The head of the congressional committee on immigration restriction, Representative 
Johnson, noted that “it is the peon type” as opposed to Mexicans from a higher class “that 
has been sucked into the United States in large numbers since 1917.”  Consequently, 
Johnson supported the restriction of immigrants from Mexico.19 Representative Wallace 
White (Republican, ME) opposed restricting immigrants from Canada, primarily on class 
grounds.  He argued that the Canadian immigrants, emigrating in equal numbers to 
Mexicans, soon naturalized and became “an integral part of our body politic.”  He noted 
that in contrast to Mexican immigrants “they are doctors, lawyers, merchants, skilled 
mechanics—they are men of industry, sobriety, and are a worth-while addition to the 
population of the New England States.”20 In other words, because they provided skilled 
or professional labor, they could enter the nation.    
 
18Chester H. Rowell, “Why Make Mexico an Exception?” Survey, May 1, 1931.  
19House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Restriction of Immigration from Republic 
of Mexico, rept. No. 1594, 71st Cong., 2d sess., (1930): 2, 6.  
20House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 323-
25, quotation on 325.  There was very little debate over Canadians as immigrants and potential Americans; 
most seemed to agree that they could become American and only extended the restriction to them so as not 
to offend Mexico.  While the quotations shown emphasize the class status of the Canadians as a reason for 
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The significance of immigrants’ class status mattered even to such ardent 
exclusionists as the newspaper editor Russell Bennett who unwittingly argued that 
assimilation was possible for Mexicans with a higher class status.  While disparaging the 
publisher for the Beverly Hills (CA) Citizen for opposing Mexican restriction, Bennett 
noted that the newspaperman had no familiarity with Mexican field workers as he instead 
“rub[bed] elbows with such Mexican cheap labor as Lupe Velez,” the popular Mexican 
movie-star in Hollywood.21 Bennett’s sarcastic language implied that he himself would 
not mind if Velez, in reality an attractive and well-to-do starlet, remained permanently in 
the United States.  He objected instead to the low-wage, Mexican workers whom, Bennett 
argued, the publisher of the Beverly Hills Citizen knew nothing about. 
Other exclusionists believed that the immigrants’ class status had harmed even 
their own culture and therefore would damage U.S. cultural traditions as well.  August 
Fast, a private citizen, supported restriction because he believed that Mexicans had a 
culture of inertia, asserting that, “Mexicans prefer to remain industrial slaves, they have 
no ambition.”22 Another exclusionist thought that Mexicans should be restricted because 
of their migratory habits, deeming them too “transient” to become American.  A 
newspaper publisher agreed, arguing that it was impossible to assimilate the “mostly 
nomadic” Mexicans.23 Labor leader, William Hushing, also perceived the Mexican 
immigrants as lacking in the drive for upward mobility and saw them as “a roving class,” 
 
belonging, many Canadian immigrants did have lower-class status and entered to take logging jobs in the 
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21House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 318.  
22August Fast to Representative Albert Johnson, March 3, 1928, Records of the House of 
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unable to establish permanent homes.  These exclusionists felt that Mexicans’ lower-class 
standing prevented the immigrants from becoming American because they lacked 
stability, were not independent workers, and did not have the goal to become so.24 In 
other words, these exclusionists thought that being American meant wanting to strive for 
the American dream and/or being stable and settled. 
A few exclusionists did not care about the race, class, or culture of the immigrants 
but did have concerns about their nationality and the opportunistic policies of the 
Mexican government.  Romano Herrera, representing Mexican American day laborers, 
submitted letters, written in Spanish and translated into English, to the Commissioner of 
Immigration to protest the presence of Mexican immigrants in Laredo, Texas.  These 
letters decried the government’s decision to allow Mexican immigrants to work in the 
U.S., thereby lowering native Americans’ wages, while the Mexican government refused 
to allow Americans to work across the border in Mexico.  Their complaint was not based 
on how the newcomers would integrate into American society—after all, they shared the 
same language, ethnic heritage, and class status—but on the injustice of permitting 
Mexican nationals to benefit over American citizens while the Mexican government’s 
lack of reciprocity prohibited Americans from working in Mexico.25 
Even some Mexican officials held exclusionist views, contributing to the growing 
movement for restriction.  While these bureaucrats did not support the exclusion of 
Mexican citizens from the U.S. on class or racial grounds, they did want to keep their 
constituents in Mexico, if for no other reason than to demonstrate that their revolutionary 
experiment was working.  They worried that they were losing their best workers to the 
 
24Ibid., 366-67.  
25Romano Herrera to the Commissioner of Immigration, October 29, 1929, RG 85, Entry 9, file 
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United States and that these immigrants would never return.  Alfonso Fabila, a Mexican 
official, lamented how Mexican immigrants pined for their return to Mexico, but became 
so entranced with their new opportunities for consumption that they racked up too much 
debt to leave.26 At the same time as Mexicans emigrated, foreigners from Syria, Turkey, 
Palestine, Lebanon, and China were arriving in Mexico, with the potential to upset 
Mexico’s own fragile national identity.27 
In the U.S., all of the arguments concerning the inassimilability of Mexicans 
gained strength in the late 1920s.  Worried about how immigration would affect their 
country, Americans did not need much urging to accept the exclusionists’ arguments.   
While the leadership of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had initially avoided 
supporting restriction proposals, preferring to work informally with Mexican labor 
organizations to stem emigration, they joined the exclusionists’ ranks in 1928, after other 
methods had failed.  In addition, the governor of Arizona and the state legislatures of 
California, Arizona, and Oregon all went on record opposing Mexican immigration.28 
Literacy Digest, a national magazine, reported that the majority of its readers favored the 
restriction of Mexican immigrants.29 The Saturday Evening Post, a popular magazine 
with a circulation of nearly three million readers, regularly published articles urging more 
restriction.30 A nationwide survey in 1930 demonstrated that most respondents then 
 
26Alfonso Fabila, El problema de la emigracion de obreros y campesinos mexicanos (Mexico 
City: Publicaciones de la secretaria de gobernacion, 1929), 12-13.  
27Secretaria de relaciones exteriors, La migracion y proteccions de mexicanos en el extranjero 
(Mexico City: Ministerio de relaciones exteriors, 1928), 17.  
28Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 228.  
29Ibid., 205.   
30Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation 
Pressures 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 29.  
156
worried about the “Mexican invasion” and believed that “these people [Mexicans] can 
never be assimilated with white Americans.”31 
To bolster their case for closing the door to immigrants, exclusionists contested 
the marginalizationists’ claims that Mexicans moved to the U.S. only temporarily.  They 
pointed to the growing “Mexicanization” evident in expanded colonias or “Little 
Mexicos” throughout the United States.32 George Lorimer, editor of the nativist Saturday 
Evening Post, observed that Mexicans were “pushing farther North” and “crowding in the 
slums” rather than departing as other Americans claimed.33 Exclusionists denied that 
Mexicans returned to Mexico after a harvest season, explaining how employers turned 
“Mr. Mexican loose to shift for himself,” giving him the opportunity to take American 
(more permanent, factory-type) jobs or simply to subsist on local charity.34 Another 
exclusionist warned how “CALIfornia [sic]” would soon become “MEXIfornia [sic],” 
noting dramatic—albeit impressionistic—changes in the school population, which were 
“once 100% white, now over 80% Mexican peon,” as evidence of this trend.35 Harry 
Laughlin anticipated that Mexico would eventually reconquer and repopulate the 
American Southwest due to the increasing number of female Mexican immigrants and 
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71A-F16.4, box 517, National Archives.  There were many voices stating that the immigrants had not left 
as initially claimed.  See the various hearings on immigration, 1926-1930 and letters to representatives.  For 
one example, see letter from Alexander Hamilton Bolton, February, 1928 to Representative Joseph Crail 
(Republican, CA) in RG 233, file HR 70A-H3.3, National Archives.  
35Pamphlet in RG 233, file HR 71A-F16.4, box 517, National Archives.  
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their higher birth rate relative to Anglo American women.36 Representative Johnson 
explained that while he had heard much testimony regarding how the workers returned to 
Mexico, he had yet to see any documentation supporting this.  Moreover, he noted that 
the AFL’s recent decision to support immigration restriction suggested that the 
immigrants remained and posed a threat to American workers.37 
Through their various writings and congressional testimony against Mexican 
immigrants, exclusionists simultaneously increased Americans’ awareness of the scale of 
Mexican immigration while successfully promoting their views that Mexicans of lower 
class standing were not capable of becoming American.  Most Anglo and Mexican 
Americans agreed with their assessment.  They believed that being American meant 
having a pure or primarily European heritage and being an independent worker with a 
decent standard of living.  They agreed that the newest immigrants failed to meet these 
criteria.  The exclusionists had less success, however, in defining Mexicans as a 
permanent threat to the American nation.  The marginalizationists would use the 
exclusionists’ own language emphasizing Mexicans’ migratory culture to make the case 
that no harm would be done to American national identity and unity if the borders were 
left open since the immigrants would not remain long enough to inflict any damage.  
Ultimately, the exclusionists failed to pass any of the restriction bills they had proposed 
from 1926 to 1930.38 
36Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 156.  
37House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Restriction of Immigration from Republic 
of Mexico, 6.  
38See Divine, American Immigration Policy, for the argument that restriction failed due to fears of 
offending Mexico and Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern 
America (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2004), in which she explains that restriction never passed 
since increased enforcement made it unnecessary.  See Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 
141 for more information on the final results of the proposed bills. 
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The historian Robert Divine contends that these failures occurred due to U.S. 
government officials’ concern about offending Mexico, an important trade partner.  More 
recently another scholar, Mae Ngai, has explained that the increased enforcement of 
existing immigration laws made passing such laws unnecessary.  Both of these arguments 
are correct, but they overlook the importance of the growing discourse that identified 
Mexicans as only living in the United States temporarily.  Frequent references to 
Mexicans’ temporary status made it easier for Americans to avoid passing restriction 
laws that would offend Mexico and frustrate U.S. agricultural interests.  This notion of 
Mexicans as temporary mollified those who worried about how the immigrants’ presence 
would affect American national identity.  By the mid-1920s, this image of Mexicans as 
temporary workers had become so ubiquitous that it influenced the views of 
assimilationists and pluralists as well. 
Assimilation 
 Americans advocating that Mexicans could assimilate were harder to discern in 
the immediate postwar era.  Hardly any testified in the restriction debates like they had 
during the statehood discussions.  The failed Americanization campaigns of the war years 
had taken their toll.  Yet, while the assimilationists were less visible, they continued to 
promote their strategy, via religious and reform organizations, as the best one for dealing 
with the immigrants and ensuring national unity.  Primarily, they concentrated on 
changing and educating those Mexicans already in the United States, rather than 
engaging directly in the battle between the exclusionists and marginalizationists over 
whether to close the swinging door or keep it open.  In doing so, they strengthened the 
exclusionists’ argument that the immigrants were not temporary, for there was a group of 
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them who remained.  The assimilationists, moreover, agreed that Mexican immigrants 
who did not assimilate posed a danger to the country.  Like the exclusionists, most of 
them believed that effective integration depended upon having a European heritage.  
Consequently, many assimilationists either emphasized Mexican’s white ancestry or 
expressed ambivalence about whether immigrants who had a mixed heritage could 
succeed in fitting within the nation.  Unlike the exclusionists, they did not think that class 
status was permanent or foreordained or that the immigrants were incapable of changing 
their culture.  Instead, they believed that immigrants, at least those who were not at the 
very bottom of the economic ladder, could improve their class standing and learn 
American ways. 
Some assimilationists were Mexican Americans who worked to integrate 
newcomers into the nation by emphasizing the dominant Anglo American culture, rather 
than a Spanish or Mexican one.  The League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC), a national organization initially established in Texas in 1928, was central to 
this effort.  Ben Garza, a restaurant owner and President of LULAC, stressed the 
immigrants’ potential American-ness, noting that many who had lived in the United 
States for several decades believed that they had become citizens even if they had never 
been naturalized.  They thought it happened automatically, alongside cultural change.  
Regardless of their de jure status as non-citizens, they considered themselves officially 
American.  Garza added that his organization educated immigrants on citizenship, 
patriotism, and the English language.  It also encouraged newcomers to acquire additional 
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education so that they “not only make a better living but they may make a more 
substantial contribution to the citizenship of our country.”39 
Garza agreed with the exclusionists that the immigrants were not in the country 
temporarily, but saw strong possibilities for their full participation in the nation as 
Americans, rather than as Spanish Americans.  He also believed that the immigrants 
should not be condemned to remain on the margins of society.  Instead, they should 
educate themselves, modify their culture, and enhance their class standing.  He thought 
this possible because he viewed the immigrants as members of the white race and thus as 
entitled to American status as any other white person.  This is evident when Garza 
informed a congressional committee that it should not restrict Mexican immigrants 
because their labor was needed and “no other white race can stand it [the type of 
work].”40 Two other representatives of LULAC, attorneys J C. Canales and Alonzo 
Perales, also rejected restriction and believed that Mexicans could become good 
Americans by learning English.41 
Apparently, however, not all LULAC members and Mexican Americans agreed 
with their leadership.  The honorary president and general vice president of the league, 
C.N. Idar and M.C. Gonzales, complained that Garza, Canales, and Perales had not 
represented LULAC’s position properly.  They asserted that “immigration from Mexico 
is foreign to the general purposes and aims of the league, which is an organization 
exclusively based upon principles of Americanism.”   These members agreed with the 
exclusionists that the border’s door should be closed, but like other assimilationists felt 
 
39House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 258-
59.  J.C. Canales also says this on pp. 172-73 of the same hearings.   
40Ibid., 260.  
41Ibid., 180-81.  
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that Mexican immigrants already within the U.S. could be assimilated.  Idar and Gonzales 
further noted that Ben Garza also worked for the Southern Texas Growers, which might 
have explained his open border views.42 Regardless of how various LULAC members 
perceived restriction, it is clear that they agreed upon an Americanism rooted in 
whiteness and the English language, rather than one promoting a mixed heritage, the 
Spanish language, and a Spanish or Mexican American identity.43 
Many missionaries and social workers accepted the exclusionists’ claim that the 
people of the United States needed to consider how Mexicans would fit within the nation 
for they were not as temporary as the marginalizationists had alleged.  But few 
themselves became exclusionists.  Many were Protestants who preferred open borders as 
a way to evangelize and extend the reach of the church to more people, whether at home 
or abroad.44 The prominent Presbyterian minister, Robert McLean, called for a greater 
effort to Americanize the immigrants and contested congressional testimony that depicted 
the immigrants as “rovers,” and as a people who returned to Mexico.  In his review of 
over one thousand interviews of Mexican nationals in San Antonio and Los Angeles, 
McLean found that only a few went back—and generally then only for the holidays.45 
Most reformers in religious or Americanization-type organizations agreed that the 
Mexican immigrants who remained had to be assimilated.  But their advocacy of 
 
42Ibid., 191. Telegram to William Green entered into testimony.     
43This fits with Thomas Guglielmo’s recent findings in his article in the Journal of American 
History and may be considered an earlier version of what he refers to as the “Caucasian strategy,” which 
was used by LULAC members and other Mexican Americans in 1940s Texas to fight for civil rights for all 
those who could claim this heritage.  I am skeptical of Guglielmo’s argument, however, regarding the 
extent to which the Mexican government used this same language to defend the rights of Mexican citizens 
in the United States.  See Thomas A. Guglielmo, “Fighting for Caucasian Rights:  Mexicans, Mexican 
Americans, and the Transnational Struggle for Civil Rights in World War II Texas,” Journal of American 
History 92 (March 2006): 1212-37. 
44Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 119.  
45Robert N. McLean, “Mexican Workers in the United States,” Proceedings of the National 
Conference of Social Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 531-38. 
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assimilation conveyed some ambivalence or doubts about their eventual success because 
they increasingly saw the newcomers as not white and of a lower-class standing than 
preceding ones.  Don Lescohier, presenting at the 1927 National Conference of Social 
Work, worried that the newcomers might have too much Amerindian blood, which he 
feared would make them incapable of assimilating.46 Other reformers such as Helen 
Walker had greater concerns about the dominant U.S. population, wondering if they 
would ever learn to respect the newcomers, mixed or otherwise, as equals.  If not, she felt 
that restriction might be better than admitting Mexicans who would be forced to remain 
in a second-class status.47 Like Walker, James Batten lamented that many Americans 
opposed naturalizing Mexicans.  At a conference on the status of Mexican immigrants, 
Batten warned that “90 per cent of our citizens…consider him [ Mexican immigrants] 
merely as a “labor commodity” and a temporary necessity.”48 At a time when few 
considered the immigrants as potential Americans, assimilationists faced an uphill battle 
to garner resources and support for their efforts. 
Few of the testifiers in the immigration restriction debates shared the desire of the 
reformers in wanting Mexican immigrants to become fully assimilated Americans.  One 
who stated that he did, E.K Cummings of Nogales (AZ), was someone who lived in one 
of the most entwined communities of Mexico and the United States, a city that literally 
straddled the political borders of the two nations.  Cummings, as head of the local 
chamber of commerce, likely had an economic motive for his pro-assimilationist and 
 
46Don D. Lescohier, “The Vital Problem in Mexican Immigration,” Proceedings of the National 
Conference of Social Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 551.  See also  Charles A. 
Thomson, “Mexicans-An Interpretation,” Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 499-503 for another example of this view. 
47Helen Walker, “Mexican Immigrants and American Citizenship,” Sociology and Social Research 
13 (5) (1929): 463-71.  
48James Hoffman Batten, “Southwest and Center:  The Mexican Conference at Pomona,” Survey 
Midmonthly, January 15, 1929, 475. 
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anti-exclusionary views, since the lack of restrictionist legislation would make economic 
exchange across the border much easier.  Thus, Cummings asserted that “the better class 
of Mexican is a mighty fine citizen.  I wish we had a lot of the better class of Mexicans in 
the State of Arizona.”  He further added that Mexicans in Arizona were different from the 
migrants otherwise discussed in the hearings.49 He testified that most of the Mexicans he 
referred to had a substantial European heritage, explaining that they had only “some 
Indian blood in him.”  When asked by the Representative Johnson if the Mexicans 
intermarried with “Americans,” he affirmed that they did but again stressed that it was 
the “better class of Mexicans” that did so.  He added that “their mode of living is equally 
as good as that of the average American family; their homes include every 
convenience.”50 In other words, Mexicans with some financial standing and the proper 
cultural inclination could buy their way into a greater European heritage and thus 
American citizenry or social acceptance.     
Although the reformers, some members of LULAC, and a few in the business 
community believed that the recent Mexican immigrants could integrate fully into the 
United States, they were in the minority.  Most Americans did not want Mexicans to 
enter the United States permanently and become full members of the country.  Likewise, 
many of the immigrants and Mexican officials did not desire this either.  As a result, very 
little time was devoted to the matter of assimilation in the congressional testimony; a very 
different kind of solution—marginalization—would become a far more popular way of 
dealing with Mexican immigrants. 
 
49House Committee, on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, 138-44.  
50Ibid.  
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Increasingly, Americans began to view the newcomers as different from previous 
Mexican immigrants or other people of Mexican descent in the U.S.  Subscribing to the 
exclusionists’ ideas that the new immigrants were racially different from the Spanish 
Americans in New Mexico or higher class Mexicans, most Americans no longer believed 
that Mexican immigrants could integrate smoothly into the national fabric and become 
like Anglo Americans. 
Pluralism 
By the late 1920s, few pluralists attempted to extend their strategy for admitting 
newcomers to the recent immigrants from Mexico.  In many ways, the exclusionists and 
pluralists had joined together to define the new arrivals as outside of American national 
identity because of their lack of European heritage and lower class status.  Oddly, this 
convergence occurred at the same time that Americans became increasingly intrigued 
with the nation’s Spanish heritage.    
This “vogue” for all things Spanish proliferated as various writers glorified the 
Spanish padres and their mission work, in contrast to the former black legend which 
attributed atrocities against the Indians to the Spaniards.51 In 1926, Cleve Hallenbeck 
explained in his history of Spanish missions that the priests who had settled the American 
Southwest belonged to the Franciscan, rather than the Jesuit, order.  These Franciscans, 
he argued, did not enforce the inquisition on American soil and were more tolerant than 
their Jesuit brethren in Latin America.  Consequently, Hallenbeck believed that these 
 
51This “vogue” is identified and described in Alfred Coester, “Why Spanish?” Hispania 7 (1) 
(1924): 21-29.  Further evidence is from US House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on the 
Pacific Southwest Exposition, 70th Cong., (1928), in which Congress approved funds for the 
commemoration of Spanish priests who landed at the port of Long Beach.  The purpose was to recognize 
and promote that “they were the first white settlers” in the area who “introduced civilization to the Indians” 
(6).  
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Spanish padres should be celebrated as the bearers of white civilization who had taught 
and improved the indigenous people in the Southwest.52 
Other authors like Sarah Bixby-Smith also created a romantic Spanish past for 
American history.  In her memoir, Bixby-Smith recounted the lyrical Spanish names of 
the California towns of her youth and then reminisced about the beautiful flowers planted 
years before by the now long absent Castilian padres. In contrast, she remembered the 
living Mexicans as hot-headed, exotic, and migratory—people who materialized to 
perform the arduous task of sheepshearing and then disappeared when the work ended.  
She did not connect the Mexican laborers of her past with Spanish missionaries or any 
kind of Spanish ancestry.53 
A few Mexican Americans tried to make an association between Mexican 
immigrants and a Spanish heritage, and to minimize or erase any link to an indigenous 
past or non-European ancestry.  Frank J. Palomares, Manager of the Agricultural Labor 
Bureau for the San Joaquin Valley, argued that Mexicans could become like himself, a 
good American “of Spanish ancestry.”  Like the immigrants, his relatives had been 
“citizens of Mexico.”54 While Palomares saw himself as above many of the Mexican 
workers because of his elite family background and marriage with an Anglo woman, he 
also wanted to improve immigrants’ lives.  He recognized that racism directed toward 
them might be directed at him as well.  Yet, he was one of only a few Americans 
extending the pluralist strategy to the newcomers.55 Other people of Mexican descent 
 
52Cleve Hallenbeck, Spanish Missions of the Old Southwest (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page 
& Co., 1926), v, 7-9, 15.  
53Sarah Bixby-Smith, Adobe Days (Cedar Rapids, IA: Torch Press, 1925), 81, 101, 121-25. 
54House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 152.   
55Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 39-41.  
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made distinctions between themselves and the newcomers.  Club Latino in Arizona, 
while sympathetic to the suffering and condition of new arrivals, distinguished between 
themselves, the long-term hispano americanos, and the newcomers or mexicanos.56 
Despite this increasing attraction to Spanish heritage, Anglo Americans seemed 
less willing to associate Mexican immigrants with this ancestry than they had during the 
statehood era.  This was due primarily to the fact that the newcomers now came from a 
lower class.  Conflating class and race, Anglo Americans perceived Mexican immigrants 
as mestizos or Indians and not as the descendants of dashing conquistadors and virtuous 
missionaries.  They made racial distinctions between Spanish Americans, whom most 
generally accepted as racially white, and the recent immigrants whom they perceived as 
dark-skinned and the progeny of Indians or mixed parentage.    
Most Anglo Americans believed that people with a Spanish heritage would be 
better able to fit within the nation because of their white race.  They also described the 
differences in class terms, viewing a well-dressed, Spanish-speaking person as Spanish 
American.  One Anglo American woman explained her understanding of the variation 
between the groups to the economist Paul S. Taylor: “the Spanish are a higher type than 
the Mexicans, use better language, and are better dressed.”57 An Anglo American 
cattleman from Texas empathized with the upper-class people of Mexican descent who 
were denied service at hotels for “they are really Spanish and white, but the laborers are 
Indians.”58 A track foreman also understood the distinctions, explaining that Mexicans 
 
56“El primer banquete del club latino fue un exìto,” El Tucsonense (Tucson, AZ), January 26, 
1926. 
57Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Valley of the South Platte, Colorado, vol. 6, 
no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928), 212.  
58Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Dimmit County, Winter Garden District, 
South Texas, vol. 6, no. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930), 432.  
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could remain in the U.S. but would have to live and be educated separately from Anglos.  
He regarded the Spanish as different, asserting that, “the Spanish are all right; they are 
our equals.  But we would not mix with the Mexican Indians.”59 A labor representative, 
William C. Hushing, testified during a congressional committee meeting that the 
Mexicans immigrants were “not the same type as the Spanish-Americans who have 
testified here recently.”60 Hushing was referring to several members of LULAC, 
mentioned previously, who as attorneys and business owners held a middle-class status.   
Despite the benefits that might ensue, recent Mexican immigrants generally did 
not claim a Spanish identity or assert that they were white.  While one immigrant 
acknowledged, “I used to say that I was Spanish,” many others recognized the benefits of 
allying closely with Mexico and the local consulates, even to the extent of wearing 
buttons proudly asserting themselves as, “Ciudadanos de Mexico” (citizens of Mexico).  
These recent immigrants had embraced the discourse of the Mexican Revolution and 
perceived themselves as Mexican—a people who prided themselves on their mixed 
European and indigenous heritage—rather than as people with a pure Spanish heritage.61 
Paul S. Taylor discovered that some upper-class Mexicans and immigrants were offended 
at being described as Spanish.62 To them, this label highlighted the heritage of 
imperialism and conquest and the pre-revolutionary emphasis on a European identity 
rather than a mestizo or Mexican one, which they preferred.   
 
59Paul S. Taylor, Dimmit County, Winter Garden District, South Texas, 446.  
60House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 366.  
61Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Chicago and the Calumet Region, vol. 7, no. 
2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932), 112.  Information collected from period 1928-29.  Also, 
see Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Imperial Valley, vol. 6, no. 1 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1928), 91. 
62Paul S. Taylor, Valley of the South Platte, Colorado, 212-14.  
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Pluralism had not expanded its vision much beyond what it was when New 
Mexico and Arizona became states in 1912.  As most of the immigrants in the 1920s 
came from the lower classes, it was not likely that many Anglo Americans would be 
willing to regard them as the educated, upper-class Spanish Americans that they had 
heard about in New Mexico and a few other pockets of the Southwest.  And, while a few 
cautious Mexican immigrants asserted a Spanish heritage to improve their opportunities, 
most recognized this action as futile, or had little interest in claiming such an ethnicity.  
Likewise, those pluralists who claimed a Spanish American identity made little effort to 
share this identity with newcomers.  So, a pluralist strategy of belonging, which opened 
and retained a space for some long-term residents and upper-class people of Mexican 
descent in the American nation, was not extended to the masses of Mexican immigrants 
in the 1920s. 
* * *
Although the marginalizationists argued that Americans did not need to worry 
about how Mexican immigrants would affect the nation for they would not remain, many 
Mexican and Anglo Americans continued to debate alternate strategies—exclusion, 
assimilation, and pluralism—for dealing with new arrivals and ensuring national unity.  
To most of these Americans (except for the few remaining pluralists), being American 
necessitated a European or white heritage and an accommodation to the dominant Anglo 
American culture.  An increasingly important topic in the debates was an awareness of 
the immigrants’ low class background and the argument that being American also meant 
having a certain standard of living.  Few believed that Mexican immigrants, willing to do 
the least desirable jobs for low pay, had the necessary drive to advance beyond peonage.  
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In addition, the growing emphasis on the immigrants’ constant movement—from place-
to-place and job-to-job—made the immigrants appear even less capable of becoming 
American.  Consequently, many Anglo and Mexican Americans began to associate the 
newcomers pejoratively with poverty, movement, and transience.  This discourse merged 
well with the view espoused by the marginalizationists—that the immigrants would not 
threaten the meaning of American identity because they would not stay in the United 
States long enough to do so.  By 1930, the exclusionists and assimilationists had 
succeeded in bringing much attention to the issue of Mexican immigration and the matter 
of unassimilated Mexicans in the nation.  Yet, the marginalizationists increasingly 
influenced the contours of the debate and kept the door swinging back and forth to admit 






The Promotion of the Temporary Worker  
 
By the mid-1920s, the exclusionists had amassed substantial national influence 
and convinced many Americans that recent Mexican immigrants did not have the 
requisite traits to become American.  According to this view, the immigrants then coming 
from Mexico were of mixed racial heritage, belonged permanently to the peon class, and 
had a primitive culture.  For these reasons, the exclusionists argued that Mexicans should 
be restricted from entering the United States.  They advocated that the existing quota 
laws for Europe or something like them be extended to Mexico so as to reduce the 
number of Mexicans who emigrated officially into the U.S. from approximately 65,000 to 
1,557 per year.2 The pluralists no longer posed a threat to the exclusionists’ strategy for 
national unity since few believed the lower-class arrivals could become Spanish 
Americans.  Nor did the assimilationists have many followers, as most Americans could 
not envision that the lowly and racially suspect newcomers could learn American ways.  
Yet, despite the exclusionists’ success in portraying the immigrants as un-American, they 
faced an active body of marginalizationists who adamantly opposed Mexican restriction 
or exclusion.  By 1930, these marginalizationists had succeeded in foiling all bills related 
to minimizing the immigrants’ entry.  How did they do it?  
 
1Nomads.  Enrique Santibañez, Mexican consul, used this term to refer to Mexican immigrants in 
Ensayo acerca de la inmigracion mexicana en los estados unidos, (San Antonio: Clegg Co., 1930), 51. 
2See US Department of Labor, Annual Reports, from the Commissioner General of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1925-30) for statistics on annual immigration.  For information on the proposed 
immigration limits, see Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow: Mexican Immigration Labor in the 
United States, 1900-1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 207 and Lawrence A. Cardoso, 
Mexican Emigration to the United States, 1897-1931: Socioeconomic Patterns (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1980), 137. 
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Recently, historian Mae Ngai has explained that the Great Depression and 
increased enforcement of existing immigration and related laws—such as the head tax, 
literacy test, and contract labor prohibitions—effectively reduced Mexican immigration, 
making the passage of restriction laws moot.  Robert Divine, another historian, has 
demonstrated how nascent pan-American relations and the fear of offending Mexico, an 
important trading partner, prevented any restriction bills from passing.  Both of these 
arguments overlook the growing dominance of the marginalization strategy and its appeal 
for Americans who desired the benefits of Mexican labor without threatening their 
national identity.3
Marginalizationists, including agriculturalists, industrial employers, and their 
political allies, agreed with the exclusionists that Mexican immigrants could not become 
full Americans.  They accepted the exclusionists’ arguments that the newcomers were of 
mixed heritage, were not independent and aspiring workers, and had an inferior culture.  
But unlike the exclusionists, they did not think it mattered, for they asserted instead that 
the immigrants would only be in the nation temporarily—to provide needed labor—and 
then return to Mexico.  Moreover, if a few did remain, they would not subvert U.S. 
national homogeneity and identity, for they would remain safely under the control of their 
Anglo American employers and marginalized from the rest of society.    Created during 
the statehood era and growing rapidly during and after the First World War, this strategy 
became the dominant way for explaining how the new immigrants would fit within 
American society.  They would be allowed to enter and work, but then would be expected 
to leave soon afterwards.   
 
3See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America, 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2004) and Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-
1952 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 
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The widespread acceptance of this strategy helps to explain why Americans 
acquiesced to ongoing immigration from Mexico.  It was not only because of the greater 
enforcement of immigration laws and pan-American pressure that open borders 
prevailed, but also due to the marginalizationists’ success in promoting the image of the 
immigrants as temporary workers, rather than as potential Americans.  The 
marginalizationists’ frequent assertions and arguments regarding Mexicans’ temporary 
status influenced Americans, allowing them to enjoy the benefits of cheap labor without 
having to worry about whether the newcomers would undermine national cohesion.  
Immigrants would work for low wages and then return home before their class, race, and 
culture impinged on the American character and nation.   
Promoting the Temporary Worker Image 
Americans were more receptive to the marginalizationists’ arguments concerning 
Mexicans’ temporary status due to the shortage of laborers available for migratory, 
agricultural, and unskilled jobs.  As crop production in the U.S. Southwest expanded, 
farmers increasingly had difficulty finding sufficient temporary pickers.  Immigration 
quota laws, imposed against Europe and the eastern hemisphere in 1921 and 1924, further 
reduced the supply of workers.  In 1929, the California Farm Bureau Federation reported 
that it faced more serious itinerant labor shortages every year.4 During that same year, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce published a study concluding that economic 
development (including agriculture, railroads, mining, and factories) in the American 
Southwest, West, and Midwest would be severely hampered without Mexican 
 
4California Farm Bureau Federation Resolution, Annual Meeting, November, 1929, Records of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Record Group (RG) 85, Entry 9, file 55639/616, National 
Archives, Washington, DC.   
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immigration.  As of 1930, the United States had more land in agriculture than in 1900, 
but fewer workers than thirty years before. 5 
This labor shortfall occurred partially because American workers preferred to do 
other kinds of work.  Between 1920 and 1930, six million Americans moved from rural 
areas to urban ones, eschewing agricultural jobs in favor of steadier and more lucrative 
employment in towns and cities.6 Employers advertised extensively for migratory 
laborers, only to find that few responded to the call and none accepted the jobs.  The 
Phelps-Dodge Corporation explained that of the Americans who had applied for mining 
jobs, most rejected the low-skilled positions and took only specialized or advanced ones.  
Fred Cummings of the Great Western Sugar Company in Colorado received petitions 
from over 3,700 farmers requesting more employees and concluded that this gap occurred 
because white workers had been educated beyond the point where they felt they should 
have to pick beets.7 The president of the Utah State Agricultural College noted that the 
“American farm boy” aspired to be a manager and that the “average American does not 
want his own children or relatives to become exclusively or predominantly menial 
workers.”8 J.T. Whitehead, the manager of a reclamation project in Colorado explained 
that it was necessary to have a class of people doing the lowliest jobs that few Americans 
would accept in order to “preserve Americanism.”9
5Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 85, 125-26.  
6Ibid., 85; Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1945), 41-42; Article reprinted from The Washington Herald, February 11, 1930 in 71st 
Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, (April 1930), 7137. 
7House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, Hearings, 69th Cong., 1st sess., (1926), 62-64.  
8House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 
Hearings, 71st Cong., 2d sess., (1930), 91.  
9House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, 112.  
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Americans agreed with these marginalizationists and called on Mexican laborers, 
frequently recruited in family groups, to perform the jobs increasingly defined as 
unsuitable for U.S. citizens.10 As Mexican immigrants gravitated toward temporary, 
agricultural, and unskilled work, even the national American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
did not complain about Mexicans entering the country to perform jobs that few 
Americans saw as providing a decent standard of living and the kind of respect and 
autonomy they expected.  The AFL was far more concerned about those immigrants who 
did not stay on the farms, venturing to cities for better-paying employment and 
competing with Americans for more attractive positions.11 
Gradually, Americans began to see a migratory lifestyle and temporary 
agricultural work as endemic to Mexicans as a group.  This prejudice then provided a 
rationale for why the immigrants could not become American:  real Americans never 
would have accepted such poor working conditions and pay.  In contrast to the Mexican 
immigrants, Anglo and Mexican Americans then considered themselves to be white 
Americans who were independent, upwardly mobile, and living in fixed and stable 
communities.  These Americans had begun to regard the recent Mexican immigrants as 
racially distinct from themselves, permanently of the lower-classes, and as a migratory 
people who moved from job-to-job and place-to-place, with no real stability or belonging 
in the American nation or, perhaps, anyplace.  As the immigrants left one location for a 
job in another, their nomadic practices made them seem perfectly suited to the 
 
10In the first half of 1928, 32,000 Mexicans emigrated to the U.S.  Of these, 20,000 were male 
adults, the remainder were women and children.  Agriculturalists hired them particularly to help with 
cotton, beet, and fruit crops.  See Linna E. Bresette, Mexicans in the United States, A Report of a Brief 
Survey (Washington, DC: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1929), 8-9, 12. 
11C.M. Newman, American National Livestock Association to El Paso Chamber of Commerce, 
October 12, 1927, Records of the House of Representatives, Record Group (RG) 233, file HR70A-F14.3, 
National Archives.  
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requirements of agricultural labor with its seasonal tasks.  R. G. Risser of the California 
Vegetable Union explained that a Mexican immigrant was most appropriate for 
agricultural work because his “migratory character makes him fit into the needs of each 
locality for transient and mobile labor.”12 In short, itinerant work had become something 
that Mexicans did and Americans did not.  
Americans also found Mexicans more desirable than Puerto Rican, Filipino, or 
black laborers because of the ease with which they could be sent away.  These other 
groups had more rights as Americans or had greater distances to traverse to return home 
than Mexicans did.  Their very permanence in the nation helped the marginalizationists 
contrast them against the temporary, and therefore more desirable, Mexican immigrants.  
Ralph Taylor of the Agricultural Legislative Committee of California argued that if 
Mexicans could no longer enter the country, the “vacuum” might be filled by the “Porto 
Rican negro” whom he saw as a greater threat to the nation than temporary Mexicans.13 
E.J. Walker of the Central Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce summed up the beliefs 
of many agriculturalists by noting that the problem with Puerto Ricans was that the 
“Porto Rico negro” was an American citizen who “becomes a fixture,” whereas a 
Mexican immigrant is “an alien [who] is returnable to his own country.”14 Walker 
conceded some rights and some claim on belonging to Puerto Ricans, but extended no 
such courtesy to the Mexicans he hired.15 They could be returned.  
 
12R.G. Risser, California Vegetable Union to Representative W. E. Evans, December 21, 1928, 
RG 233, file HR 70A-F14.3, National Archives.   
13House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 222.  
14Statement from E.J. Walker, Executive Secretary, Central Chamber of Agriculture and 
Commerce (AZ), n.d., RG 233, file HR 70-A-F14.3, National Archives.  
15In 1917, Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens per the Jones Act.  
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Initially, some agriculturalists in the Southwest had hoped that Puerto Rican 
migration would ease the labor shortage and had imported 1,100 workers from the island 
in 1926.  This experiment ended disastrously as the Arizona Cotton Growers’ Association 
found their new employees too demanding.  As the growers’ representative explained, the 
Puerto Ricans expected to be taken care of and then insisted on being returned to their 
native isle when certain wages and conditions failed to materialize.16 Reporting on this 
incident, the Pittsburgh Courier noted that “a horde of unfortunate black men, women, 
and children” had been promised free transit from Puerto Rico to Arizona as well as 
decent wages and living conditions.  Instead, the growers’ association charged them 
$66.50 for their transportation, an additional amount for meals, and wanted to pay them 
less than the prevailing wages from the preceding year.  Because the Puerto Ricans 
refused to work under such unfair terms, the growers’ association moved them into the 
State Fair Grounds in Phoenix “without proper food or shelter in an attempt to force them 
into submission.”17 
Eventually some Puerto Ricans made it to Texas where they appealed for 
assistance.  Mary Wood of the United Charities of Galveston (TX) requested financial 
help from the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization for the destitute 
Puerto Ricans from Arizona.  According to Wood, they had no jobs, did not speak the 
language, and needed money for the cost of a steamer back to the island.  The Committee 
refused to cover these expenses, explaining that the Puerto Ricans, as American citizens, 
could not be deported and that consequently the government had no responsibility to pay 
 
16Senate Committee on Immigration, Restriction of Western Hemisphere Immigration, Hearings,
70th Cong, 1st sess., (1928), 36-37.  
17George Perry, “Imported Porto Rican Laborers Suffering at Hands of Arizona Cotton Growers’ 
Combine,” Pittsburgh Courier,  October 9, 1926.  
177
for their return.18 While the Arizona press was sympathetic to the Puerto Ricans’ plight, 
it was clear that the editors did not want any more Puerto Ricans to enter the state, 
arguing that, “any further entry of these people should be prevented.”19 The local 
growers agreed.  They began touting the merits of Mexican laborers who had no 
citizenship rights and generally left at their own expense. 
Few agriculturalists or other Americans relished the idea of Filipinos filling the 
available agricultural jobs.  Like Puerto Ricans, Filipinos lived too far away for most to 
afford to leave on their own, and could not be sent away as they were colonial subjects or 
“nationals” who had the right to move throughout the United States and its territories.20 
In part because of their right to remain permanently in the nation, Filipinos reportedly 
learned English quickly, intermarried with white or black Americans, organized strikes 
against unfair pay and working conditions, and moved on to more lucrative jobs and 
positions when they could.  Many Americans feared their ability to displace other 
Americans from jobs and businesses.21 
Southwestern and midwestern employers also avoided hiring black Americans 
from other parts of the nation.  As with Puerto Ricans and Filipinos, black Americans 
could not be easily sent away.  Their employment was also problematic as the 
agriculturalists worried that they would be “pirating [workers] between sections [of the 
U.S.] and industries” and that the “negroes would create a much larger social problem 
and school problem than do Mexicans since the latter are not American citizens and a 
 
18Mary Wood to Representative Johnson (WA), November 14, 1927, RG 233, file HR 70-A-
F14.3, National Archives.  
19From an Arizona paper, reprinted in George Perry, “Imported Porto Rican Laborers.”   
20Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 96-97.  
21House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 
Hearings, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, 60-61, 244-46; “Mexican Labor Exclusion Bill Would Cause Influx of 
Filipino Population,” Hayden Collection, MSS-1, Hayden Papers, box 580, file 2, Hayden Library, Arizona 
State University, Tempe, AZ. 
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very large percentage of them return annually to Mexico.”22 Again, it was the 
permanence of black Americans that made them less desirable than Mexicans.   
Employers feared that they would remain in the vicinity after the seasonal work had 
ended and become dependent upon local charity.  
Many agriculturalists and their political allies preferred Mexican labor precisely 
because they believed that the immigrants would reside only temporarily in the U.S.  
They perceived Mexicans as short-timers who had little interest in competing with 
Americans or in belonging to the American nation.  The president of the Los Angeles 
Times, Harry Chandler, testified that Mexicans were “not enterprising like other races, 
but are more desirable from our standpoint.”23 Fred Hart of the California Farm Bureau 
agreed, explaining that Mexicans did not compete with Americans as other groups since 
“you don’t find the Mexican buying land and settling down and doing those things.”24 
Harry Chandler added that few Mexicans interacted with other Americans (in terms of 
where they chose to live or whom they chose to marry) or attempted to naturalize, 
“Mexicans do not come here to live, they do not come here to mix…They keep to 
themselves.”25 George Clements of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce went even 
further, asserting that even if Mexicans did remain, there was an easy solution for “in any 
event, he is an alien, which offers the possibility of relief should we desire it through 
deportation” as had occurred previously during the early 1920s.26 Clements believed that 
 
22Ventura County Farm Bureau to Representative Johnson, January 31, 1928, RG 233, file HR 
70A-F14.3, National Archives.  
23House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 60. 
24Ibid., 209. 
25Ibid., 69.  
26George P. Clements to Representative Phil D. Swing, December 27, 1928, RG 233, file HR 70A-
F14.3, National Archives.  
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Mexican laborers remained only at the whim of the American people; they did not belong 
and could be removed whenever desired. 
By the mid-1920s, most marginalizationists recognized the advantages in 
promoting Mexicans as temporary inhabitants over admitting them as potential second-
class or subordinate Americans.  Hence, they persuaded many Americans that they had 
nothing to fear from open borders and Mexican immigrants who would soon leave.  Still, 
observing that some Mexicans did not return to Mexico, a few marginalizationists 
continued to stress that immigrants who stayed permanently would not threaten the nation 
as these newcomers would remain at the bottom of society and not contest existing 
hierarchies.  One Arizona farmer testified that although he was not sure if Mexicans 
made good citizens, he believed that they made “passable” ones.27 A sugar beet grower 
informed legislators that the immigrants generally “drift[ed] back,” but that if they 
remained they were only “worker[s] and never will be anything else.”28 A Texas farmer 
argued that the immigrants generally returned but when they did not he noted that “I 
think Texans [white Americans]…feel satisfied that they are fully capable of maintaining 
their superiority over the Mexican.”29 A representative of the El Paso Chamber of 
Commerce agreed, noting that while half of the city’s residents were Mexican 
(presumably of Mexican descent) “the Mexican is not in any way controlling the 
institutions or retarding the Americanization of the city of El Paso.”30 
The marginalizationists strengthened the prevailing image of Mexicans as only 
temporarily in the United States by bombarding Americans with anecdotes and statistics 
 
27House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 139. 
28House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, 95. 
29Ibid., 46.  
30Ibid., 53.  
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regarding the immigrants’ transitory status in the U.S.  Harry Chandler testified that “a 
large number of them [Mexicans] come in automobiles and then they drive home.”31 In 
close questioning by some dubious lawmakers, various employers asserted that when the 
Mexicans left, they returned to Mexico rather than taking jobs in other parts of the nation.  
Representative John Garner (Democrat) of Texas assured fellow legislators that “80 per 
cent of the Mexicans that come over for temporary work go back” as “all they want is a 
month’s labor in the United States, and that is enough to support them in Mexico for six 
months.”32 The Central Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce in El Paso reported that 
80 to 90 percent of Mexicans returned.33 A resolution submitted by the Anaheim (CA) 
Union Water Company informed Congress that Mexicans were “temporarily resident in 
the United States,” with “most of the laborers returning home at the close of the harvest 
season.”34 Many others concurred, repeating these or even larger percentages of the 
number of Mexicans who had left.  Few provided any hard data.  Reliable statistics were 
slippery and difficult to find.  While the U.S. immigration commissioner reported few 
cases of immigrants returning to Mexico in his annual reports, Mexican officials cited a 
much higher number.35 In either case, the incessant repetition about the immigrants’ 
leaving reinforced the image of Mexicans as temporary in the minds of many Americans.   
Few marginalizationists were as active as Carl Hayden, the former Democratic 
representative and then senator from Arizona, in defining Mexicans as temporary.  
 
31House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 61.  
32House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, 188.  
33“Declaration of Principles” from the Central Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce, El Paso 
Conference, November 18-19, 1927, RG 233, file HR 70A-F14.3 National Archives. 
34Resolution from the Anaheim Union Water Company, February 6, 1928, RG 233, file HR 70A-
F14.3, National Archives.  
35Secretaria de relaciones exteriors, La migración y protección de mexicanos en el extranjero, 
(Mexico City: Ministerio de relaciones exteriors, 1928), 11-13.    
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Hayden went further than mere promotion of this image by calling for the codification of 
the existing back and forth practice into a temporary worker program.  Although there 
had been severe problems with a similar policy during the First World War, leaving 
destitute Mexicans stranded far from the border without food and work, Hayden believed 
it could be improved and that a German program offered an attractive model.  According 
to Hayden, the German state had successfully imported Polish workers for seasonal work 
and then returned the Poles before they jeopardized Germany’s racial character or 
endangered “the German standard of living or way of thinking.”  Hayden further 
emphasized that “their temporary admission had no effect upon either the Government or 
the people of Germany.”36 He did not mention what the Poles or the Polish state thought 
of this program, or if they had benefited.   
Even an ardent exclusionist like Representative Albert Johnson (Republican, WA) 
seemed intrigued with the possibilities of creating a temporary pool of workers.  
Politically astute, he recognized that this was a potential way for balancing the labor 
demands of agribusiness against those like himself who feared the changes the 
newcomers would make in the nation.  In debating restriction, Johnson frequently asked 
people on both sides of the debate what they thought about a temporary worker program; 
generally the responses were positive.  But one factor which prevented Johnson and his 
followers from embracing this idea was how to ensure that the temporary status would 
apply to the entire Mexican family without violating federal laws.   
Johnson understood that the birthright citizenship clause in the 14th amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted and upheld in the 1898 Supreme Court case U.S. v. 
 
36House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from 
Mexico, 191.  
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Wong Kim Ark, clearly conferred citizenship to children born in the U.S., regardless of 
the status of their parents.  This decision posed a problem for Johnson as he considered 
the creation of a temporary worker program.  For while the immigrants could be returned 
to Mexico per the terms of a contract, their citizen children had the right to remain.  
Representative John Box (Democrat, TX), another exclusionist, also demanded to know 
just “how is Uncle Sam going to force them into Mexico—those children born into the 
United States?”37 Johnson wondered the same in the committee hearings and wanted to 
know if there would be any problems if they needed to remove children.  He also 
questioned the possible relationships that Mexicans might form with Anglo Americans in 
the states, and whether there were or should be prohibitions on interracial marriage so 
that the immigrants would not be tempted to remain permanently for those reasons.   
Further troubling Johnson was how the family unit overall would affect temporary status, 
as he wondered if those who emigrated in groups would be more or less likely to return to 
Mexico.38 This was a major issue for, in comparison to most other immigrant groups, 
more Mexicans emigrated as families.39 Clearly, the problems in devising such a 
program were in how to work around certain principles and details: how long the season 
would last, who would bear the cost and responsibility for the workers’ return, and how 
much Congress could restrict the immigrants’ freedom in terms of movement and 
marriage.   Ultimately, the problems overwhelmed Johnson and his fellow exclusionists 
who did not support or approve a formal, temporary worker program.   
 
37Ibid., 94-95.  
38Ibid., 195.  
39Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in 
the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 34.  
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Despite the marginalizationists’ failure to establish such a program, the mere 
subject and discussion of it contributed to the growing discourse of Mexicans as 
temporary.  Throughout this and other debates regarding Mexican immigration, 
agribusiness, legislators, and other participants providing testimony frequently used 
language referring to Mexican immigrants as sojourners, homers, and rovers, or 
migratory and seasonal as well as temporary and transient.40 Often those testifying did 
not actually know where the Mexicans went, did not care, or for their own purposes in 
retaining open borders, preferred that the answer remain muddled and merged.  In the 
final analysis, it did not really matter to the marginalizationists that some migratory 
workers stayed in the U.S.  What did concern them was their ability to depict all 
Mexicans as mobile and restless so that other Americans would not recognize the 
immigrants’ growing permanence and fear the consequences of their extended presence 
on American homogeneity.  Although some critics had questioned the accuracy of the 
marginalizationists’ claims, that the immigrants remained only temporarily, the 
opponents’ use of the same terms emphasizing constant movement and migration (to 
disparage the immigrants) only enhanced the growing image of Mexicans as temporary.41 
The constant repetition of such language helped to fix in American minds the image of 
Mexican immigrants as only temporary laborers who would never become American.   
 
40The word guest, a less pejorative euphemism for some of these words, was not used until a much 
later date.  
41One of many specific examples in the congressional hearings was S. Parker Friselle, the 
Chairman of the Agriculture Committee of Fresno (CA) County Chamber of Commerce who described 
Mexican immigrants as “transient” and “homers,” whom “like the pigeon goes back to roost” in his 
testimony.  Roy Richard Woodruff, the House representative from Michigan used words like “drift” to 
emphasize Mexicans’ movement.  See House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Seasonal 
Agricultural Laborers from Mexico, 6, 8, 26.  Other examples are Russell Bennett, editor of the Holtville 
Tribune in California who referred to Mexicans as “mostly nomadic” and William Hushing, the Legislative 
Representative of the American Federation of Labor in Washington, DC who described them as “a roving 
class.”  See House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 317, 
367.   
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The emerging sense of Mexicans as transient contributed to the growing notion of 
Mexicans as unable to establish meaningful communities, and thus incapable of being 
American.  Despite Americans’ own migratory ways, Americans had a long history of 
viewing themselves as settled, stable, and permanent.  They regarded others who were 
migratory—generally newcomers or people deemed foreign—as barbaric, unsettled, and 
wild.  This image was clear during the struggles over statehood when legislators opposed 
to Arizona’s admission railed against the territory because of its significant population of 
single, transient men.  These mobile men, they argued, lacked morals and general 
civilization.  Those who favored statehood emphasized that the people of Mexican 
descent who lived within the territories were exceptionally stable and thus imminently 
American.   This past, then, made it less likely that Anglo or Mexican Americans would 
envision that the recent Mexican immigrants—depicted as roamers—would qualify as 
potential or even second-class members of the United States.  Their peripatetic practices 
suggested that they did not belong anywhere at all.   
Yet the growing colonias in the Southwest, Midwest, and even parts of the eastern 
United States demonstrated that the immigrants did remain and establish permanent 
communities.  In Chicago, Mexicans increased from 1,310 in 1920 to 75,000 by 1928.   
The sociologist Emory Bogardus reported that many Mexicans in California were 
homeowners, suggesting that the immigrants had become permanent settlers.  The 
number of Mexican children likewise increased dramatically on California school 
rosters.42 Yet the length of the immigrants’ stay in any particular place, and the meaning 
of “temporary,” was rarely discussed or defined.  While policymakers presumed it was of 
a seasonal duration, lasting three to 18 months, immigrants frequently conceived of their 
 
42Bresette, Mexicans in the United States, 8-9. 
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temporary status in much different terms, related to specific events rather than time.  
They spoke of returning to Mexico only for holidays, or dreamt of returning permanently 
when violence in Mexico ceased or the economy improved.  This amorphous timeframe 
made it easier for marginalizationists to fight against various restrictive measures for no 
one had to explain exactly when the immigrants would leave. 
 Even American authors and scholars who noticed the immigrants’ growing 
presence unwittingly promoted the marginalizationists’ agenda.  As they learned of 
Mexicans’ ambivalence toward the United States, due to the discrimination, segregation, 
and ostracism they experienced within it, they incorporated the findings into their studies.  
James Batten concluded that Mexicans “cross[ed] the border physically” into the U.S. but 
remained within Mexico “racially and nationally.”43 Helen Walker, a sociologist, 
reported that most Mexicans had little interest in naturalizing as citizens and “had no 
desire to become a part of our body politic.”  She added that even those who had become 
citizens were generally “peons” who avoided voting since they believed that they were 
“really not part of the real America.”44 Even an English-language teacher, in a profession 
generally linked to Americanization campaigns, thought that she was contributing to 
“international goodwill” by teaching English since she fully expected that her Mexican 
students would return to Mexico.45 In making these statements, these researchers and 
educators further enhanced the image of the immigrants as temporary. 
But U.S. agricultural interests, their legislative allies, and a handful of American 
scholars alone did not convince Americans of the merits of an image of Mexicans as 
 
43James Hoffman Batten, “Southwest and Center: The Mexican Conference at Pomona,” Survey 
Midmonthly, January 15, 1929, 475.  
44Helen W. Walker, “Mexican Immigrants and American Citizenship,” Sociology and Social 
Research 13 (May-June, 1929): 465-71.  Quotations from page 467.  
45J. Francis Lemon, “The English-Mexican Class,” Hispania 9 (October 1926): 248-50.    
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temporary workers.  They had help from many Mexicans as well.  The actions and 
discourse of Mexican officials, scholars, journalists, and the immigrants themselves all 
helped to promote the image that Mexicans would enter the U.S. only to provide their 
labor, and then return home as quickly as possible.  With everyone urging their temporary 
stay, Mexicans had even less incentive to remain in the U.S. and pursue permanent 
residency or citizenship.   
The Mexican Government Supports the Temporary Worker Image  
The Mexican government and officials did much to strengthen the image of 
Mexicans as only temporary sojourners to the U.S.  While embarrassed at the number of 
Mexicans leaving the country—at a time when the authorities were trying to promote the 
nascent revolutionary state and prove that they could provide for their citizenry—
government officials also regarded emigration as an expedient safety valve.  The 
immigrants’ absence served to defuse growing economic tensions until the new leaders 
could resolve the state’s economic problems.  The immigrants also provided valuable 
remittances, an important source of income for the faltering Mexican economy.46 Despite 
the recognizable benefits from the immigrants’ short-term absence, the Mexican 
government wanted the immigrants to stay connected to their native country so that they 
would continue to send money home, and eventually return to re-build the war-torn 
society when Mexico was ready to absorb them.  Therefore they did much to promote 
voluntary repatriation as the ultimate goal.47 
46Some Mexican scholars and officials did see the loss of Mexicans as negative and that it only 
enriched the North at the expense of Mexico.  Still, many others recognized that there were few 
opportunities in Mexico and that the remittances from the North contributed to the Mexican economy.  See 
Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 104-10. 
47Lore Diana Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots: Mexican Newspaper 
Debates over Immigration, Emigration and Repatriation, 1928-1936” (PhD diss., University of California-
Riverside, 2002), 19, 28, 54-61.  
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To increase the likelihood of the immigrants’ continued allegiance and eventual 
homecoming, Mexican officials established comisiónes honoríficas, or honorary 
commissions, to extend the reach of the Mexican consulates far into the United States.  In 
the early 1920s, fewer than 60 consulates existed to serve two million Mexicans in the 
U.S.  Consequently, the Mexican president, Alvaro Obregón (1920-1924), encouraged 
the creation of honorary organizations, with the first one established in Texas in 1921, to 
ensure that more Mexicans remembered the homeland.  Under the official sanction of the 
Mexican consulates, these commissions offered various kinds of assistance to Mexicans 
in the U.S., such as helping them to contest police or employer mistreatment or incidents 
of discrimination.  They sponsored nationalistic activities to maintain ties with the 
immigrants abroad, registering them with the consulate, and sponsoring classes in the 
Spanish language, literacy, and Mexican history.48 They also organized libraries 
emphasizing the greatness of the nation, which included Mexican maps, Mexican history, 
and Mexican literature. In part, this was done to counteract Americanization efforts such 
as those conducted by the Friendly House in Phoenix, which taught immigrants English 
as well as how to read.  In the late 1920s, a few consulates established private schools to 
further combat assimilationist efforts, with some consuls going so far as to visit various 
colonias, urging parents not to permit their children to Americanize.49 By the end of the 
decade, many honorary commissions had sprung up throughout the United States, 
extending the influence of the Mexican government deep into el norte.
48Jaime R. Aguila, “Protecting ‘Mexico de Afuera:’ Mexican Emigration Policy, 1876-1928” (PhD 
diss., Arizona State University, 2000), 64-75, 211-12. 
49F. Arturo Rosales, !Pobre Raza!: Violence, Justice, and Mobilization Among México Lindo 
Immigrants, 1900-1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 36-44.  
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In addition to the honorary commissions, Obregón encouraged the creation of 
Brigadas de la Cruz Azul Mexican (The Blue Cross) to raise money for the immigrant 
community in the United States.  The Blue Cross members fed and clothed the 
impoverished and visited the immigrants hospitalized or incarcerated in the U.S.50 These 
efforts helped to keep the immigrants connected to Mexico and only temporarily attached 
to the United States.  The Blue Cross, honorary commissions, and Mexican consulates all 
helped to remind Americans that the immigrants had little interest in or need to become 
part of the nation; they belonged in Mexico. 
At the same time that the Mexican government sanctioned emigration, it also 
pronounced itself eager and willing to welcome the return of Mexican citizens from the 
United States.  It thereby enhanced the idea that the immigrants had only left temporarily 
and would soon return to Mexico.  This was not idle rhetoric.  These officials did provide 
funds to recruit experienced Mexican farmworkers from the United States to colonize 
underutilized Mexican land.  The plan involved assisting the immigrants with their return 
home as well as providing them with land and resources.  The repatriates then were 
expected to use their recently acquired knowledge to establish efficient and successful 
farms.  These schemes, however, usually failed as the land proffered was generally of 
poor quality, the projects underfunded, and the immigrants not provided with adequate 
equipment and machinery to make the farms a success.  Also, the immigrants themselves 
generally had few resources and little experience in developing a farm, especially given 
their lowly positions picking crops in an unmechanized industry in the U.S.51 
50Rosales, !Pobre Raza!, 42-44, 78.  
51Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots,” 19, 28, 54-61, 78, 261-62. 
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Various Mexican scholars and writers also enhanced the image of Mexicans as 
only temporarily in the United States.  According to these authors, all persons of Mexican 
descent, whether seasonal migrants, Mexican citizens in the U.S. for a longer duration, or 
even American citizens of Mexican origin, belonged to an “imagined community” 
affiliated with the Mexican nation.52 These writers desired and encouraged many of these 
hijos de México (children of Mexico) to return to Mexico, bringing what they had learned 
in the U.S. of modern agriculture, industry, work habits, and technology back to their 
native country.53 
Manuel Gamio, a prominent Mexican anthropologist, argued in this vein and 
recommended that Mexicans go to the United States for experience, but then return to 
develop their homeland.54 Many Mexicans in the mid-1920s shared this view and 
optimistically regarded the returning Mexicans as “super-Mexicans,” who had 
“undergone socioeconomic mestizaje [mixture].”  These repatriates then were expected to 
resolve the problems of Mexico, training other leaders in the methods that they had 
learned, and improving the Mexican nation.  Such writings emphasized the idea that the 
hijos, no matter the length of their absence, were really a part of Mexico and would be 
welcomed whenever they returned.  Some writers extended this argument to include even 
those whom had never lived in Mexico but had been in the territory taken by the United 
States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.55 Despite this welcoming propaganda, 
 
52See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).  
53Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots,” 267-70.  Kuehnert uses the term 
hijos de México. 
54This is from Robert Redfield’s summary of Gamio’s work on Mexican immigration in 1926-27.  
See Robert Redfield, “The Antecedents of Mexican Immigration to the United States,” American Journal 
of Sociology 35 (July-May, 1929-30): 433-38.  Also see Cardoso, Mexican Emigration, 104. 
55Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots,” 270, 288. 
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the Mexican government had little success in getting immigrants to return.56 Still, the 
discussion and encouragement helped to cement the image that Mexicans belonged to 
Mexico, and only temporarily worked in the U.S. 
By the late 1920s, however, more Mexicans were returning either because of 
financial hardship or because the U.S. government deported them.  At this point the 
Mexican government openly discouraged Mexicans from leaving Mexico so that they 
would not have to finance the repatriates’ return.  They supported the efforts of the 
Mexican labor union, Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), to stem 
emigration and required immigration officials to tell the would-be immigrants of the 
hardships they would face in the United States.  They also began to enforce a 1926 
Mexican law, which stipulated that the immigrants provide evidence of a U.S. work 
contract before they received a travel visa.57 
In 1928, Enrique Santibañez, the Mexican consul in San Antonio (TX), tried to do 
his part to discourage emigration by informing Mexicans of the lack of opportunities in 
the United States.  He emphasized that the immigrants would not be accepted as potential 
citizens and consequently would experience discrimination and financial hardship.  
Santibañez argued against emigration because he had discovered that even when the 
immigrants lost their jobs, they did not return to Mexico.  Instead, they became like 
“nómadas” (nomads), looking for work wherever they could find it.58 In this way, they 
had become rootless, people with no home or sense of belonging in either the United 
States or Mexico. 
56Ibid., 254.  
57Ironically, this requirement was against U.S. laws, which prohibited people from emigrating to 
the U.S. if they had pre-arranged work contracts.  
58Enrique Santibañez, Ensayo acerca de la inmigracion mexicana en los estados unidos, 98, 104-
5.  Quote is my trans. from p. 51.   
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As these efforts to stem their movement proved fruitless, many Mexicans began 
to favor and promote an official temporary worker program, mandating the immigrants’ 
short-term belonging in the United States.59 They believed that while the Mexican 
government was doing all it could feasibly do to stem the movement to el norte, it needed 
to make a greater effort to prevent “nuestras compatriotas [our compatriots]” from 
establishing permanent roots in the United States.  The editor of El Heraldo Mexicano 
called upon the Mexican government to establish a temporary work program in which the 
American employers would send the workers back to Mexico; in this way Mexico would 
retain a pool of laborers to rebuild the country when it was in a position to do so.60 
Consul Santibañez concurred and argued that the best solution was for Mexicans to 
emigrate in accordance with a fixed contract-labor program, in which the American 
employers would be financially responsible for returning them to Mexico in a few 
months.61 
Various Mexicans also helped to promote the image of the immigrants as 
temporary workers by viewing Mexico, rather than the U.S., as responsible for the 
immigrants’ welfare.  El Diario criticized the Mexican government and consulates for not 
dealing with the immigrants’ poor living conditions, forcing them to rely upon private 
organizations or mutualistas in the U.S. to resolve serious problems.  While this author 
called upon other local organizations in the U.S.—such as independent schools and job 
placement organizations—to help the indigent, he did not make similar demands upon 
any level of American government.62 This journalist believed that the emigrants did not 
 
59See Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 117.  
60El Fronterizo (Tucson, AZ), April 7, 1928.  Reprinted editorial from El Heraldo de México.  
61Santibañez, 104-5.   
62“Los Emigrantes,” El Tucsonense, July 12, 1928.  Reprinted from El Diario. 
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belong in the U.S. long-term, and that Mexico was primarily responsible for their 
welfare.  When the Mexican government tried to get mutualistas and charities in the 
United States to cover the cost of the immigrants’ return, Mexicans in Mexican border 
towns criticized their government for not doing more to help the impoverished repatriates 
who flooded their communities.63 Important elements of Mexican society, then, actually 
deepened the marginalizationists’ argument that Mexican immigrants had come to the 
United States only temporarily and that the nation to which they belonged was Mexico.   
Mexican Immigrants Sustain the Temporary Worker Image  
Influenced by these U.S. and Mexican officials and the poor treatment they 
experienced, many Mexican immigrants in the 1920s also considered their stay in the 
United States as temporary.  Whether this ended up being the case or not, they spoke 
openly of returning to their patria.  A septuagenarian explained that he had recently 
emigrated to the U.S. but intended to stay only until he could afford to purchase a 
barbershop back in Mexico.64 A seasonal railroad worker in the U.S. reported that he 
considered Mexico his “home and final resting place.”65 Mexicans as far away as 
Chicago made various references to their eventual return once they had sufficient money, 
the political situation in Mexico had improved, or more opportunities for advancement 
developed in their homeland.66 Certainly, some immigrants recognized that their 
duration in the U.S. would be lengthy, others not, but virtually all shared the desire to 
make their time in the United States brief, regardless of how likely that might be. 
 
63Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots,” 54, 77, 261-62.  
64Quoted in Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 77.  
65Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Chicago and the Calumet Region, vol. 7, no. 
2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932), 275.  
66Ibid.   
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This desire sprung not only from nostalgia or yearning for some aspect of a 
remembered homeland, but also from the efforts of the Mexican government and their 
representative consuls in the U.S. to keep Mexico alive in the hearts and minds of the 
immigrants.  These officials hoped to generate a sense of community amongst Mexican 
citizens abroad and at home, especially in the wake of the tumultuous Mexican 
Revolution.  This so-called México lindo (beautiful Mexico) movement, or campaign for 
the immigrants’ devotion, included all kinds of elaborate celebrations and pageantry.  
Festivals in the U.S. memorialized various political events such as Cinco de Mayo—
commemorating Mexicans’ success over the French in the 1862 battle at Puebla—and 
Dieciseis de Septiembre—glorifying Mexico’s independence in 1821 from Spain.  Likely 
influenced by such efforts, most Mexicans in the U.S. prominently displayed some 
symbols of Mexico in their homes.  These included portraits of the revered former 
president, Benito Juarez, and the Virgin of Guadalupe, an important religious figure in 
Mexico.67 
Despite some of the immigrants’ distance from their homeland, and their 
emphasis on daily survival, many were well aware of and attracted to the dramatic 
changes and increased nationalism pulsing throughout Mexico.  In the Midwest, 
Mexicans organized to sponsor art exhibits of the latest works of David Alfaro Siquieros, 
one of the foremost artists associated with incipient Mexican nationalism.  In 1928, 
hundreds of Mexican immigrants traveled to Chicago to hear José Vasconcelos, a well-
known Mexican official, who had given voice to Mexico’s revolutionary nationalism.  In 
Chicago, Vasconcelos spoke eloquently of la raza cósmica (the cosmic race), a slogan he 
had coined to express the nation’s more expansive view of Mexican identity rooted in the 
 
67Rosales, !Pobre Raza!, 5-7. 
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melding of an indigenous and European heritage.68 Consequently, Mexicans abroad felt 
more connected to their native country and a stronger sense of belonging there; few 
pursued naturalization in the U.S.   
At the same time that the immigrants became engrossed with this new version of 
Mexican nationalism, they faced greater hostility from Americans who had become more 
aware of their presence.  Increasingly, Mexicans recognized that many Americans saw 
them as second-class Americans, if they viewed them as any type of Americans at all.  
The immigrants’ exclusion from permanent status in the U.S., and their own disinterest in 
naturalization, fed upon each other and compounded both.  Although the immigrants 
sometimes received favorable attention from missionaries or social workers, other 
reformers daily impressed upon Mexicans just how they would have to change—in terms 
of dress, religion, food, language, and housing—in order to become successful in 
American society.  This kind of pressure irked the new arrivals who resisted this intrusion 
into their personal lives.  Felipe Hale, an immigrant, proudly explained how he continued 
to cook his meals in an estila mexicana (Mexican-style) rather than adopt American 
foods and preparations.  In addition, he recounted how he had sent his daughter to school 
in Mexico, rather than in Arizona where flag worship outweighed education.69 
68The concept of the cosmic race celebrated mestizaje (or mixture) and the cultural mixing of 
Europeans and native Americans.  It signified that Mexican identity would henceforth be rooted in an Aztec 
or indigenous heritage and the creation of a new mixed race, the cosmic race, which would be superior to 
all existing ones.  All Mexicans, then, theoretically, could see themselves in this more inclusive Mexican 
identity, which previously had emphasized a pure European heritage.  Africans and Asians, however, were 
excluded from this national narrative and not recognized as being a part of the nation’s history or current 
era.  Also, the new ideology called for the indigenous people to change their ways to coincide with those 
who had already melded their cultures and identity.  See Zaragosa Vargas, Proletarians of the North: A 
History of Mexican Industrial Workers in Detroit and the Midwest, 1917-1933 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 151, 157.  See also Kuehnert, “Pernicious Foreigners and Contested Compatriots,” 
11-12. 
69Manuel Gamio, El inmigrante mexicano: la historia de su vida, entrevistas completas, 1926-27, 
eds., Devra Weber, Roberto Melville, and Juan Vicente Palermo (Mexico City: Regents of the University 
of California, 2002), 413-14.  
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Mexican immigrants were in a difficult bind.  They were working in a country 
whose citizens did not want them to become members of the nation and wooed by the 
country they had left but which could not provide them with jobs.  Many immigrants 
dealt with this awkward situation by claiming ongoing allegiance to Mexico, even as they 
continued to work in the United States.  To remain connected to Mexico and apart from 
Americans who discriminated against them, some immigrants made a point of refusing to 
learn English.70 Others dreamt of their return and wrote corridos or songs expressing this 
sentiment, “I go sad and heavy-hearted to suffer and endure; my Mother Guadalupe, 
grant my safe return.” 71 The writers for El Correo Mexicano, a Spanish-language 
newspaper in Chicago, expected that most immigrants, including themselves, would 
return to Mexico eventually, and lauded those immigrants who organized themselves into 
associations to stay affiliated with the homeland.  According to these journalists, the 
Mexican nation would reward the mobile immigrants for their loyalty when they returned 
to their patria (native country).72 These immigrants lived in the U.S. physically, but 
culturally and psychologically they remained Mexican.  
Some Mexicans were temporary workers or “birds of passage.”  Yet many others 
had remained and settled in the growing colonias—despite their nostalgia for their native 
country—and begun to put down roots in the American nation.  But the success of the 
temporary worker image overwhelmed this distinction in the minds of most Americans.  
To most Americans in the late 1920s, all Mexicans were in the U.S. only temporarily, 
 
70Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 55-56.    
71Corrido quoted in Cardoso, Mexican Emigration to the United States, 76. 
72“A propósito de la emigración,” La Opinión (Los Angeles), October 5, 1926.  
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conveniently providing their labor and then returning home so that U.S. national identity 
would remain intact.  
The Marginalizationists’ Success 
Although the exclusionists successfully portrayed Mexicans as un-American due 
to their race, class, and cultural background, the marginalizationists had convinced a 
sufficient number of Americans that the immigrants would provide their labor and then 
leave.  In the 1920s, this notion of the temporary worker contributed substantially to the 
marginalizationists’ victory over exclusionists in preventing the European quota laws 
from being applied to Mexico.  This image of Mexicans as temporary workers, rather 
than as potential Americans via the pluralist or assimilationist strategies, had become the 
dominant way to regard Mexican immigrants.  Their physical presence was tolerated in 
the short-term, but they had no real place or permanence in the American nation. 
By the close of 1930, the debates over immigration restriction and temporary 
worker policies had resolved themselves through the deepening depression and greater 
enforcement of existing legislation (including the collection of head taxes, determinations 
of literacy, and investigations of contract labor violations).  Five times during the latter 
part of the twenties Americans had debated whether to restrict Mexican immigration and 
five times they had opted against a restrictive policy in favor of more open immigration, 
which most believed or hoped would result in only temporary workers, rather than 
potential citizens.  By 1930, Americans recognized that the crisis over restriction had 
largely vanished since fewer Mexicans were emigrating.  The ardent marginalizationist, 
Senator Carl Hayden, enthusiastically declared that “the Mexican quota problem has been 
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solved.”73 In Arizona alone, the number of Mexican immigrants entering the nation 
decreased from a high of 9,041 in fiscal year 1926 to 749 in 1930.74 As this decline 
paralleled national statistics, the more pressing concern then became what to do with the 
thousands of Mexican workers whose presence in the United States during a growing 
economic crisis was a glaring reminder of just how fictional the image of the temporary 
worker had been.   
 
73Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2d sess., (1930), 7111.  
74“Mexican Labor Exclusion Bill Would Cause Influx of Filipino Population,” Hayden Collection, 











“To Keep America American”:1
The Temporary Worker is Sent Away  
1930 to 1935 
 
Santiago Lopez grew up near Tucson, Arizona, although he was born in Mexico 
around 1907.  At some point he returned to Mexico and in 1925 crossed the border again 
near Sasabe, Arizona.  Two years later, the border patrol arrested Lopez and ordered him 
out of the U.S.  He left but came back within only two hours, walking into the United 
States a few miles west of Nogales.  Seven years later, Lopez was working on a ranch 
owned by the Southern Arizona Bank and Trust Company when immigration authorities 
nabbed him again; this time, they initiated formal deportation proceedings.  Hearing of 
Lopez’s troubles, Hubert H. D’Autremont, the vice president of the Tucson Bank, wrote 
to his congressional representative, Lewis W. Douglas, and asked him to intercede in the 
case.  D’Autremont vouched for his employee by recounting Lopez’s extensive history in 
the country and explaining that his presence would do “no harm to the United States.”2
By this time, Lopez had lived continuously within the U.S., save two hours, for nine 
years.  Additionally, he had spent some time growing up in Arizona and was only 25 
years old.  To which country did he belong? 
 In the nineteenth century, Lopez might have continued his transnational 
peregrinations through both countries, hardly noticing his journey across invisible 
boundary lines.  If he had reached adulthood in the first decade of the century, he might 
have apprenticed himself much as Carlos Jácome had done in Tucson, rising 
 
1A common restrictionist slogan quoted in Paul S. Taylor, “More Bars Against Mexicans?” Survey 
64 (April 1930), 26.  
2Hubert H. D’Autremont to Lewis Douglas, February 5, 1932, Lewis Douglas Papers, AZ 290, 
box 181, University of Arizona Library, Tucson. 
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economically to become a member of the middle-class and potentially accepted as 
Spanish American.  Yet by the mid-1920s, his initial encounter with border agents had 
convinced him to stay put, remaining in the U.S. rather than risking a trip outside the 
country.3 If asked, Lopez likely would have said his preferred home was in the United 
States; clearly his contestation of deportation suggests that he wanted to live there.  
 By 1930, however, the broad marginalizationist camp—of employers, the U.S and 
Mexican governments as well as academics, journalists, and some immigrants—had 
succeeded in defining Mexicans’ presence in the United States as temporary.  Perceived 
as short-timers, the immigrants purportedly would not affect Americans in any way, 
except to benefit them through the sweat of their labor.  The growing prevalence of this 
temporary worker image would up-end the lives of people like Santiago Lopez who had 
committed to a life in Arizona.  The immigration bureau, unimpressed by Representative 
Douglas’s intercession, ruled that Lopez had violated the 1924 immigration law for 
crossing without a visa and the 1917 Immigration Act for entering the U.S. as an 
illiterate.  Lopez had returned to the United States unlawfully after having been granted 
permission to depart on his own recognizance, and in lieu of a formal deportation 
hearing.  Because he violated this agreement, Lopez could not then re-apply for 
admission despite his employer’s offer to cover his entrance fees and teach him English.  
The conviction that Mexicans should remain only temporarily in the nation surely 
undergirded the ease with which the immigration officials deported Lopez.  For despite 
 
3Mae Ngai makes the argument that due to increased restriction, Mexicans stayed longer in the 
U.S. rather than risking deportation or being prevented from re-entering the U.S. at a later date.  See Mae 
M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
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his time in the U.S., American bureaucrats quickly determined that he did not belong 
there.4
Background on Repatriation 
During the 1920s, when the economy boomed for cotton growers in the 
Southwest, the marginalizationists had successfully persuaded many Americans that their 
strategy for dealing with Mexican newcomers was the best.5 They had argued in favor 
of allowing Mexicans to become subordinate Americans, destined to remain in dead-end 
jobs, or, more commonly, to be only temporary residents.  In either case, the result would 
be the same:  that Mexicans who came to the United States would not threaten U.S. 
national identity or the nation’s unity, for either they would remain under the control of 
Anglo American employers or soon leave the country (or both). 
This growing consensus rested on a variety of factors:  relatively open borders, a 
strong economy, and the immigrants’ temporary stay in the U.S.  The agreement 
increasingly muted the most strident exclusionists and silenced the few assimilationists 
and even fewer pluralists who wondered how and if the most recent Mexican immigrants 
had the requisite racial heritage or class status to integrate into the nation.  It also blinded 
most Americans to the reality that immigrant behavior was contradicting the image of 
Mexicans as temporary workers.  The economist Paul Taylor observed that Americans 
 
4Hubert H. D’Autremont to Lewis Douglas, February 5, 1932; Lewis Douglas to Hubert H. 
D’Autremont, February 10, 1932; Harry E. Hull to Lewis Douglas, March 24, 1932; Hubert H. 
D’Autremont to Lewis Douglas, March 29, 1932; Lewis Douglas Papers, AZ 290, box 181, University of 
Arizona Library.   
5Although some areas of the country were already experiencing falling crop prices and depression, 
cotton prices continued to soar throughout the 1920s.  In fact, many agriculturalists switched to cotton from 
other crops because of the higher prices. This cotton boom, however, did not benefit pickers whose wages 
fell during the same period.  See Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm 
Labor in California (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1939), 191-93; Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: 
California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) 21, 
35-41, 215.  
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had overestimated the number of temporary workers because they had failed to 
distinguish between internal and international migration.  While some Mexicans traveled 
between the U.S. and Mexico, other families migrated along regular circuits from Texas 
and New Mexico to the beetfields of Colorado, Michigan, and others parts of the 
Midwest.6 The sociologist Ernesto Galarza reported that while there had been much 
“back and forth” Mexican immigration in the first years of the twentieth century, this 
practice had changed to “a more or less permanent settlement in the United States.”7
Indeed, many Mexican immigrants had decided to stay.  They brought their 
extended families, bore children, and thereby increased the population in crowded 
Mexican colonias or barrios of the U.S.  These colonias then spread throughout the 
nation, from various cities in the Southwest into eastern Pennsylvania and the outskirts of 
Detroit, Chicago, and other towns in the Midwest.  By 1930, the U.S. Census calculated 
that at least 1,422,533 people of Mexican descent lived in the United States, double their 
population from 1920.8 Despite the immigrants’ increased numbers, Paul Taylor argued 
that most Americans presumed that Mexicans would “melt like the snow” when they 
were no longer needed.9
But as the depression intensified, many Americans became aware that the 
immigrants had not melted away as expected.  An editor of Survey magazine observed 
 
6Paul S. Taylor, An American-Mexican Frontier: Nueces County, Texas (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1934), 103-4.  
7House, Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens, 76th Cong., 
3rd sess., (1940-1941), pt. 10, 3883.  
8See “Population of the United States by Color or Race,” Bureau of the Census, Department of 
Commerce (Washington: GPO, 1931).  Official figures for people of Mexican descent are notoriously 
inaccurate.  The 1930 figure includes all people of Mexican descent except those deemed as members of 
the white race, which accounted for an additional 65,965.  The 1920 statistic (700,541) is an estimate since 
Mexicans were not recorded separately from whites until the 1930 census.  Neither decennial census 
accounts for the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants.  Mae Ngai estimates that approximately 
200,000 such immigrants arrived between 1908 and 1920 and an additional 100,000 annually throughout 
the 1920s.  See Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 131. 
9Paul S. Taylor, “Mexicans North of the Rio Grande,” Survey, May 1, 1931, 205. 
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that “what we have to reckon with are the fortunes of a permanent Mexican 
population.”10 By 1931, the Arizona state legislature felt sufficiently concerned to warn 
the U.S. Congress that “large colonies of Mexican people” inhabited their state.  
Moreover, these Americans worried that Mexican immigrants remained with “little desire 
or intention to become American citizens,” taking jobs from “citizen workers” and 
lowering their standard of living.11 Americans now believed that they had the right to 
enforce the immigrants’ temporary status and began to call for Mexicans’ repatriation or 
removal.     
The economic downturn of the early 1920s had evoked a similar response, but the 
difference was that in the 1930s there were no contracts stipulating the immigrants’ 
return date.  There was no temporary work program or fixed policy, only rhetoric 
implying Mexicans’ non-binding, temporary status.  In fact, there was no requirement at 
all for legal immigrants to leave.  They could live in the United States as long as they 
liked.  Even those who had entered the country illegally prior to the 1924 Immigration 
Act could not be deported for this reason alone, or for becoming a public charge, if they 
had lived in the U.S. continuously (and could prove it) for at least five years.12 Many 
Americans, however, did not recognize or wish to understand the difference between 
 
10Editor’s note, “Now is the Time to Take Stock” in Paul S. Taylor, “Mexicans North of the Rio 
Grande,” 135. 
11“Ban on Alien Inflow from Mexico Asked,” Tucson (AZ) Daily Citizen, January 27, 1931.  
12The 1924 Immigration Act authorized immigration officials to deport people whose only crime 
was to enter the country illegally for not coming in through an appropriate entrance station, paying the 
necessary fees, and passing medical and literacy exams.  It eliminated the statute of limitations on illegal 
entry.  This meant that if an immigrant entered illegally after 1924, they could be deported whenever 
caught, regardless of their years in residency.  Later, the 1929 Registry Act provided a method for 
immigrants to legalize their status.  If they could prove continuous residency since 1921, and paid $20, they 
could get a certificate which would make them legal, allowing them to exit and re-enter the country without 
problem and begin the naturalization process if they wished.  Between 1930 and 1940, 115,000 people took 
advantage of this law, over 80% of them were Canadian and European.  Few Mexicans used this law either 
because they did not know about the act, could not provide sufficient proof, or did not have money to pay 
the $20 fee.  See Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 82.   
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those who could and could not be forcibly removed.  While the U.S. government had no 
jurisdiction to conduct wholesale deportations against any immigrant group who had 
legal claims to be on American soil, Americans nevertheless began to argue that all 
people of Mexican descent in the U.S.—often regardless of the technicalities of their 
birth or citizenship—needed to be removed to protect American workers.  Having 
accepted the marginalizationists’ arguments that the immigrants would be in the United 
States on only a temporary basis, many Americans perceived all Mexicans through the 
lens of this status and believed that it was time for them to go.  Just as many Americans 
and Mexicans in the 1920s had concurred that the marginalizationists’ strategy of open 
borders for Mexicans made good immigration policy, they now agreed that the other 
element implicit in the strategy—the right to remove these people whose labor was no 
longer needed—should be enforced as well.   
Estimates vary, but scholarly consensus is that approximately 500,000 people of 
Mexican descent left the United States in the first half of the 1930s, representing an 
exodus of about one-third of all people of Mexican descent in the U.S.  Those who left 
included those whom the United States deported, those whom various local government 
or organizations helped to return, and those who repatriated themselves.13 The federal 
government actually did not deport very many people of any immigrant group in the 
1920s.  However, in the 1930s, Mexicans were disproportionately expelled compared to 
other immigrant groups:  8,335 Mexicans were sent away in 1931 compared to 2,276 
 
13From the General Department of Statistics in Mexico City in James Carl Gilbert, “A Field Study 
in Mexico of the Mexican Repatriation Movement” (master’s thesis, University of Southern California, 
1934), 19; Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in 
the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 121-22; Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted 
Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1974), 2. 
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Canadians and 6,162 immigrants to all of Europe.14 Another 10,000 plus immigrants 
(from all over the world) left annually as “voluntary departures,” cases in which 
immigrants agreed to leave on their own, rather than await a formal hearing that resulted 
in deportation 95 percent of the time.  The vast majority of these departures were 
Mexicans.15 The advantage of bypassing the deportation process was that immigrants 
could then apply for re-entry in the future.  If they were deported, the 1929 Deportation 
Act mandated that they could never apply for re-admission.16 Unfortunately, many who 
opted for a voluntary return later discovered that it was next to impossible to get back 
into the U.S. legally.  Immigration officials considered the visa applicants as “likely to 
become a public charge,” a legitimate category for denial, and thus rejected their appeals 
for admission.  Immigration authorities made these decisions based on the immigrants’ 
financial resources, whether they ever had received any form of relief while in the United 
States, or if they had previously left the country at any government’s expense.  As few 
immigrants attempting to cross the border had any funds, and many had taken advantage 
of railfare or relief, the immigration agents had ample reasons to deny most visa requests.  
 
14Only 16,000 to 20,000 immigrants from all areas of the world were deported each year in the 
early 1930s.  One-third to one-half of all immigrants deported in these years were Mexican.  While 
deportations were uncommon, the U.S. investigated 100,000 people each year, increasing Mexicans’ fears 
of being removed.    Deportations increased dramatically after the 1929 Deportation Act provided more 
funds for investigation and removal.  From 1908 to 1920, the U.S. deported only two to three thousand 
immigrants annually.  See Francis F. Kane, “The Challenge of the Wickersham Deportations Report,” 
Journal of Law and Criminology, 23 (Nov-Dec 1932): 589 and Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 131.  
15Kane, “The Challenge of the Wickersham Deportations Report,” 591; US Department of Labor, 
Annual Report, from the Commissioner General of Immigration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1932), 6, 73.    
16In 1932 the 1929 Deportation Act was amended to allow those who had been deported to re-
apply one year later with the Secretary of Labor’s permission.  This was done to address hardship situations 
in which family members had been separated as a consequence of deportation.  Those deported for cause, 
such as because they were deemed criminals or were anarchists, could not take advantage of this 
amendment.  The 1929 Deportation Act also defined illegal entry as a misdemeanor with jail time and/or 
fines.  A second illegal entry constituted a felony with greater jail time and fines.  See Kane, “The 
Challenge of the Wickersham Deportations Report,” 604; for details on the Deportation Act, see Mae Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects, 59-60.  
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In one month, immigration officials rejected 78 percent of Mexicans’ requests for 
entrance visas.17 
Most of the immigrants returning to Mexico did not get picked up or processed 
for deportation but instead decided to repatriate themselves.  Repatriation was ostensibly 
voluntary, in contrast to involuntary deportation.  Although most repatriates arrived at the 
decision to leave of their own volition, in the sense that they were not forcibly removed, 
all faced various pressures encouraging them to go.  The rise in anti-immigrant legislation 
in many states and municipalities prevented immigrants from working in a variety of 
fields (by limiting professional licenses to citizens) and public works jobs, making it 
difficult for them to “live where they could not work.”18 Two-thirds of the repatriates 
interviewed by sociologist James Gilbert identified job loss as their primary motivation 
for returning to Mexico.19 Increased incidents of racial discrimination, the omnipresent 
fear of being arrested and deported, threatened removal from relief rolls, and intimidation 
or violence all contributed to immigrants’ decisions to leave.  The persuasive and 
combined efforts of various Mexican consuls, American government officials, and 
various charitable and relief organizations further encouraged Mexicans to take 
advantage of potential new opportunities in Mexico.  These included colonizing 
underutilized Mexican land, constructing national highways, or guarding and excavating 
archaeological ruins such as Monte Alban in Oaxaca and the now famed Teotihuacán 
 
17Monthly statistics are from July, 1931.  See “Immigration from Mexico,” Department of State, 
September 24, 1931, Carl Hayden Papers (MSS 001, Box 654, Folder 3), Arizona Collection, Department 
of Archives and Manuscripts, University Libraries, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.  
18Harold Fields, “Where Shall the Alien Work?” Social Forces 12 (Dec. 1933): 213-221.  Quote is 
from Justice Hughes in his decision against the Arizona law, which restricted the number of non-citizens 
employed by private companies.  Quoted in Fields, 221.   
19Gilbert, “A Field Study in Mexico,” 25.  
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outside of Mexico City.20 The massive return migration, voluntary and involuntary, 
suggests that marginalizationists and their supporters had achieved some success in 
imposing a temporary status upon the former immigrants. 
Marginalizationists and Exclusionists Enforce the Temporary Worker Image  
When the panic of 1929 first hit, some Mexicans fled the United States 
immediately; many others chose to ride out the hard times.  Once Americans recognized 
that the immigrants were not leaving in the anticipated numbers, they encouraged or 
coerced Mexicans to depart.  The Colorado Fuel and Iron Company laid off its Mexican 
employees and promptly informed them that they would pay for their transit to the border 
in appreciation of their good service, as well as to remove any obligation of providing for 
them.21 Senator Carl T. Hayden, one of the chief marginalizationists, advocated stepped-
up deportation drives and increased funding to remove Mexican workers.22 Initially, the 
marginalizationists had wanted a surplus of laborers so that they could have their choice 
of workers and pay them low wages, but by the early 1930s they supported Mexican 
repatriation and deportation because they no longer needed Mexican labor.  These 
employers now preferred American “Okies” and “Arkies,” who had become willing to 
accept formerly distasteful jobs after losing their tenancies or farms in the Great Plains.23 
20Edna Ewing Kelley, “The Mexicans Go Home,” Southwest Review 17 (April 1932): 305-7.  
21Mercedes Carrera de Velasco,  Los mexicanos que devolvio la crisis, 1929-1932 (Mexico City:  
Colección del Archivo Histórico, 1974), 75. 
22Newspaper clipping, “Congressional Records Show Hayden’s Stand on Immigration and the 
Copper Tariff,” December 26, 1930, Carl Hayden Papers (MSS 001, Box 503, Folder 54).  Senator Hayden 
advocated this even after increased penalties for illegal entry and greater funding for deportation had just 
been passed in the 1929 Deportation Act.   
23Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1945), 62.  
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By January 1933, there was a sizeable labor surplus with more than two workers for 
every agricultural job in California.24 
The exclusionists, who previously had focused on restriction, now joined 
unemployed Americans and marginalizationists in calling for the deportation of Mexican 
immigrants to retain the few remaining jobs for U.S. citizens.  J.C. Brodie, an active 
exclusionist, who had long disliked Mexican immigrants and headed up the nativist 
Committee on Mexican Immigration in Superior (AZ), demanded that the federal 
government deport all Mexicans.  He mistakenly believed the state had done so in an 
earlier depression and reminded officials that “the Harding Administration…did a 
splendid thing for the Southwest and America in 1921 when they deported 150,000 
Mexican indigents.”  He called for a repetition of this policy as “a final and complete 
solution” to what he deemed the problem of Mexican immigration.25 
While immigration officials found Brodie to be a tiresome crank, they took him 
seriously enough to investigate his myriad complaints.  In one case, his perseverance 
caused Margarito Sanchez, a meter reader for Arizona Edison Company, to lose his job 
due to lack of American citizenship, despite the fact that Sanchez had lived in the United 
States for 15 years, had three U.S.-citizen children, and had formally declared his 
intention to become a citizen by filing the initial paperwork.  Brodie’s influence did not 
stop with Sanchez, as several other Mexican immigrants found their cases intensely 
 
24Mark Reisler, By the Sweat of their Brow, 228.  
25Brodie was mistaken.  The federal government did not deport 150,000 Mexicans in the early 
1920s.  While the Mexican government has statistics showing that approximately 100,000 Mexicans 
returned in the early 1920s, many of these immigrants repatriated themselves, with the aid of the Mexican 
government or charitable organizations, or at the expense of their employer if they were brought in via 
special exemptions approved by the U.S. Department of Labor.  The federal government did not obtain the 
authority to deport Mexicans solely for illegal entry until 1924.  They could only deport immigrants if they 
had become a public charge within five years of their entry, or if they were anarchists or communists.  J.C. 
Brodie to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, March 29, 1934, Records of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Record Group (RG) 85, Entry 9, file 55739/674A, National Archives, Washington, DC. 
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reviewed at the behest of the indefatigable Brodie.  Brodie’s frequent letters also brought 
immigration officials to his town to hunt for immigrants who had not entered the nation 
through the proper channels.26 
Brodie was not alone in his efforts to deport Mexicans and preserve jobs for 
Americans, particularly white Americans.  R.E. Pasters, a cohort of Brodie’s in the 
Committee on Mexican Immigration, claimed that Anglo and Mexican Americans in his 
town all agreed that it was “next to impossible for white laborers and mechanics to get 
employment,” and called for officials to deport the city’s immigrants.  He believed that 
there were at least 400,000 Mexicans throughout the country who should leave and 
demanded a massive deportation campaign.27 In Texas, W. L. Warren lobbied “to return 
these people back to Mexico where they belong,” so that they would not live off San 
Antonio’s charitable resources.28 From California, Cora West wondered “if there isn’t 
something that can be done to keep the Mexicans and Phillipinos from getting all the 
work?”29 H. Hanshaw of Port Huron (MI) implored President Roosevelt to allocate the 
necessary resources and authority to immigration agents so that they could clear her city 
of Mexicans.30 Some Americans also threatened violence to ensure that few immigrants, 
and people of Mexican descent in general, would gain employment.  In Chicago, 
Mexicans faced the hostility of Americans and of other immigrant groups who 
 
26Samuel T. Wright, Immigration Inspector to Inspector in Charge, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Tucson (AZ), April 9, 1934, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55739/674A, National Archives. 
27R.E. Pasters to U.S. Representative Lewis Douglas, March 16, 1931 and April 3, 1931, Lewis 
Douglas Papers, AZ 290, box 181, University of Arizona Library; R.E. Pasters to Rep. Albert Johnson and 
Sen. Henry R. Ashurst, February 25, 1931, Records of the House of Representatives, Record Group (RG) 
233, file HR 71A-F16.4, box 517, National Archives. 
28Letter from W. L. Warren, August 14, 1933, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55739/674A, National 
Archives.   
29Cora West to President Roosevelt, August 6, 1933, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55639/616A, National 
Archives.    
30Ms. H. Hanshaw to President Roosevelt, August 11, 1933, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55639/616A, 
National Archives.    
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congregated outside the packinghouses where they worked in order to intimidate them.31 
In Terre Haute (IN), violence erupted when American laborers attacked Mexicans 
working on the railroad, leading the immigrants to quit out of fear for their safety.32 In 
another case, an enraged crowd forced a California contractor to take refuge in a 
municipal building because he had hired immigrants.33 
Many elected officials shared the belief that Mexicans should go.  In the process, 
these politicians often disregarded the law as they clumped together all people of 
Mexican descent, regardless of citizenship or legal status.  The Mayor of Wickenburg 
(AZ), Charles Ryder, was one such man, declaring public works jobs off-limits not only 
to Mexican immigrants but also to Mexican Americans.34 Americans in many local 
communities and state legislatures around the country acted similarly to Mayor Ryder, 
passing various exclusionary and anti-alien measures.  By 1933, ten states—generally in 
the Midwest, West, and Northeast—had laws requiring citizenship for employment on 
public works contracts.  Four others gave U.S. citizens preference on such jobs.  
Wyoming required that immigrants must have filed their first papers toward citizenship 
before being eligible for this type of work.  Anti-alien laws also extended to various 
trades and professions, with three states requiring barbers to be citizens.35 Some states 
also began passing additional residency requirements of one year or more for certain 
 
31Balderrama and Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, 66. 
32Robert Frazer, Consul General, Mexico, D.F. to U. S. Secretary of State, January 28, 1931, State 
Department Records, Record Group 59, file 812.5511/107, National Archives. 
33Robert N. McLean, “The Mexicans Return,” Nation, August 24, 1932, 165.  
34Interestingly, a Spanish-language publication in Tucson slyly commented in a parenthetical that 
the mayor was a naturalized Arab.  It is likely this was done to contrast his more recent American status 
with the newspaper’s readership, many of whom were native-born Americans.  See “No Solo a los 
Mexicanos Sino a los Hispano-Americanos se les Niega Trabajo,” El Tucsonense (Tucson, AZ), June 17, 
1930 and Thomas E. Sheridan, Los Tucsonenses: The Mexican Community in Tucson, 1854-1941 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1986), 216. 
35Harold Fields, “Where Shall the Alien Work?” 213-221.  
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public works projects, making it particularly hard for people of Mexican descent, 
immigrant or otherwise, to qualify since many regularly migrated within several month 
cycles to different states and jobs.36 
Governor Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, a vigorous enforcer of the temporary 
worker image, called for the expulsion of all aliens (by whom he meant primarily 
Mexicans) from his state.  Immigration officials ignored Johnson’s wishes, declining to 
deport the Mexicans who were legally present in the country.  Johnson responded by 
announcing his own plans to round up Mexicans and hold them in an internment camp in 
Golden, just outside Denver, until the necessary arrangements could be made for their 
permanent removal to Mexico.  Although Johnson’s pet project never materialized—and 
it is possible that he never expected that it would—he hoped his announcement would 
cause Mexicans to fear being removed and depart on their own.37 
Shortly after Johnson’s proclamation, some people of Mexican descent stopped to 
request gas money from a charitable organization so that they could get to jobs they had 
held previously in Greeley (CO).  Instead of helping, the relief workers turned them over 
to the local sheriff who detained 40 of the travelers and ordered them out of the state.  
Although half the exiled workers were American citizens, Johnson denied this, declaring 
that those expelled were “mostly aliens without passports.”38 His words suggest that, in 
his mind, a person of Mexican descent never could be American. 
 
36Lawrence Leslie Waters, “Transient Mexican Agricultural Labor,” Southwestern Social Science 
Quarterly 22 (June 1941): 49-66.  
37Amy Elizabeth Davis, “Deportation and the Border Blockade: How Western Conservatism 
Impacted Immigrant Sugar Beet Workers in Colorado Between 1900 and 1940” (master’s thesis, University 
of Oregon, 2003), 2, 61-68. 
38Ibid.  Also see Sarah Deutsch, No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-
Hispanic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 
165-66. 
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Johnson was not alone in his thinking.  The New Mexican and Texan governors 
wired their support, hoping to adopt similar practices within their own states.  The 
Mexican Consul in Colorado also backed Johnson because he knew that there were no 
jobs for Mexicans in the Colorado beetfields and thought it better to help the workers 
leave the country.  Other Mexicans raised few complaints, believing that the governor 
and Americans had the right to protect their citizens first.  Unfortunately, they did not 
recognize how American many of the Mexican nationals felt that they had become in 
their long absence from Mexico.39 
The controversial governor finally overstepped his bounds when he declared 
martial law and established checkpoints on the southern border of his state to scrutinize 
entries.  Johnson alleged that he had to do so to preserve jobs for Americans.  Within 
only a few days, over 422 people had been denied entry into Colorado.  The New 
Mexican governor, Clyde Tingley, had previously supported Johnson’s actions against 
immigrants, but turned against these draconian sweeps and searches when he learned that 
many of the people detained were Mexican Americans whose families had lived in New 
Mexico long before it joined the union.  Eventually, Governor Johnson backed down.40 
Assimilationists and Pluralists Join the Consensus  
In addition to the exclusionists, who had always wanted Mexicans expelled from 
the U.S., the few remaining assimilationists joined the growing consensus that the 
immigrants ought to leave.  Primarily middle-class religious and secular reformers of 
 
39Although only between five and 13% of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. in 1910, 1920, and 
1930 had become naturalized citizens  (see Balderrama and Rodríguez, Decade of Betrayal, 20),  I argue 
that Mexicans’ extended duration in the U.S.—in that they settled and established lives there—rendered 
them American.  See Davis, “Deportation and the Border Blockade,” 61-68; “The Lesson of Mr. Johnson,” 
enclosure in El Universal (Mexico City), May 11, 1935, RG 59, file 812.5511/170, National Archives. 
40Davis, “Deportation and the Border Blockade,” 3, 68-74.   
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Anglo and Mexican descent, the assimilationists had declined in numbers and fervor 
since the First World War.  The economic downturn and incessant appeals to preserve all 
available jobs and relief for American citizens then inclined most assimilationists to join 
forces with the marginalizationists and their expanding group of allies. 
These former assimilationists justified their support for the marginalizationists 
and repatriation drives in humanitarian terms.  Rather than permitting Mexicans to starve 
in their midst, they argued that the best way to advocate on their behalf would be to 
encourage and assist them to depart for Mexico where they might find more empathy and 
opportunities.  Placida Garcia Smith, a Mexican American from Colorado and director of 
the Friendly House, an Americanization agency in Phoenix, made it part of her mission to 
repatriate Mexicans.  In July 1933 she reported having helped 130 families to the border 
since the previous spring.41 A similar organization, the Neighborhood House in St. Paul 
(MN), no longer considered Mexicans legitimate neighbors and worked in conjunction 
with the Ramsey County welfare office and the Catholic Church to repatriate 15 percent 
of St. Paul’s Mexican colonia.42 In 1931, the Pueblo (CO) Family Service Society 
explained that it had always helped Mexican immigrants and was doing so again by 
assisting 200 people to leave.43 A social worker in Detroit rationalized his efforts by 
observing that a Mexican worker and his family “ ‘would be happier in their own 
country.’ ”44 A member of the middle-class Americanization organization, the League of 
 
41Letter from Director of Friendly House, Placida Garcia Smith to Maricopa County Board of 
Supervisors, July 11, 1933, Hugh C. Gilbert Papers, 1914-1933, MS 1097, Arizona Historical Society, 
Tucson; “Placida Garcia Smith,” 80-81, Arizona Women Collection, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, University Libraries, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
42Dionicio Valdés,  Mexicans in Minnesota: The People of Minnesota (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society, 2005), 9-18.  
43Davis, “Deportation and the Border Blockade,”54-55.  
44Norman D. Humphrey, “Mexican Repatriation from Michigan: Public Assistance in Historical 
Perspective,” Social Service Review 15 (Sept 1941): 511.  
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United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), expressed anger at being associated with 
immigrants whom he regarded as “cotton picking ‘drifters,’ ” suggesting that he had 
nothing in common with such people and would do nothing to help them integrate into 
the nation.45 Even Chicago’s Hull House helped some immigrants to return to Mexico.46 
A writer for Current History magazine, Remsen Crawford, applauded this trend, noting 
how efforts to avoid “alienizing Americans” had replaced flagging campaigns to 
Americanize the immigrants.47 A few years later, the journalist Carey McWilliams 
agreed with this assessment (although not the sentiment that underlay it), noting that the 
assimilationists who had been so eager to transform Mexicans in the 1920s either 
remained silent in the early 1930s or promoted and facilitated repatriation.48 
Like the assimilationists, the pluralists had dwindled considerably in numbers and 
authority since their heyday during the statehood debates.  Mostly located in New Mexico 
and in a few pockets in Arizona, these pluralists had never considered post-World War I 
Mexican immigrants as potential Spanish Americans.  Instead, they viewed the recent 
arrivals as of a different class and racial background than themselves.  Consequently, 
they did not criticize repatriation and deportation policies.  In a few cases, they actively 
supported them.  Mr. Delao, an Arizona businessman of Mexican heritage who referred 
to himself as Spanish American, urged the U.S. government to deport Mexicans who had 
 
45Rubén R. Lozano, “LULAC Subsidiaries,” LULAC News 2 (Oct 1932), Chicano Collection. 
Department of Archives and Manuscripts. University Libraries. Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
46Adena Miller Rich, “Case Work in the Repatriation of Immigrants,” Social Service Review 10 
(Dec 1936): 601.  
47Remsen Crawford, “The Deportation of Undesirable Aliens,” Current History 30 (Sept 1929): 
1079. 
48Carey McWilliams, “The State of the Union: Getting Rid of the Mexican,” American Mercury 
(1933): 322-24.   
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not naturalized or made any effort to do so.49 Journalists for El Tucsonense, a Spanish-
language newspaper, suggested that officials exercise more discretion, but not cease, 
repatriation and deportation campaigns.  They recommended stipulating that Mexicans 
without documents be sent away first, then recent immigrants, and finally, if necessary, 
long-term Mexican residents.50 
The few times in which pluralists openly criticized repatriation were when Anglo 
Americans extended discrimination in the workforce and repatriation to all persons of 
Mexican descent, regardless of their nationality or class status.  One such situation that 
roused the pluralists to activism was Governor Johnson’s expulsion of Mexican 
Americans from Colorado.51 But mostly they, like the assimilationists, either assisted 
with repatriation, or ignored it.  
Mexican Government Officials and Journalists Support the Consensus  
Throughout the 1920s, Mexican government officials, journalists, and other 
prominent Mexicans had encouraged immigrants to remain connected to their homeland 
and to repatriate at some point in the future.  Therefore, during the early years of the 
Great Depression, when the immigrants were no longer wanted in the U.S., these same 
Mexicans felt an obligation to assist fellow citizens with their return.   
Mexicans’ interest in helping the immigrants stemmed from humanitarian and 
nationalistic impulses.  They wanted to help their compatriots as well as to use them to 
fulfill nationalist agendas of settling and improving underutilized land.  In 1931, a 
journalist for the Mexico City Excelsior urged repatriation “not only for the sake of 
 
49J.C. Brodie to Franklin Delano Roosevelt , September 30, 1933, RG 85, Entry 9, file 
55739/674A, National Archives.  
50“Los mexicanos en E.U. perderemos,” El Tucsonense, February 7, 1931. 
51Davis, “Deportation and the Border Blockade,” 61-68.  
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patriotism and national dignity but for that of humanitarianism” because of the poor 
treatment the immigrants experienced in the United States.52 Other writers for the same 
periodical complained that while it was important to “repatriate the nationals,” they 
believed that many U.S. investigators did not review the individual circumstances 
sufficiently.  Thus, they often expelled the heads of families, leaving dependents without 
a source of income.  Despite this mild criticism, the paper supported the overall objective 
of sending Mexicans back to Mexico.53 
Mexican officials generally expressed delight at the immigrants’ return and 
considered how to do even more to encourage it.  The Mexican Secretary of Exterior 
Relations promoted legislation (which never became law) that removed citizenship status 
from those Mexicans absent for ten years or more.  He promoted this draconian policy 
since he believed it would cause more Mexicans to return.54 Governor Andrés Ortíz of 
the state of Chihuahua noted approvingly that several hundred repatriated families had 
settled around Villa Ahumada, building adobe homes and farming land that had not been 
tilled since the first years of the Mexican Revolution.  He demonstrated his eagerness to 
have more such repatriates or repatriados for he believed that “they are experienced 
farmers with a knowledge of the American system of cultivating.”55 
52Translation of Excelsior (Mexico City), February 9, 1931 included in Letter from Robert Frazer, 
Consul General in Mexico to U. S. Secretary of State, February 18, 1931, RG 59, file 812.55/98, National 
Archives. 
53Translation of Excelsior, February 11, 1931 included in Letter from Robert Frazer, Consul 
General in Mexico to U. S. Secretary of State, February 18, 1931, RG 59, file 812.55/98, National 
Archives.  
54“Pierden su nacionalidad los mexicanos?” in “Notas Editoriales,” El Tucsonense, October  2, 
1930.  
55William P. Blocker, American Consul, to US Secretary of State, January 3, 1931, RG 59, file 
812.5511/102, National Archives. 
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While various colonization schemes had long been proposed to settle and secure 
the northern territory of Mexico, with varying degrees of success, the Mexican 
government expanded its investment in such ventures in the 1930s.  This time 
government officials anticipated greater success since they believed that the returning 
nationals would bring new skills and knowledge and thereby improve the land and the 
Mexican economy.  They also hoped to divert the repatriados from moving to 
communities already overburdened with unemployed workers.  To facilitate colonization, 
Mexican officials offered long-term loans, land gifts, seed, food, and tools.  In the end, 
they committed to more than they could deliver, incorrectly anticipating that the 
repatriates would have more of their own supplies to contribute.  These projects mostly 
failed.   
One of the most famous and spectacular failures was that of Pinotepa Nacional, a
tropical swampland in the state of Oaxaca.  Mexico’s National Repatriation Committee  
initially planned to have over 5,000 settlers clear the land of trees and brush, establish 
productive farms, and grow a variety of market crops including pineapples, mangoes, 
watermelon, the ajonjoli seed (used for oil), and the usual subsistence crops of corn, 
beans, and vegetables.  Instead, only 700 or so repatriates moved there during the winter 
of 1932-1933.  While the repatriados had thought that they would have more control 
over their settlement, they soon became frustrated by the dictatorial attitude of the 
organizing officials.  Yet this was the least of their difficulties.  Although the colonizers 
succeeded in clearing some land for housing and recreation, they began to get sick.  The 
region’s native peoples had warned them that no outsiders ever grew old there.  They 
were right.  Shortly thereafter, two to three people per day began to die.  The newcomers 
218
had no immunity against the various disease-infested mosquitoes, nihua bugs, which 
burrowed under fingernails, jejens or black flies, and the pinolillo microbe that made 
people itch. Eventually, the repatriados fled on their own.  One small group evacuated 
after only a month, walking eight days through dense tropical forests and high mountains 
to reach Oaxaca.  Several months later the remaining repatriates, having suffered from 
disease, hunger, and malnutrition, marched 23 days en masse towards the sea and 
Acapulco.  There they encountered the campaigning Lázaro Cárdenas, the future 
president of Mexico, who made sure that they had provisions and transit to Mexico City 
where they might find jobs.  By spring 1934, the Pinotepa Nacional project had 
collapsed.  Although other such ventures did not have this ignominious end, none of them 
lasted very long.56 
Aside from these colonization projects, to which only five percent or so of the 
repatriates went, the Mexican government tried to help other returning nationals as well.57 
The government did not have the resources to bring the immigrants home from interior 
locations in the United States, but officials did arrange to pay for transit from border 
cities to inland Mexican communities.  Consuls and other prominent Mexicans worked 
closely with local governments and charitable organizations in the U.S. to cover the cost 
of sending Mexicans to the border via train.  Ignacio L. Batiza, the Mexican consul in 
Detroit, was particularly active in arranging for repatriation.  The Mexican communities 
in Michigan were hit especially hard by the depression so Batiza saw it as his role to help 
his compatriots back to Mexico.  In this effort, he allied not only with members of 
 
56Gilbert, “A Field Study in Mexico,” 105-19.  Also see Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, 
139-141. 
57Emory Bogardus, “Mexican Repatriates,” Sociology and Social Research 17 (Nov-Dec., 1933), 
170.  
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community organizations, but also with the famous Mexican artist, Diego Rivera, who 
happened to be present in 1932, working on a mural at the Detroit Institute of Arts. 
Rivera was reportedly distressed upon observing long lines of Mexican nationals 
awaiting handouts.  He decided to use this opportunity to organize the workers for a 
socialist-style, agrarian community near Zihuatenejo in the state of Guerrero, Mexico.  
To drum up support for his colony, Rivera established an organization, the League of 
Mexican Workers and Peasants, and donated 700 pesos for agricultural tools.  Batiza and 
Rivera made speeches throughout the Mexican colonia to enhance interest in the project, 
explaining that it was not likely that the immigrants’ situation in the U.S. would improve 
any time soon.  Within two weeks, 850 workers had signed up with the league.58 
While Batiza, Rivera, and others in Michigan helped approximately 1,300 
Mexicans return, many immigrants remained unconvinced that their lot would improve 
back in Mexico and opted instead to ride out the depression in the U.S.  Batiza’s and 
Rivera’s activism, however, reinforced the temporary worker image in the minds of many 
Americans as they saw that even Mexican officials and prominent Mexicans believed that 
the immigrants belonged in Mexico.  Later, both Batiza and Rivera would reverse their 
views, after they discovered that the Mexican government was not providing sufficient 
support or opportunities for the repatriates.59 But by then, many more Mexicans had 
already left. 
Despite the late defection of Batiza and Rivera, most Mexicans continued to 
support the temporary worker image.  In 1932, the Mexican state decided that it would no 
 
58Statement by Ignacio L. Batiza, Mexican Consul in Detroit to the Mexican colonia, October 13, 
1932, RG 85, Entry 9, file 55784/585, National Archives; Mercedes Carrera de Velasco, Los mexicanos 
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longer collect statistics for emigrants since they did not regard any citizen as having left 
the country permanently.60 Mexican officials provided more than just rhetoric as they 
tried to help the repatriados by lifting the onerous franquicia tax that had been imposed 
on their goods when they returned to Mexico.  This had forced them to sell their property 
for less than its value in the U.S., or to spend their last resources to cover the prohibitive 
fees.  This policy reversal helped the immigrants to preserve their funds and assets and 
gave them a better chance of establishing themselves in their former homes.  Some used 
the cars they drove and the tools they carried with them to offer taxi services, or to work 
as mechanics.  More than one brought their barbershop chairs so that they could re-
institute the businesses they had lost due to shrinking Mexican colonias in the U.S. or 
other consequences of the depression.61 The Mexican government also assisted the 
repatriates by passing restrictive immigration laws, preventing all foreigners from 
entering Mexico except tourists with large amounts of cash.  This decision ensured that 
all available jobs would be preserved for Mexican nationals.62 
While the Mexican state and most of its constituents supported repatriation, some 
Mexicans expressed frustration with their compatriots’ “habit of emigrating.”  They 
wondered why they had left in the first place, since people in the U.S. mistreated them 
and they had “been thrown out time and time again.”  One journalist so objected to this 
 
60Report by Edward Anderson, American consul, Mexico, D.F., “Analysis of Mexican Migration 
Statistics: 1932-1936,” November 11, 1938, RG 59, file 812.55/297, National Archives. 
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emigration that he called for measures to restrict Mexicans from leaving.63 Others 
complained about the repatriados who had returned, called them gringos (a derogatory 
term for Americans), and discriminated against them.64 But sociologist James Gilbert 
found that over 80% of the repatriates he had interviewed believed that they had not been 
abused, and that most of their fellow Mexicans treated them as citizens who had fallen 
upon hard times.65 
U.S. Government Officials and Journalists Support the Consensus 
 As in Mexico, prominent Americans and government officials continued to 
support the idea that Mexican workers did not belong in the U.S. and developed various 
proposals to make the immigrants temporary.  The impetus for this came from the top. 
President Herbert Hoover declaring Mexican immigrants to be a primary cause of 
unemployment since they allegedly took jobs from Americans.66 Hoover’s Secretary of 
Labor, William N. Doak, immediately acted upon the president’s words and took it upon 
himself to ensure that Mexicans would be removed from the United States.  In February 
1931 he issued an order to all 35 immigration district offices, calling upon them to work 
with local charitable agencies to rid the country of as many aliens as they could.  To do 
so, he relied upon a provision of the 1917 Immigration Act that permitted the federal 
government to pay for the removal of those immigrants who had been in the U.S. for less 
than three years, faced serious economic problems after entering, and wanted to return.  
He anticipated that many would apply for this generous offer of transit, but was 
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disappointed to learn that only 159 Mexicans left under this provision along with several 
hundred immigrants from other countries.67 
Consequently, Secretary Doak worked with various local officials in Los Angeles 
to encourage Mexican immigrants to return to their native country.  Charles P. Visel, 
head of the Los Angeles Citizens’ Committee on Coordination of Unemployment Relief, 
eagerly complied with this new agenda, masterminding a plan to create an atmosphere of 
anxiety that would induce immigrants to flee in advance of deportation or other reprisals.  
Those involved in this campaign believed that such policies would result in more jobs for 
Americans and/or reduced relief expenditures.  Although Doak was criticized for his 
aggressive tactics in ordering immigration officials to conduct raids (many of which 
turned up few deportable immigrants), he succeeded in his objective to persuade or force 
many immigrants, legal or otherwise, to leave.68 
While accelerating the repatriation of Mexican immigrants from Los Angeles, the 
U.S. Department of Labor also investigated various complaints against Mexican 
immigrants in other communities.  Frequently, the bureaucrats determined that many of 
the immigrants they encountered were in the United States legally and could not be 
deported.  W.W. Simon, a welfare worker for Associated Charities in Superior (AZ), 
explained that most of the Mexicans on relief had lived in her town “for years and years.”  
Visiting immigration officials confirmed the accuracy of her statements and noted that 
none of the people on her list could be deported.   Still, there were some immigrants who 
did not have the proper documentation.  These Mexicans either hid until the officials had 
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left for the next community or decided to repatriate themselves before being deported.69 
In this way the federal government assisted the out-migration of Mexican immigrants and 
continued to enforce the immigrants’ temporary status by helping to remove those 
immigrants who had remained longer than most Americans had wanted them to stay.  
The federal government also sanctioned and facilitated repatriation initiatives 
already underway.  When John Zurbrick, the U.S. District Director of Immigration in 
Detroit, learned that the Mexican trains had not arrived at the border as scheduled and 
that the repatriates had been forced to wait in enclosed trains “without light or heat” for 
many hours, he solicited funds from the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration, 
Harry E. Hull, to improve the quality of the trips.  Zurbrick believed that if these 
campaigns went smoothly, the news would encourage other Mexicans to leave, freeing up 
more jobs or relief funds for American citizens.70 Approving Zurbrick’s request, 
Commissioner Hull expressed his pleasure “that so many citizens of Mexico and their 
children, who were entirely or partly destitute, have been started to their home country.”71 
Other federal employees agreed.  U.S. Congressman Douglas noted that Mexicans in 
Arizona would be more comfortable in Mexico as it was, “their own country and they 
will be happier there as well as more healthful.”72 John S. Littell, the American Vice 
Consul in Mexico City, found other reasons to commend repatriation, observing that the 
returned residents would help boost Mexico’s economy since it had lost “most able-
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bodied and enterprising citizens” in the preceding three decades.73 There was little sense 
among U.S. government officials—even those stationed in Mexico—that repatriation had 
or would pose a problem for many families or for Mexico itself.   
Many American journalists and writers began echoing the words of government 
officials on Mexicans’ preference for residing in their homeland, and about the temporary 
nature of Mexican migration.  They titled their articles, “Back to the Homeland,” 
“Guitars Strum as 400 Mexicans Start Home,” “Jobless Latins to be Sent to Homes,” and 
“Send Them Home.”74 Edna Ewing Kelley, the author of another similarly headlined 
story, “The Mexican Goes Home,” reveals how much she had absorbed of the 
marginalizationists’ rhetoric when she wrote, “it was not difficult to entice them back, for 
they had only been sojourning in this country.” She further depicted Mexicans’ departure 
as a merry occasion, reminiscent of a “fiesta,” and observed how even a friendly dog 
trotted “happily” at the side of a retreating caravan.  Oddly, she matter-of-factly 
mentioned how “one man died and six babies were born while the party was en route,” as 
if this was merely to be expected in a long journey.75 Clearly, Kelley never seriously 
considered that any of these immigrants had belonged in the nation on a permanent basis 
or that they might have established deep roots in the United States and regretted leaving.  
Contesting the Temporary Worker Image  
Some Mexican immigrants did agree to return to Mexico as most Americans and 
Mexicans had thought and hoped that they would.  They went back either because they 
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hoped for better circumstances across the border in their native land or because they were 
frustrated due to the lack of opportunities in the U.S., increased anti-alien laws, 
discrimination, and incessant pressure to leave.  One man in his 70s indicated that as he 
had been gone for five years, it was time go home.  Others longed for and were intrigued 
with the various possibilities promoted by the Mexican consuls for their own plot of land 
and a new start, and signed up for colonization projects.76 
But many more immigrants demonstrated that they preferred to remain in the 
United States, as they now considered it their home.  Paul Taylor discovered in his field 
research among Mexican immigrants that “bonds to the mother country have become 
tenuous.”77 While U.S. welfare officials and Mexican consuls initially expected that the 
immigrants would sign up in droves for free transit back to Mexico, they were surprised 
when few did.  Instead, the bureaucrats had to rely upon relentless persuasion, coupled 
with the coercive power of anti-alien laws and threats to remove individuals from relief 
rolls, to get immigrants to agree to depart.  In Detroit, relief workers used special 
techniques to encourage Mexicans to leave and referred any person of Mexican descent 
who applied for welfare to their “Mexican Bureau.”  This bureau was designed to 
convince the applicants to return to Mexico, rather than accept welfare.  When some 
immigrants expressed reluctance in going, they discovered that they had to receive their 
monthly food allotment in a public cafeteria, rather than eat in privacy as other recipients 
did.  Still, many Mexicans accepted this indignity over the alternative of repatriation.78 
76Newspaper article, “Guitars Strum as 400 Mexicans Start Home,” RG 85, Entry 9, file 
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Other people of Mexican descent patiently explained to frustrated bureau workers, 
year after year, why they had no interest in migrating back to Mexico.  One such Mexican 
national repeatedly informed welfare workers that he had lived in the U.S. for over 12 
years, that he had American-born children, and that he had no relatives in Mexico.  In one 
of the most egregious cases, 15-year old Mary Lou enlightened her persistent interviewer 
that she did not wish to move to Mexico because she was an American citizen and had 
never been there.  Moreover, she had little interest in ever going for she had heard only 
negatives stories from repatriates.79 
Some Mexican immigrants tried to remain in the U.S. but found themselves 
caught in the complicated web of U.S. immigration laws, which made little or no 
allowance for family relationships or the length of time the immigrants had lived in the 
United States.  One such case involved a Mexican immigrant who settled in Cudahy 
(MN) with her father in 1924, and bore a child there a few years later.  In 1930, she 
briefly returned to Mexico to visit her sick grandmother but left her two-year old baby in 
Minnesota.  A few months later, when she tried to return, her entry was denied because of 
the perception that she would become a public charge.  Yet denial for this reason made 
little sense given that her father owned two houses, retained a stable position at 
Burlington company (a job that he had held for ten years), and earned $90 per month, 
sufficient to support his daughter and her child.80 
Celia Vasquez had the misfortune of growing up in a household so large that 
when her family emigrated to the United States her parents could not afford to pay the 
entrance fee for everyone.  Thus Celia, her sister Belen, and brother Alfredo entered 
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illegally through Nogales (AZ).  Years later, Celia married an American citizen.  Having 
been reported as delinquent by her estranged brother Alfredo who faced a deportation 
charge of his own, Celia had to report for a similar hearing the day after her wedding.  
Her new husband moved quickly and successfully to have her take advantage of the 
bureau’s voluntary departure policies, which allowed her to leave on her own and then 
immediately apply for re-admission.  On October 17, 1932, Celia left the U.S; she applied 
for re-entry the following day.  Although she succeeded in obtaining an immigration visa, 
her entrance was denied that December.  The records do not show why Celia was rejected 
or if she was ever re-admitted.  What is clear is that her life and home had been in the 
United States.  Her parents, most of her sisters and brothers, and her husband with whom 
she had been together for many years prior to marriage, all lived in Arizona.  She was in 
Mexico alone.81 
Celia’s case was not unusual.  An anonymous man, born in the Yucatán peninsula 
of Mexico, emigrated in 1915 as a young teen after both his parents died.  Other than a 
few visits to Mexico, this man remained permanently in New Orleans (LA) for about 
fifteen years where he married and then raised two children.  Despite his ties to the 
United States, this unfortunate man was deported when immigration officials found that 
he did not have the appropriate paperwork to satisfy the authorities.  Distressed with his 
exile, he plaintively wrote to President Hoover, hoping for restitution.  He justified his 
case by explaining that he had thought he was an U.S. citizen when he lived in New 
Orleans, and begged for the opportunity to become officially American, adding, “I feel as 
I were one.”  With his family in New Orleans, he declared that there was nothing for him 
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in Mexico.  He then stated simply, “I like to get back home.”  But it was too late.  The 
extant laws would not permit his return.  The man then became what he had alleged at the 
beginning of his letter: “I am a man without a country.”82 
Tiburcio Vasquez, a 38 year old legal Mexican immigrant and musician who had 
resided in the United States for most of his life also faced increased scrutiny during the 
hyper-charged, anti-immigrant years of the Great Depression.  When the Arizona crank, 
J.C. Brodie, demanded that immigration officials investigate the status of the musician 
Vasquez, the bureaucrats complied.  They found nothing amiss and noted, moreover, that 
Vasquez had recently submitted his first papers for American citizenship.  But Vasquez 
had a problem.  In 1930, his wife and children returned to Mexico after eleven years in 
the U.S.  Soon after, they decided to come back and reunite with Vasquez in Louisiana.  
During their absence, Vasquez stayed off relief and held a variety of jobs, including 
roadwork, copper smelting, working in a gold mine, teaching music, and playing music at 
various dance halls in Phoenix.  In 1933, Vasquez filed for citizenship so that he could 
begin the process of bringing his wife and children back to the United States.  Vasquez 
was permitted to stay, but it is unclear whether his wife and children were ever allowed to 
join him.  Vasquez was a legal immigrant with a long history in the U.S., and his wife 
and children had previously lived there for eleven years.  Yet they all came under 
suspicion and had their family unification imperiled because the marginalizationists had 
persuaded many Americans that Mexican immigrants should be in the U.S. only 
temporarily.83 
82Information in a letter reprinted from a Mexican immigrant (with name removed) to President 
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Unlike these cases in which Mexicans tried to remain or get back to the U.S., 
other Mexicans agreed to return to Mexico, but only because they had no choice.  Mrs. 
Antonio Frías, awaiting to take a train south to the border, pointed to her crying children 
and noted how they would miss their schools and friends.  Another woman, Mrs. José 
Perez, stated that she and her husband did not want to leave because “we loved it here.”  
But as her husband, José, could not find work in the U.S., they were going to seek it 
elsewhere.84 Others boarded the southbound train but either had a different agenda—that 
of getting to a new part of the United States where jobs or family might be more 
plentiful—or changed their minds en route since 12 people asked to disembark in San 
Antonio.  Informed that the railroad officials would not permit them to leave, these 
passengers had to continue on to the Mexican side of the border.  Clearly this trip had 
become less than voluntary for them.  Recognizing their limited options, a few intrepid 
souls jumped through the train windows at Laredo, attempting to hide in the railyard and 
remain in the U.S.  The following morning the authorities found the wayward repatriates 
and put them back on the train to Mexico.85 
As some Mexicans in the U.S. began to hear of other repatriates’ travails, and the 
failures of colonization, they became even less inclined to follow their compatriots south.  
Repatriates told interviewers that while they had been pleased to see old friends and 
family, they yearned to return to the United States as soon as possible.  A 44-year old 
barber who had lived in the United States for 24 years complained that he and his wife 
did not wish to be in Mexico and were extremely unhappy.  Sociologist James Gilbert 
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discovered that many of the younger repatriates desperately wanted to return to the U.S., 
persistently asking him about job opportunities and assistance in getting there.  Many of 
the repatriates eventually found employment in Mexico, working as taxi drivers or as 
agricultural workers, but they were often not satisfied with their new circumstances.86 
Children and young adults, born in or mostly raised in the United States, had a 
particularly difficult time with adjustment since Mexico had never been home to them.  
They complained of the lack of things to do, the absence of economic opportunities and 
consumer goods, cultural differences, and in general missed their schools and friends in 
the U.S.  One repatriate expressed deep frustration with his situation, explaining that 
“even if I can’t get work there right away.  I’d rather be there.  There is nothing here.  I’m 
just wasting my time.”  An eleven-year old repatriate disliked the new environment in 
arid Mexico with its stark landscape and lack of daily comforts such as hot water and a 
soft bed.  She had trouble in school as well, having to repeat several years because she 
did not understand Spanish well enough to move forward with her studies.  Gilbert 
concluded that 70 percent of the children or young adults he interviewed had become 
“cultural misfits,” people who did not belong in Mexico.87 
The few extant statistics available on repatriates’ attitudes all indicate that many 
yearned to be in the United States and likely considered it their home.  The scholar 
Osgood Hardy reported that all of the repatriates he interviewed wished to go back to the 
U.S.  James Gilbert found that of the 101 he interviewed, 73 wanted to settle permanently 
in the U.S., while the remaining 28 were either unsure or planned to revisit at least 
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temporarily.88 The Mexican anthropologist Manuel Gamio found Mexican repatriates 
divided about whether they wanted to stay permanently in Mexico.89 Regardless of the 
exact numbers, it seems that just a few years after the major repatriation movements, at 
least half of repatriates indicated that they had not really wanted to leave the U.S. and 
intended to return as soon as they could.  At one border entrance, immigration officials 
estimated that 90% of the people detained for illegal entry were former repatriates.90 
Some succeeded in re-crossing the border within a short period of time.  In 1933, H. M. 
Brown complained that “dozens of those who were sent to Mexico by the Red Cross have 
returned” to Arizona.91 William A. Carlson, a member of the county commission of 
Greeley (CO), notified immigration officials that some of the Mexicans who had 
previously been repatriated with county funds were already returning, “unsolicited, 
uninvited and unwanted” and called for their deportation.92 
The many unhappy repatriates had little recourse to change their situation. 
Marginalizationists had allied with powerful U.S. legislators, various officials in the U.S. 
and Mexican governments, Mexican and American journalists, and ordinary Americans 
to promote their strategy of convincing everyone that Mexicans were temporary 
immigrants.  Mexican immigrants, constrained by their circumstances in the 1920s, had 
initially contributed to this developing notion as well, but by the early 1930s, many of 
them had changed their minds and decided that the U.S. had become home.  Yet even the 
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Mexican consuls, journalists, government officials, and American assimilationists—who 
might have been presumed to be sympathetic to the immigrants’ plight—had succumbed 
to the marginalizationists’ rhetoric and believed that Mexicans would be better off in 
Mexico.  While there was some criticism of how deportation was conducted, particularly 
for the most egregious removals such as with Governor Johnson’s actions in Colorado or 
the warrantless round-ups and raids in Los Angeles and other cities, few complained 
about the notion that Mexicans belonged in Mexico and should return there in hard 
times.93 The temporary worker image initially had offered something for everyone, 
including many immigrants.  By the 1930s, however, it had become a convenient 
rationale for denying tens of thousands of immigrants the right to claim America as their 
home.  
Redefining Migratory Workers as Good Americans  
One reason Mexicans had been encouraged to leave the U.S. in the 1930s was 
because employers had found a replacement source of labor ready to accept unsavory 
tasks and migratory jobs at low wages.  In the 1920s, migratory jobs held no prestige.  
Americans then linked the characteristics of the job with the people who performed them 
and viewed both the jobs and the people who filled them as lower class and not 
American.  Yet, during the Great Depression, some Americans found themselves needing 
the formerly undesirable employment.  Thus they worked to redefine the jobs as dignified 
and worthy of being held by an American, rather than by a Mexican temporary worker.  
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In 1940, the scholar George Gleason reported that at the beginning of the previous 
decade, “80% of the migrant workers were Mexicans and Filipinos” in California.  He 
estimated that by 1935, “the complexion of the agricultural migrants has literally 
changed, so that 80-90% are now native white Americans.”  He explained that as the 
California newcomers were now people “whose culture is similar to our own,” he felt that 
the poor conditions of the migratory worker “must be promptly faced and wisely 
solved.”94 Agreeing with Gleason, U.S. legislators differentiated between Mexican 
workers who had performed much of the migratory work in the 1920s and the new 
migrants.  They wrote that the former Mexican laborers had been repatriated and that 
now “those who leave home…are predominantly normal, worth-while American people.”  
In case there was any dispute about which Americans they referred to, the congressional 
authors explained that the new migratory workers included the “descendants of the oldest 
white families in the Southeastern and Eastern States.”95 Consequently, American 
scholars and officials attempted to redefine the previously maligned migratory jobs as 
well within the American tradition. 
In the 1930s, various writers of federal and state government publications began 
to laud the character of transients and migratory laborers.  David Cushman Coyle argued 
in the Works Progress Administration’s Depression Pioneers that those who migrated 
internally were among the very best Americans because of their individualism, drive, and 
courage. “They are Americans in the old tradition, doing their best to fend for 
themselves.”  Coyle believed that the new transient was someone who had only recently 
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fallen upon hard times, “superior to the run of the population,” and more highly educated.  
One such case was that of Jim Slade who had lost his job after holding a position for five 
years in the Youngstown steel mills.  Upon hearing of opportunities in Flint (MI), Slade 
moved there and landed a job.  Shortly afterwards, he was laid off and needed relief.  
According to Coyle, “Jim Slade can hardly be considered an undesirable citizen because 
he had the gumption to find himself a job in a distant city and then got left flat.”96 Yet 
before the depths of the depression, few Americans would have applied the same logic to 
a betabelero or beetpicker of Mexican descent who had migrated from Mexico or other 
parts of the U.S. to the Michigan beetfields.   
The Texas Transient Bureau reclaimed iconic American heroes to boost the status 
of migratory workers.  The bureau’s Alamo publication highlighted the connections 
between Daniel Boone’s intrepid spirit, migration, and the new transient workers.  The 
most obvious of such connections was that of a sketch entitled “Transients,” in which the 
artist depicted Abraham Lincoln, Daniel Webster, and Sam Houston alongside “today’s 
transient” who appeared to be a well-dressed white man.97 A more curious juxtaposition 
in the same publication was that of an association of migratory people with American 
heroes like Davy Crockett who fought at the Alamo.  The authors argued that, “these 
heroes of the Alamo were transients.”98 Anglo Americans previously had not looked 
upon migration as something noble and patriotic, and instead had disparaged such 
movement as uncivilized and intrinsic to Mexicans’ character.  Yet, Davy Crockett of the 
famed coonskin cap had himself been an emigrant from the United States to the then 
Mexican state of Texas.  The irony of this was lost on the authors.  
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The trend of lauding the migratory worker would continue throughout the 1930s.  
John Steinbeck, in his acclaimed novel, The Grapes of Wrath (1936), sympathetically 
portrayed an “Okie” family, uprooted through no fault of their own, and forced to try 
their luck in California.  Three years later, the success of this book launched a popular 
movie of the same name.  Depression-era murals also valorized the strength and courage 
of white, working people.99 
As long as the depression endured, it would be difficult for people of Mexican 
descent to fit within or be recognized in the nation as any kind of American.  The 
marginalizationists had provided a space for Mexicans only at the bottom of society, as 
either subordinate Americans or temporary guests, doing work that no Americans wanted 
to do.  The depression wiped out even that lowly status as these jobs were then to be 
reserved for Americans.  With Mexicans safely out of sight, American politicians, 
government officials, and writers began to adjust and boost the image of migrant jobs and 
the people who performed them.   
But some forward-looking journalists and scholars wondered anew what would 
happen when the economy improved and once again there was “work no white man will 
do” at the proffered wages.100 They were right to wonder.  For during the Second World 
War, that time would arrive, and result in the welcoming of Mexican immigrants once 
again as temporary workers.  
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Between 1900 and 1935, the country experienced frequent clashes over what it 
meant to be an American.  Americans argued passionately about how to maintain a 
cohesive and unified nation as the United States acquired new colonies, as the nation 
expanded its fixed boundaries to grant territories statehood, and as immigrants entered 
the country in increasing numbers.  Those most active in the debates, generally people in 
positions of economic and political power, seemed to believe that unity should be 
grounded in some kind of homogeneity, although they differed as to whether this 
homogeneity should be defined solely in terms of shared political beliefs and traditions or 
if it should also be based on having a specific racial background, class standing, or 
language and culture.  Embedded in the debates over statehood and immigration was the 
question of who could be an American—and who could not.  During the first third of the 
twentieth century, exclusionists, assimilationists, pluralists, and marginalizationists 
presented their competing visions or strategies on whether to admit certain people into 
the nation, and how to maintain a unified nation and American identity in the face of 
growing diversity.     
By the end of the era, the exclusionists had failed to prevent Mexicans from 
becoming members of the nation via statehood or through migration across the border.  
The assimilationists also failed in their efforts to persuade Americans that Mexican  
immigrants were capable of melting into an Anglo American mold.  The pluralists, while 
initially successful with their arguments that long-settled people of Mexican descent 
ought to be accepted as Spanish Americans, failed to gain a similar acceptance for 
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Mexican immigrants entering the U.S. after the First World War.  It was the 
marginalizationists who prevailed, winning popular support for their strategy of admitting 
people of Mexican descent as long as they made no attempt to rise above a subordinate 
status or did not claim any rights to being American.  They succeeded by convincing 
most Americans that Mexicans should be relegated to the margins of the nation as peon-
like workers under the control of their Anglo American employers (as during the 
statehood era) or as temporary workers who would eventually return to Mexico.  In this 
way, the marginalized Mexican workers would not threaten American homogeneity.  
Americans could continue to promote themselves as descended from Europeans, as 
having a middle-class standing and aspirations, and as a people who spoke English, 
permanently resided in the United States, and only accepted migratory jobs during 
unusual economic times.  The lowest-class jobs could be reserved for those already living 
in the nation as second-class citizens, including Asian, African, and Mexican Americans, 
or for those who would be in the nation only temporarily.    
The marginalizationists’ creation of the temporary worker image initially offered 
something for everyone.  It helped keep U.S. gates open to Mexican immigrants, 
provided Mexico with a respite from its unemployment crisis, and supplied labor for 
American employers and lower prices for all consumers.  It appeared to provide 
interested groups on both sides of the border with the assurance that Mexican immigrants 
would not remain long enough to abandon their allegiance to Mexico or to subvert the 
extant conception of American identity.  But this “perfect” compromise came at a high 
price for the immigrants.  For this strategy that had proved so successful in keeping the 
U.S. open to Mexican immigration in the 1920s, would be used in the 1930s to send 
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500,000 allegedly temporary workers back to Mexico.  It would be recalled and 
reconfigured again with the creation of a formal temporary worker or bracero program in 
the 1940s.  Throughout this history, a discouraging feature of the strategy endured.  Its 
depiction of Mexicans as individuals who only belonged in the U.S. as marginal 
Americans or temporary workers meant that Mexicans were always vulnerable to being 
sent away when they were no longer needed or welcomed.   
The tragedy in this story is that by the 1930s the majority of Mexican immigrants 
in the U.S. had not wanted to move back to Mexico.  In many ways, they had become 
Americans:  not through the legal process of becoming a formal citizen, or even through 
social acceptance by Anglo or Mexican Americans, but through the mere fact of having 
lived within the bounds of the United States for an extended period of time.  For many in 
their ranks, the United States was and had been their physical home for many years.  It 
was the place where they had secured jobs, made friends, established families, raised 
their children, and settled into communities.  In the 1920s, some of the immigrants 
nostalgically longed to return to Mexico, and perhaps did so to visit remaining friends 
and family.  Yet in moments of crisis, and particularly by the 1930s, many realized that 
the United States had somehow become home.  By then, the image of Mexicans as 
temporary workers had proved so engrained that no one intended to give them a voice in 
determining whether or not they would be allowed to remain in the U.S. 
The swinging door opened and shut in accordance with the vagaries of the 
American economy and the marginalizationists’ demands.  By the mid-1930s, the 
marginalization strategy had become the dominant way in which Americans viewed 
Mexican immigrants.  A broad array of voices and institutions on both sides of the border 
240
had participated in its creation and promotion, and contributed to its ongoing success.  
The Mexican government seemed to be little better in this regard than the U.S.  Because 
this consensus was so powerful, it was hard to break the stereotype of the temporary 
worker and allow the complexity of the Mexican immigrant situation, and immigrant 
voices, to emerge.  Future creators of immigration policy must resist this stereotype in 
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